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I develop Anscombe‘s distinction between mistakes in judgment and mistakes in performance into a 
novel account of intentional action and the metaphysics of mind.  
Anscombe‘s distinction is usually understood in terms of the ―direction of fit‖ possessed by 
different kinds of mental states. In Chapter 1 I argue that direction of fit is a hopeless idea. 
Direction of fit is guided by intuitions of symmetry, but those intuitions are misguided: there are 
ineliminable asymmetries between the mind‘s theoretical and practical activity. I further argue that 
Anscombe‘s distinction is best understood not in terms of direction of fit, but in terms of mental 
activity that is partially constituted by norms. 
In Chapter 2 I develop a theory of fallible capacities: capacities that sometimes issue in mistakes. 
Fallible capacities are essentially normative because norms are built into their logical structure. I 
argue for the essential normativity of the mind on the basis of the claim that the fallible capacity to 
know is essential to minds like ours. The primary dialectical opponent to the argument is a reductive 
naturalist, who accepts the appearance that we have a fallible capacity to know, but offers a reductive 
account of what it is to possess that capacity. I argue that such reductive accounts fail; the options 
are to reject the appearances outright, or to accept that the mind is essentially normative.  
Chapter 3 solves a problem about action individuation. A basic action is one that is not 
performed by means of some other action. Basic action theorists say that all intentional actions 
decompose into basic actions; Michael Thompson says that none do. I argue that neither view is 
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right, because action individuation is up to individual agents themselves. I further argue that this 
independently plausible conception of intentional action is, in one key respect, best accommodated 
by the theory of fallible capacities outlined in Chapter 2, because that theory can explain why 
mistakes in performance fall into the logical category of particulars; something that traditional basic 
action theory and Thompson‘s view cannot easily explain. 
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PREFACE 
I have been uncommonly fortunate to study philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, and I owe 
many debts of gratitude. 
 First, thanks are due to the members of my committee. I came to Pittsburgh in 2004 as a 
Visiting Scholar under the generous auspices of Bob Brandom. I had no clear ambition to make a 
career of the study of philosophy at the time. It is through conversations with Bob, and attention to 
his work, and the few months I spent in the department, that I changed my mind, and I am very 
happy that I did so. When I started as a graduate student, I also had little idea what philosophy of 
action was, or why it might be important. In this respect, I owe Michael Thompson a great 
intellectual debt, as will be obvious from the text of the final chapter in this dissertation. When I was 
at a low ebb, and wondering whether to pack it all in, it was some pointed challenges from Peter 
Machamer that spurred me to complete the account of fallible capacities, in the face of what seemed 
at the time to be insuperable difficulties. Each in different ways deserves a ―without whom not‖.  
Special thanks must go to my advisor Kieran Setiya. Kieran, through conversation, criticism 
and example, has taught me more than almost anyone else about how to do philosophy, and there 
really would be no dissertation were it not for his unfailing encouragement and support. I have, as 
best I can, tried to live up to the high standards he has taught me. I will take those standards with 
me when I move on, and I am not sure how to repay that debt, which is enormous, except by paying 
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it forward. (Should I have students of my own to advise some day, I have no doubt I will be saying 
to myself, sotto voce, ―What would Kieran say?‖) 
I would also like to thank the members of the philosophy faculty at Pitt more generally. You 
just can‘t get an education like this anywhere else in the world. (And they pay you for it!) In particular 
I would like to thank James Shaw, for teaching me a great deal about how to teach, and John 
McDowell, for his advice, help and philosophical example. 
The graduate student community at Pitt is uniquely lovable. For conversation and 
camaraderie I would particularly like to thank Daniel Addison, Ben Breuer, Rachael Driver, Tim 
Greenfield, Dorcinda Knauth, Kathryn Lindeman, David Matthews, Brandi Neale, Sasha Newton, 
Stephen Makin, Evgenia Mylonaki, Jesse O‘Brien, James Pearson, Ben Schultz, Greg Strom, and 
Tim Willenken. Tyke Nunez deserves special thanks for long, illuminating conversations about 
almost any aspect of philosophy. I hope I haven‘t left anybody out: if I have then I am a forgetful 
wretch, but not an ungrateful one. 
Michael Cuccaro and Stacy Hoffman have been wonderful friends over the years. I am 
extremely lucky to have met them, and they have made me feel right at home in the ‗burgh. 
Thanks are also due to Paul Redding, my advisor in Sydney back in the day, who let me skip 
out of a Masters thesis with never a word of reproach and only words of encouragement. 
My family‘s love and encouragement has been a blessing. I look forward to the day when we 
are not separated by an ocean and can see each other more often. (A year between visits is too long!) 
I am not sure how to find the right words to thank Hille Paakkunainen. With her, I am living 
well: nothing has been plainer in my life. And she‘s a damn good philosopher too. Much of what is 
right and intelligible in what follows would be wrong and garbled were it not for her keen insight, 
loving support, and uncanny good judgment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What are mistakes? We are quite familiar with the experience of error: of making mistakes and being 
mistaken. Other higher animals seem to share in this liability to err. But God (presumably) doesn‘t 
make mistakes, and things without minds, like atoms, rocks, and pistons, don‘t make mistakes either. 
Mistakes seem to be coordinated with – perhaps even an essential feature of – minds like ours. 
My dissertation consists in three loosely connected investigations of mistakes and their place 
in our mental lives. The investigations are united by a common theme: namely, that fallibility enters 
into the constitution of our powers of thought at a metaphysically fundamental level.  
 
Chapter 1: On the Very Idea of Direction of Fit 
My starting point is Anscombe‘s distinction between mistakes in judgment and mistakes in 
performance, as this distinction is applied to our powers of theoretical and practical thought. 
Anscombe‘s distinction is usually understood in terms of the ―direction of fit‖ possessed by 
different kinds of mental states. According to direction of fit theory, some mental states (beliefs) 
have a thetic direction of fit, in that they ―aim at truth‖ or ―ought to fit‖ the world, whilst other 
mental states (desires, or intentions) have a telic direction of fit, in that they ―aim at realization‖ or 
the world ―ought to fit‖ them.  
In Chapter 1 I argue that the very idea of direction of fit is a hopeless one. The two 
directions of fit are supposed to be determinations of one and the same determinable two-place 
relation, differing only in the ordering of favored terms. But there is no determinable of which the 
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two directions of fit are symmetrically related determinations, because there are ineliminable 
asymmetries between the way that beliefs ―aim at truth‖ and the way that desires (or intentions) 
―aim at realization‖. The vast array of views in philosophy of mind and moral psychology that rest 
on a conception of direction of fit all rest on a mistake.  
I further argue that Anscombe‘s distinction is best understood not in terms of direction of 
fit, but in terms of standards of correctness. Beliefs are partially constituted by a standard of correctness 
of truth (or knowledge) against which a mistake in judgment may be measured. Beliefs do not share this 
generic property with another kind of mental state, such as desire or intention, but rather with a kind 
of event: what I call telic events. Telic events are partially constituted by the standard of correctness of 
success (or practical knowledge), against which a mistake in performance may be measured. This shift in 
emphasis, from comparative analyses of kinds of mental state to comparative analyses of 
normatively-constituted states and events, accounts for the asymmetries that direction of fit theory 
cannot, and promises to deliver an argument for the essential normativity of the mind. 
 
Chapter 2: Why the Mind Is Essentially Normative 
In Chapter 2 I go on to develop an account of the nature of the mind that accommodates mistakes 
at a metaphysically fundamental level, and explains what mistakes are. Most contemporary theories 
of capacities (abilities, dispositions etc.) hold that any capacity to A has only perfect exercises, where 
a perfect exercise is a way for A to be wholly manifested in some state or episode. Taking inspiration 
from Aristotle‘s conception of rational capacities, I offer a theory of fallible capacities. Fallible 
capacities have perfect and imperfect exercises. An imperfect exercise of the fallible capacity to A is 
not a way for A to be wholly manifested in some state or episode, but is instead a mistake: a way of 
precluding perfect exercise on that occasion in that regard. For example, a mistake in judgment (e.g. 
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believing that not-p) precludes knowing that p on some occasion. The theory is quite general and 
provides a powerful and versatile explanatory tool.  
Drawing on the theory, I argue for the essential normativity of the mind on the basis of the 
claim that the fallible capacity to know is essential to minds like ours. It certainly seems as if we can 
know, and that we can merely believe, and that these cognitive powers have some common source, 
and that the common source is oriented towards knowledge as cognitive success. Call these the 
appearances. The appearances would be well explained by positing the fallible capacity to know as 
essential to minds like ours. But fallible capacities are essentially normative, because they are 
inherently ―positively valenced‖ towards one of a pair of mutually opposed exercises (for example: 
knowing, rather than merely believing). If the fallible capacity to know is essential to minds like ours, 
the mind is essentially normative. 
The primary dialectical opponent to my argument is a reductive naturalist, who accepts the 
appearances, but offers a reductive, non-normative account of what it is to possess the fallible 
capacity to know, made out solely in terms of non-fallible capacities (or their functional-dispositional 
equivalents). I argue that any such reduction must fail to capture the appearances, and can only give 
us an alienated conception of the powers of thought of the thinking subject. The options are to 
reject the appearances, or accept that the mind is essentially normative. 
 
Chapter 3: The Antinomy of Basic Action 
Chapter 3 begins as an extended meditation on the mereological structure of intentional action. 
Traditional action theorists must choose whether to believe in basic actions or not, where basic actions 
are things that agents simply do intentionally, without the mediation of doing anything else 
intentionally as means to that end. The orthodox position is to accept basic actions. In Life and 
Action, Michael Thompson gives a powerful argument against the very idea of basic action, based on 
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little more than common sense considerations about the continuity of time: any purportedly basic 
action has temporal parts, and the parts are rationalized by the whole as compositional means, so the 
parts are (more basic) intentional actions in their own right. The disagreement between the orthodox 
view and Thompson‘s represents a kind of antinomy, where both poles of the antinomy have their 
own absurdity.  
I argue against each pole of the antinomy, disputing the claims of necessity. It is neither the 
case that there must be basic actions in every expression of the will, nor is it the case that there must 
not be, but usually there are basic actions when the will expresses itself. This is because for the most 
part, and within certain limits, it is up to individual agents themselves to carve up the instrumental 
joints of what they have in mind to do, by conceiving of what they do in terms of potential 
successes or failures. 
 The connection of Chapter 3 to the earlier chapters only emerges in the second half of the 
chapter, once the importance of the individual agent‘s practical conception of the case has been 
brought into view. Intentional actions are discrete events in history: they fall into the logical category 
of particulars. The same seems to be true of mistakes in performance, because they are cases of doing 
something that rules out (precludes) doing what one has in mind to do. If we conceive of intentional 
actions as exercises of the fallible capacity to do what one has in mind to do, we can account for the 
fact that mistakes in performance fall into the logical category of particulars; something that 
traditional basic action theory and Thompson‘s view cannot easily explain. 
 
Overview  
Taken together, the three investigations lay the groundwork for what I take to be a coherent, 
explanatorily powerful and genuinely novel conception of the mind and its essential powers of 
thought. The investigations also expose some of the more tempting errors in theorizing about the 
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nature of the mind and intentional action. But most importantly, the three investigations offered 
here articulate a conception of the mind that helps to make sense of ourselves not as complicated 
machines, nor yet as little Gods imprisoned in the Cartesian Theater, but as the more or less 
bumbling, thoughtful monkeys that we are. 
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1.0  ON THE VERY IDEA OF DIRECTION OF FIT 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Many philosophers draw a distinction between practical and theoretical thought. Drawing the 
distinction precisely is difficult, but the rough idea is easy to grasp. Theoretical thought aims at 
reflecting the world as it is (was; will be; could be; etc.). Practical thought aims at getting things 
done, which may change how the world is (from how it is at the moment).  
 How can we draw the distinction between practical and theoretical thought more precisely? 
Some philosophers have looked to Anscombe for inspiration: 
Now let us consider a man going around town with a shopping list in his hand. Now it is clear that 
the relation of this list to the things he actually buys is one and the same whether his wife gave him 
the list or it is his own list; and that there is a different relation when a list is made by a detective 
following him about. If he made the list himself, it was an expression of intention; if his wife gave it 
him, it has the role of an order. What then is the identical relation to what happens, in the order and 
the intention, which is not shared by the record? It is precisely this: if the list and the things that the 
man actually buys do not agree, and this and this alone constitutes a mistake, then the mistake is not in 
the list but in the man‘s performance (if his wife were to say: ‗Look, it says butter and you have 
bought margarine‘, he would hardly reply: ‗What a mistake! We must put that right‘ and alter the word 
on the list to ‗margarine‘); whereas if the detective‘s record and what the man actually buys do not 
agree, then the mistake is in the record.1 
 
                                                 
1 Anscombe (1957: 56) 
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Anscombe‘s story of the shopper and the detective has provoked several theories about the direction 
of fit (DOF) an intentional mental state might have with regard to its object. According to DOF 
theory, there are two and only two directions of fit (DOFs). The first, which we shall call the thetic 
DOF, flows inwards from the world to the mind, so that some states of mind (beliefs) ―aim at the 
truth‖ about the world, or ―ought to fit‖ how things are with the world. The second, which we shall 
call the telic DOF, flows outward from the mind to the world, so that some states of mind (pro-
attitudes, or desires, or maybe intentions) ―aim at realization‖ or are such that the world ―ought to 
fit‖ them.2 These slogans present an image of symmetry at work in the thetic and telic DOFs: 
whatever the thetic relation of mind to world is, the telic relation is somehow the ―flipside‖ version 
of the same. The slogans differ primarily in the ordering of terms, suggesting that a developed 
theory of DOF could distinguish practical from theoretical thought not just by means of slogans 
(images, metaphors, stories, etc.) but by means of a deep, general and precise logical contrast – the 
mark of respectability in philosophy.  
DOF was introduced to contemporary philosophy of mind as a normative notion, but there 
are both normative and descriptive theories of DOF.3 Normative theories use normative terms like 
‗responsibility‘ and ‗ought (to fit)‘ in the statement of what DOF consists in, whilst descriptive 
theories use terms that refer to causal relations or dispositions. Different theories of DOF have been 
employed in support of a number of influential and controversial views in philosophy of mind and 
moral psychology. The language of different and opposed directions suggests that the two DOFs 
                                                 
2 Humberstone (1992) came up with the terms ‗thetic‘ and ‗telic‘. I use these terms rather than those of Searle (1983) 
because Searle‘s ‗mind-to-world‘ and ‗world-to-mind‘ terminology is potentially confusing. Searle‘s terminology fits 
normative theories of DOF reasonably well, where the term ‗mind-to-world‘ is, for instance, shorthand for ‗the mind 
ought to fit the world‘ (the thetic DOF). But Searle‘s terms have everything backwards when applied to descriptive 
theories of DOF, where ‗mind-to-world‘ is most naturally thought of as a direction of causation, and so would be a term 
for the telic rather than the thetic DOF. 
3 Searle (1979; 1983) is responsible for introducing the term ‗DOF‘ to contemporary philosophy of mind. Austin (1953) 
used the term earlier than Searle, but Austin‘s distinction and purposes were somewhat different to those of most DOF 
theorists, so I do not deal with him in this chapter. 
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exclude each other somehow, so that we could use them to do some psychological taxonomy. 
Psychological taxonomy is not as boring as it sounds. On the basis of a theory of DOF the claim is 
sometimes made that no mental state could have both DOFs, or be both thetic and telic, and this 
has consequences for live philosophical debates about whether beliefs could independently motivate 
one to act (or whether a more Humean theory of motivation is true), whether virtue could be a form 
of knowledge, and exactly what it takes for a nearby event to count as one‘s own full-blooded 
intentional action.4 
Apart from its use in support of substantive (and influential) contemporary philosophical 
views, and apart from its more modest use as a constraint on exercises in psychological taxonomy,5 a 
true theory of DOF promises to explain the unity and difference of theoretical and practical reason 
and knowledge. We can think of reasoning as a formally structured movement in thought (i.e. from 
one set of thoughts to another, where the former require, or at least count in favor of, the latter), 
and of knowledge as non-accidental agreement of thought with its object. (Nothing hangs on these 
characterizations: I pick them up only in order to make a broad point about the stakes). If our 
thoughts are divided in kind by two fundamental, closely-related constitutive standards, functions or 
aims, such as aiming at truth and aiming at realization, then one could argue that this division is the 
basis of corresponding differences in kinds of reasoning and knowledge. For example, one could 
argue that the difference between theoretical and practical reasoning consists in whether the 
reasoning concludes in a thetic or telic thought, or one could argue that theoretical knowledge is non-
accidental agreement of a thetic thought with its object, whilst practical knowledge is non-accidental 
                                                 
4 For the relevance of DOF theory to the Humean theory of motivation see Smith (1994); for the relevance of DOF 
theory to the question of whether virtue could be a form of knowledge see Little (1997); for an argument for the claim 
that full-blooded intentional actions depend on the presence of attitudes with both DOFs see Velleman (2000). For a 
small list of other applications of the concept of DOF, see Searle (1979, 1983); Blackburn (1988); Schueler (1991); 
Aulisio (1995); Lenman (1996); Kriegel (2003). There are many more examples. 
5 For this more modest use of direction of fit as a (potential) constraint on psychological taxonomy, see e.g. Jacobson-
Horowitz (2006), Setiya (2007).  
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agreement of a telic thought with its object.6 According to such a strategy, to explain why there are 
two (and only two) DOFs would be to explain why there are two (and only two) fundamental kinds 
of reasoning and/or knowledge. Alternatively, indulging what Anscombe calls our ―incorrigibly 
contemplative‖ attitude to reasoning and knowledge, a true theory of DOF, coupled with an 
independent account of necessary conditions on reasoning and knowledge, could explain why there 
just isn‘t anything for distinctively practical reasoning or distinctively practical knowledge to be, by 
explaining why telic thoughts cannot enter into reasoning or cognition in the way required.7 
Given the widespread use of the concept of DOF, not to mention the promise of clarity 
about the unity and difference of practical and theoretical thought, reason and knowledge, it‘s 
important to work out which theory of DOF (if any) is correct. In this chapter I argue that no 
theory of DOF is correct. There is no clearly unified genus or determinable of which the two 
proposed DOFs are species or determinations. Whatever they are, the two proposed DOFs do not 
deserve treatment under a common heading. So philosophical views that rest on a theory of DOF all 
rest on a mistake; at very least, they require reformulation. 
 My argument does not merely make a methodological point about the use of an ill-conceived 
technical term. The failure of DOF theory represents a deeper failure to appreciate the real point of 
Anscombe‘s story. Despite what DOF theorists will tell you, Anscombe herself was not a DOF 
theorist. Her story of the shopper and the detective was not primarily a way of comparing two 
fundamental kinds of mental state (i.e. the thetic and telic kinds) in terms of some essential property 
that they share (i.e. possession of a DOF, of the thetic or telic determination). It was rather a way of 
comparing a kind of mental state to a kind of event. Anscombe‘s basic insight is that just as there is a 
                                                 
6 This characterization does not preclude the idea that practical reasoning is reasoning that concludes in an action: see 
Rödl‘s talk of thought that is a movement in Rödl (2007). 
7 Another way of exploiting DOF to illuminate the unity and difference of practical and theoretical would be to explain 
how practical knowledge is a species of theoretical knowledge, because telic thoughts are a species of thetic thoughts. 
Arguably this is the view of Velleman (2000), for whom telic thoughts are a species of belief, differentiated by a special 
self-referential content and causal role, but justified in the same way that other thetic thoughts are justified. 
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kind of mental state (belief) that is partially constituted by a standard of correctness, against which a 
mistake in judgment may be measured, so too is there a kind of event – what I call a telic event – that 
is partially constituted by a standard of correctness, against which a mistake in performance may be 
measured. If Anscombe is right, then an understanding of telic events is prior to an understanding 
of telic attitudes. The failure of DOF theory represents a failure to appreciate the merit or possibility 
of this way of drawing the distinction between practical and theoretical thought, which promises a 
generality of account that DOF theory cannot match. It is the task of this dissertation to defend 
Anscombe‘s basic insight, and to develop it into a novel account of the nature of the mind and the 
nature of intentional action. 
Before we turn to Anscombe and her basic insight, we had better make sure that the very 
idea of DOF is a hopeless one: this is the task of §§1.2–1.4. In §1.2 I summarize the extant attempts 
to say what DOF consists in, offer some preliminary criticisms, and give reasons to dismiss 
descriptive theories of DOF. In §1.3 I describe an internal tension between the logical structure and 
theoretical goals of an adequate normative theory of DOF. In §§1.4.1-1.4.3 I outline three problems 
that rely on the internal tension. Together the problems indicate that we should treat whatever 
interesting differences there are between belief and desire (or intention) directly, without supposing 
that the most important of these differences are somehow symmetrically reflected determinations of 
some common determinable (i.e. possession of a DOF). In §1.4.4 I diagnose what goes wrong with 
DOF theory. The opposition between mind and world that guides DOF theory is a bogus one, and 
in trying to maintain the opposition, DOF theory misapprehends the nature of the telic. 
Having found reason to think that the very idea of DOF is a hopeless one, we may return to 
Anscombe‘s basic insight. In §1.5 I argue that Anscombe‘s view is not a DOF theory and explain 
her distinction between mistakes in judgment and mistakes in performance. In §1.6 I outline several 
puzzles that face an account of practical and theoretical thought based on Anscombe‘s basic insight. 
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The puzzles motivate a program of inquiry in the metaphysics of mind and philosophy of action that 
is pursued in subsequent chapters. 
 
1.2 THEORIES OF DOF 
DOF theorists, whether normative or descriptive, think that some deep symmetry structures the 
normative or causal relations characteristic of practical and theoretical thought; hence the imagery of 
two DOFs, pointing in opposite directions. In this section I summarize the extant attempts to cash 
out this image of symmetry in philosophically respectable terms. 
1.2.1 Normative “No Theory” Theories (Searle and Platts) 
Searle (1983) has done the most to popularize DOF in contemporary philosophy of mind. Claiming 
inspiration from Anscombe‘s story, he offers the following theory of DOF: 
…the idea of direction of fit is that of responsibility for fitting… If my beliefs turn out to be wrong it 
is my beliefs and not the world which is at fault, as is shown by the fact that I can correct the situation 
simply by changing my beliefs. It is the responsibility of the belief, so to speak, to match the world … 
But if I fail to carry out my intentions or if my desires are unfulfilled I cannot in that way correct the 
situation by simply changing the intention or desire. In these cases it is, so to speak, the fault of the 
world if it fails to match the intention or the desire …8 
 
Searle says that ‗DOF‘ is an irreducible, unanalyzed, primitive term.9 I call his theory a ―no theory‖ 
theory because although he makes several suggestive remarks that cleave close to the slogans with 
which we began, he never tries to explain in any detail what it is for a belief or the world to bear 
                                                 
8 Searle (1983: 7-8). The suggestion that the idea of DOF is Anscombe‘s is found in Searle (1979: 3-4). 
9 Searle (1983: 173). The lack of explanation in Searle‘s account is a bit surprising. Searle‘s (enormous) project in 
philosophy of mind and philosophy of language is partly founded on his theory of DOF. One expects at least a little 
more explanation of what this foundational primitive amounts to, even if it cannot be analyzed in other terms. 
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―responsibility for fitting‖; what particular kind of norm is at issue; what difficulty or qualification 
the words ‗so to speak‘ mark; why and to what extent symmetry is present in the very idea of DOF; 
etc.  
Platts (1997) offers a slightly more detailed theory that is very similar to Searle‘s: 
Miss Anscombe, in her work on intention, has drawn a broad distinction between two kinds of mental 
states, factual belief being the prime exemplar of one kind and desire a prime exemplar of the other… 
The distinction is in terms of the direction of fit of mental states with the world. Beliefs aim at the true, 
and their being true is their fitting the world; falsity is a decisive failing in belief, and false beliefs 
should be discarded; beliefs should be changed to fit the world, and not vice versa. Desires aim at 
realisation, and their realisation is the world fitting them; the fact that the indicative content of a 
desire is not realised in the world is not yet a failing in the desire; the world, crudely, should be 
changed to fit our desires, not vice versa.10 
 
Platts also cleaves close to the slogans with which we began, and once again we have a ―no theory‖ 
theory. Platts offers more claims than Searle, made out in terms of decisive failings, what should be 
changed, what should or need not be discarded, and so on. But he never tries to explain how the 
claims are related to each other; what kind of norms are at issue; whether ―aiming at truth‖ and 
―aiming at realization‖ are the same kind of ―aiming‖; etc. (Unlike Searle, Platts has doubts about the 
value of the distinction he finds in Anscombe, and no doubt this explains the lack of detailed 
explanation in the account.)11 
Although they both claim Anscombe as progenitor, the distinction Platts and Searle make is 
not the one Anscombe made. Anscombe‘s talk of records is plausibly read as a way of talking about 
beliefs. But where Anscombe wrote of intentions and orders, Platts and Searle substitute or add in 
desires. Furthermore, although Anscombe is clear enough about mistakes (―decisive failings‖), she has 
nothing to say about whether the world should be changed to fit one‘s desires or intentions, and 
nothing to say about the world being ―at fault‖ when it fails to match one‘s desires or intentions. We 
will return to the question of how to properly understand Anscombe in §1.5. For now we may note 
                                                 
10 Platts (1997: 256-7) 
11 Platts worries that ―all desires involve elements of belief‖ and so are not purely telic. See Platts (1997: 257). 
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that Platts and Searle depart appreciably from what Anscombe wrote, and that it is not obvious that 
they have Anscombe right, or even close to right. The point is worth raising now because every 
DOF theorist follows this misreading of Anscombe.  
 Platts‘s account brings out a problem for normative theories that Searle‘s account obscures. 
Platts works hard to preserve symmetry of account, swapping ―[relevant state of mind]‖ for ―the 
world‖ as required, but he balks at the final hurdle. Beliefs should be changed to fit the world, but it 
is only in a ―crude‖ sense that the world should be changed to fit our desires. Although the nature of 
the crudity is mysterious, the fact of it is not surprising. There is certainly no moral sense in which 
the world should be changed to fit someone‘s desire to murder out of mere curiosity (not even prima 
facie, if it is indeed murder that they have in mind). If the sense of ‗should‘ at issue is that of a reason 
for action, whereby agents should do the things for which they have reasons, Platts‘s view may 
involve the unreasonably strong assumption that all desires, merely by their possession, give their 
possessors decisive reason to act so as to fulfill the relevant desire. Even a committed subjectivist 
would want to qualify this claim.12 This seems like a general problem. Whilst one leaves the nature of 
the relevant norms in relative obscurity, nothing seems to hinder a thoroughly general symmetry of 
account. But for any precise statement of the norms involved, it seems that qualification is required 
on the telic side, where no corresponding qualification seems in order for the sense in which beliefs 
―ought to fit‖ the world. I will outline a generalized version of this problem in §1.4.2 below. 
1.2.2 The Higher-Order Mental State Theory of DOF (Humberstone) 
Humberstone (1992) thinks that a ―no theory‖ theory of DOF is no theory at all. He cites with 
approval Anscombe‘s talk of mistakes, but expresses dissatisfaction that the ―source of normativity‖ 
                                                 
12 See e.g. Sobel (2009) for a brief discussion of subjectivists‘ attitudes to desires and reasons for action. 
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remains mysterious in her work, and suggests that an account of DOF grounded in occurrent 
episodes or states of the thinking subject‘s psychology will help dispel the mystery. Humberstone 
says the two DOFs are two different higher-order intentions that individuals adopt towards lower-
order attitudes. These higher-order intentions are supposed to be partially constitutive of those 
lower-order attitudes‘ being the kinds of attitudes they are. According to the theory, it is constitutive 
of belief (the paradigmatic thetic attitude) that one intends that one does not believe what‘s false. It 
is also constitutive of a broad range of pro-attitudes (encompassing desire, intention, and a whole lot 
more besides as paradigmatic telic attitudes) that one intends that the objects of those lower-order 
pro-attitudes obtain.13  
Humberstone produces some notation to exhibit the logical structure of these two 
fundamental, constitutive, higher-order intentions: 
 [Thetic DOF]:  Intend ( ¬Bp /  ¬p ) 
[Telic DOF]:  Intend ( p  /  Wp ) 14 
 
The formulations are conditional in form: one intends to not believe that p, given that not p ( ¬Bp / 
¬p ), and one intends that p obtain, given that one wants, or desires, or intends that p, or has some 
other lower-order pro-attitude towards p obtaining ( p / Wp ). 
We can be alienated from some of our desires. When we are alienated from a desire, it would 
be false to say that we intend that the desire‘s object obtains, so Humberstone‘s stated account of 
the telic DOF is false, and this casts doubt on his account of DOF in terms of higher-order telic 
attitudes. Humberstone acknowledges this problem, but his solution is odd: he says that he has used 
the wrong word, because intentions are obviously too committed for cases of alienation from lower-
                                                 
13 Humberstone is rather blasé about what counts as telic: he says that ―intentions, desires or whatever‖ are telic attitudes, 
and later that all kinds of pro-attitudes are telic attitudes. See Humberstone (1992: 75, 81). 
14 Humberstone (1992: 75). 
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order attitudes.15 He doesn‘t tell us what the right word is, so let us call these mysterious higher-
order telic attitudes that (magically?) sidestep alienation ‗humberstentions‘. It is very unclear what 
humberstentions are supposed to be. They are not intentions. They are not desires or evaluative 
attitudes: Humberstone himself argues against the definition of the thetic DOF as Desire (¬Bp /  ¬p) 
or Value (¬Bp /  ¬p).16 Presumably they are not affective attitudes like Feel-Warm-And-Fuzzy (¬Bp /  
¬p). We are left with the vague idea that they are telic attitudes that set a normative standard, but the 
attitude is not a kind of telic attitude with which we are familiar (and for which we already have a 
word), and the standard is not a committed standard that would cause trouble for the possibility of 
alienation. Positing a largely empty theoretical term in order to fix a theory is an occupational hazard 
for the philosopher; we could be forgiven for thinking that ‗humberstention‘ is a term of this kind. 
The worst problem with Humberstone‘s account is that even if we could make sense of the 
mysterious humberstention, the account would still be circular. Appealing to higher-order telic 
attitudes, Humberstone attempts to ground the thetic DOF on a prior understanding of the telic 
DOF, but this depends on a prior understanding of telic attitudes, and it is not clear that the grab-
bag of telic attitudes that Humberstone provides, or the mysterious humberstention itself, represents 
an improvement over the ―no-theory‖ theory.17 To avoid circularity, Humberstone could drop the 
individualistic aspect of his theory, so that instead of ‗Intend‘ he just writes ‗Standard‘, without 
presupposing that the constitutive normative standards must be grounded in the content of some 
occurrent episode or state of the subject‘s psychology. This would not explain the source of 
normativity in the only individualistic way that Humberstone seems to think possible, but then his 
                                                 
15 Humberstone (1992: 81). 
16 Humberstone (1992: 66-68). 
17 Humberstone, honest philosopher that he is, acknowledges this problem with circularity. He does have a defense 
against one understanding of what is wrong with such circular explanations. See Humberstone (1992:67 n13). 
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own theory doesn‘t do that, so it looks to be a reasonable trade. We will consider, and find reason to 
reject, such a normative account in §1.4. 
1.2.3 Causal-Dispositional Theories of DOF (Smith and Velleman) 
Smith (1994) provides the most widely cited and criticized theory of DOF:  
… the difference between beliefs and desires in terms of direction of fit can be seen to amount to a 
difference in the functional roles of belief and desire. Very roughly, and simplifying somewhat, it 
amounts, inter alia, to a difference in the counterfactual dependence of a belief that p and a desire that 
p on a perception with the content that not p: a belief that p tends to go out of existence in the 
presence of a perception with the content that not p, whereas a desire that p tends to endure, 
disposing the subject in that state to bring it about that p. Thus, we might say, attributions of beliefs 
and desires require that different kinds of counterfactuals are true of the subject to whom they are 
attributed.18 
 
According to Smith, the thetic and telic DOFs are not normative relations, but rather tendencies or 
dispositions possessed by belief and desire respectively. He rules out the possibility that a mental 
state could have both DOFs, as nothing could have both dispositions at once. 
There are counterexamples to Smith‘s theory.19 On the telic side, my desire that the car is red 
now tends to desist in the face of a perception with the content that it is not the case that the car is 
red now, where Smith‘s theory says it should tend to persist.20 (I see that I cannot have what I want.) 
Of course, I might quickly adopt the desire that the car is red very soon, but that is a different desire, 
just like the belief that it will be red very soon is a different belief. On the thetic side, my belief in 
your innocence, sustained by a long history of trust, is thoroughly robust in the face of appearances 
                                                 
18 Smith (1994: 115). 
19 Apart from raising similar counterexamples, Sobel and Copp (2001) also object that Smith‘s account is circular in an 
objectionable way. According to them, the perception that not p must function as a response to evidence if it is to play 
the role it is supposed to in Smith‘s theory of DOF. But as a response to evidence, it is something that itself has the 
thetic DOF, so no non-circular account of the underlying phenomenon has been offered.  
20 Setiya (2007: 49) makes essentially the same point. 
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to the contrary: my first and abiding impulse is to go looking for reasons to doubt the appearances 
rather than reasons to doubt you.21  
Apart from such counterexamples, Smith‘s theory has a notably lopsided logical structure. 
DOF theory is guided by intuitions of deep symmetry. The disposition to A in C and the disposition 
to not-A in C exclude each other and so presumably satisfy the requirement of symmetry of account 
by exhausting the options in some interesting logical space. But there are three elements to relate in 
Smith‘s theory, not just two. These elements are: (a) the disposition to desist in the face of a 
perception that not-p, (b) the disposition to persist in the face of a perception that not-p, and (c) the 
power to dispose the subject to act (so as to bring it about that p). Whereas Smith‘s thetic DOF is 
simple, consisting of (a) alone, his telic DOF is complex, consisting of a conjunction of (b) and (c). 
Even allowing that (a) and (b) are incompatible, and so by implication that the thetic and telic DOFs 
that Smith describes are incompatible, Smith hasn‘t told us why there couldn‘t be a third DOF that 
combines (a) and (c).22 Mental states that possess this third DOF might be bizarre – they are called 
‗besires‘ in the literature – but we should not think that just because Smith‘s two favored DOFs 
exclude each other that he has shown that besires are therefore impossible.23 Indeed, the fact that it 
doesn‘t seem to matter to Smith whether a DOF is simple or complex raises the worry that for all he 
has told us about the genus DOF, one could invent an infinite number of further species of DOF, 
by coming up with more or less arbitrary additions to (a), (b) and (c) to cover one‘s favorite 
dispositional aspects of thought.  
                                                 
21 We may speak of appearances here as Smith notes in correspondence with Humberstone that he does not mean 
factive perception by the word ‗perception‘, where what one perceives must be true, but rather how things appear to 
one. See Humberstone (1992: 64 n10). 
22 If his thought is that nothing that was disposed to desist (etc.) could hang around long enough to dispose the subject to 
act, his thought is straightforwardly mistaken. When one has reason to doubt the appearances, a belief may hang around 
whilst being in the presence of a ‗perception‘ to the contrary, so there is no reason why it couldn‘t hang around long 
enough to exert some power over the subject and her behavior. 
23 Zangwill (2008: 52 n1) makes essentially the same point. 
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Smith himself implies that something like this last suggestion is the right one. In the 
footnotes Smith recommends giving up on DOF talk altogether in favor of ―speaking directly about 
patterns of dispositions,‖ because talk of DOF is often too ―slack‖ to do whatever work is 
required.24 He goes on to say that when he uses the term ‗DOF‘ we should understand him as 
referring to ―whole packages of dispositions constitutive of desiring and believing‖ rather than his 
stated theory of DOF. So there is a relatively clear and self-attributed sense in which Smith is not 
after all a DOF theorist, and has no particular interest in cashing out an image of symmetry in terms 
of DOF. His theory of DOF, however widely cited and criticized, is really a theory about bundles of 
dispositions, and there are an infinite number of possible such bundles, pointing in an infinite 
number of directions, not just two pointing in opposite directions.25 
 Are there any other descriptive theories of DOF apart from Smith‘s? Velleman (2000: 105) 
seems to present an alternative. Velleman distinguishes two modes in which a propositional attitude 
might regard its propositional object – regarding-as-true and regarding-as-to-be-made-true – and 
says that those are the two DOFs. He also says that these modes of regard do not involve any 
commitment or disposition towards truth or action: beliefs, hypotheses, musings, fantasies etc. all 
regard their object ―as true‖ (even if not as really true); desires, hopes, wishes, fantasies etc. all regard 
their object ―as-to-be-made-true‖ (even if not as to be really made true).26 This looks like an 
alternative descriptive theory of DOF, but it isn‘t. Velleman notes that his use of the term ‗DOF‘ is 
                                                 
24 Smith (1994: 209-210 n8) 
25 Of course Smith‘s interest is not in any old bundles, but in bundles of dispositions that are constitutive of the mental 
states relevant to the motivation of action. But for all Smith has shown, there are an infinite number of those, not just 
two. Certainly the claim that there are only two that are relevant to the motivation of action requires more argument 
than Smith has given.  
26 Fantasies appear in both lists because Velleman isn‘t very clear about where they fall. He introduces fantasies as 
cognitive attitudes that regard their propositional object ―as-true‖ but within a few pages he talks of ―fantasy wish-lists‖ 
that regard their propositional object ―as-to-be-made-true‖. See Velleman (2000: 110, 120). If one has fantasies that one 
enacts, or considers enacting, perhaps they have both modes of regard in turn, or at once. 
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―somewhat different‖ from that found in the DOF literature.27 This is an understatement. Modes of 
regard do not involve anything ―fitting‖ anything else in any sense of fitting (normative or 
otherwise). To this extent, Velleman is talking past the concerns of DOF theorists when he uses the 
term ‗mode of regard‘ synonymously with the term ‗DOF‘. We should ignore his stated theory as an 
unfortunate terminological confusion, however interesting modes of regard might be in their own 
right.28 
 As it happens, Velleman does have a secret theory of DOF of a more traditional form, 
whereby two paradigmatic kinds of mental state contrast in how they ―fit‖ their objects, although he 
doesn‘t acknowledge it as such. Velleman thinks that belief and choice contrast in their ―direction of 
guidance‖: beliefs are caused by what they represent, whilst choices cause what they represent.29 
―Direction of guidance‖ is Velleman‘s (cheeky? dimly cognizant?) term for his secret descriptive 
theory of DOF. 
 Velleman‘s secret theory seems too crude as stated. We may grant that when all goes well 
choices cause intentional actions that they also represent. But some mere beliefs also reliably cause 
what they represent: consider the belief that I am a failure, or the belief that this relationship isn‘t 
working. Presumably Velleman doesn‘t think these beliefs are telic attitudes. On the thetic side, the 
claim that beliefs are caused by what they represent only seems plausible when restricted to certain 
kinds of belief. It seems plausible enough to say that when all goes well, the object of a perceptual 
belief causes the belief and determines its content. But even when all goes well, beliefs about the 
future are not caused by what they represent: not unless effects precede their causes (a claim that 
                                                 
27 Velleman (2000: 105 n14). 
28 Velleman doesn‘t need the term ‗DOF‘ to do any work for him, unless he wants to make the objectionable suggestion 
that all the other DOF theorists unconsciously wanted to write about his distinction between modes of regard, but 
somehow didn‘t manage to do so. Velleman seems to make this objectionable suggestion in Velleman (2000: 250 n12). 
29 Velleman (2000: 25) 
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requires some defense). And it seems quite adventurous to say that e.g. when all goes well, beliefs 
about abstract objects are caused by abstract objects.  
Velleman has a less adventurous gloss on what he means when he says that belief is caused 
by what it represents; he means that beliefs are regulated by ―truth-tracking‖ mental mechanisms 
that aim to ensure that the believer believes what‘s true.30 In some cases, such as perception, these 
mechanisms relate thought directly to its object, but in other cases, such as beliefs about the future, 
something else happens (something that isn‘t precognition). Given the gloss, there is no clear 
commonality and reflected symmetry that unites the two DOFs of the secret theory. One DOF 
relates thought to a broad range of regulatory ―truth-tracking‖ mechanisms; the other relates 
thought to its object. The DOFs point in merely different directions to merely different things, not 
in opposite directions to the same (kinds of) things.31 It may be for this reason that Velleman, who is 
perhaps conscious of the similarity between talk of DOF and his own talk of directions of guidance, 
does not acknowledge what we have called his secret theory of DOF as his own. For if one isn‘t 
trying to cash out an image of symmetry in terms of some deep and general logical contrast, one 
isn‘t really in the business of offering a theory of DOF, and the constraints on one‘s account will be 
quite different. 
                                                 
30 Velleman (2000: 253). 
31 Could Velleman restore symmetry of account by saying that choices also relate thought to regulatory mechanisms, and 
not (more or less directly) to the object of thought? No. If Velleman takes this option, he has no reason to deny that the 
mechanisms that incline us to intentional action are just part of ―truth-tracking‖ mechanisms more generally. A 
mechanism that produces an object of thought seems like just one more way to track the truth for certain actionable 
contents, the way that perceptual mechanisms are just one more way to track the truth for certain perceptual contents. 
So there is no special reflected symmetry to be found here, but only mere difference. 
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1.2.4 Preliminary Conclusions 
There is something wonderfully farcical about the preceding literature survey. Apart from Searle, 
who doesn‘t really have a theory, Humberstone is the only unabashed DOF theorist in the world, 
and his account is circular. Platts, Smith and Velleman (implicitly at least) acknowledge in the 
footnotes that they have their doubts and would like to change the subject. The consensus seems to 
be that on close examination, the very idea of DOF is slightly embarrassing.32  
 I think it would be a mistake to dismiss the very idea of DOF on the basis of this consensus 
of embarrassment. The image of symmetry is still with us, and it is a powerful one. There aren‘t 
many philosophers who have proposed a third kind of thought (or reasoning, or knowledge) to lay 
alongside the practical and theoretical kinds with equal dignity. The image of symmetry hints at an 
explanation of why this is. There are only two ways to order terms in a two-place relation between 
mind and world: either mind comes first and world second or vice versa. If there is such a schematic 
relation that delimits the bounds of thought in an interesting way (i.e. DOF as such), that would 
explain why practical and theoretical thought are the only two fundamental kinds in this particular 
logical space. We ought to at least try to see if we can do justice to this intuition (supposing we have 
it) before giving up and deciding that we are chasing shadows. So in what follows, I will broaden the 
focus and investigate whether it is possible for there to be an adequate theory of DOF, regardless of 
the relative merits of the extant theories. 
 That said, I propose that we dismiss descriptive theories from further consideration. Smith 
and Velleman have no particular interest in cashing out the image of symmetry that guides DOF 
theory: that is one reason why they want change the subject (to bundles of dispositions in Smith‘s 
                                                 
32 Unfortunately, this consensus of embarrassment doesn‘t seem to stop non-DOF theorists from employing the 
concept of DOF in the exposition of their views. If I am right that the very idea of DOF is a flawed one, such 
philosophers need at very least to reformulate their views in other terms. 
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case, and to modes of regard in Velleman‘s case). More generally, it is very difficult to see what 
advantage or deep insight a symmetrical descriptive account of DOF could afford us. The central 
explanatory concept available to the descriptive theorist is that of the causal disposition. But the 
great advantage of the causal disposition is its flexibility. Mental states seem to be caught up in all 
kinds of causal dispositions that point in all kinds of different directions, and not just in two that 
point in opposite directions. We may grant that some mental states (e.g. intentions) tend to be 
caught up in causal relations where they contribute to an intentional action that matches their 
content in some special way. We may also grant that some other mental states (e.g. beliefs) can be 
caught up in perceptual causal relations, where the belief is more or less directly caused by what is 
the case, and its content determined by what is perceptually available to the perceiver. But this 
opposition doesn‘t mark any deep symmetry. As noted above in response to Velleman: there are 
some beliefs that have a (reliable) role in causing what they represent without doing so via 
intentional action, and there are many beliefs for which the invocation of a direct causal relation to 
the object of belief as cause of the belief is strained at best. To try and force the relevant causal 
relations into the mold of deep symmetry for two particular paradigmatic kinds of mental state (the 
thetic and telic kinds) seems pointless, as it puts a straitjacket on the very flexibility that is supposed 
to be one of the great advantages of theorizing about the structure of the mind by reference to 
causal dispositions. 
This is not to say that there cannot be a descriptive account of DOF that cashes out an 
image of deep symmetry in an illuminating way. But I have no idea what such an account would 
look like, or what its interest would be. It doesn‘t seem like an accident that the actual theorists who 
tried for a descriptive theory of DOF ended up changing the subject. So rather than trying to 
construct an ill-motivated straw-man descriptive account of DOF to criticize, I shall proceed on the 
assumption that if there is an adequate theory of DOF it will be a normative one. 
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1.3 THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE AND THEORETICAL GOALS OF AN 
ADEQUATE THEORY OF DOF 
What would make for an adequate theory of DOF? On the one hand the slogans with which we 
began dictate a particular logical structure for an adequate theory of DOF. On the other hand, 
‗DOF‘ is a technical term, so we will not get a good grasp on what would make for an adequate 
theory of DOF in advance of understanding what DOF is for, theoretically speaking. Let us deal with 
each point in turn. 
The opening slogans present an overwhelming impression of deep (geometric) symmetry at 
work in the very idea of DOF. The point is best shown, then said: 
  Thetic DOF:   Mind   World 
  Telic DOF:   Mind   World 
The DOF theorist must explain what the arrows represent, but the arrows must represent the same 
kind of relation; that is why they deserve treatment together under a common heading. Here instead 
of ‗Mind‘ and ‗World‘ we might put ‗aspect of Mind‘ and ‗aspect of World‘, but the aspects must be 
the formally the same across the thetic and telic cases: suitable candidates are e.g. a mental state and 
what the mental state refers to, or a propositional attitude and the propositional object of the 
attitude. If the aspects weren‘t formally the same for both DOFs, we would have good reason to 
think that the arrows are not symmetrically reflected versions of the same kind of relation, precisely 
because of the formal difference in the relevant relata. 
 What logical structure of account would capture both the intended unity and reflected 
(geometric) symmetry of the two DOFs? A two-dimensional spatial direction can be represented 
without a diagram by means of an ordered pair of coordinates. So represented, spatial directions that 
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point in opposite directions differ only in the ordering of the coordinates they share. Similarly, we 
can expect an adequate theory of DOF to have the following schematic logical structure: 
  Thetic DOF:  Ought-to-Fit < (aspect of) Mind, (aspect of) World>   
Telic DOF:  Ought-to-Fit < (aspect of) World, (aspect of) Mind> 
Here ‗Ought-to-Fit‘ is a schematic term for the normative relation that captures the unity of practical 
and theoretical thought in terms of DOF. We can see from the schema why there are two and only 
two DOFs.33 DOF as such is supposed to be a determinable normative relation with two terms, one 
standing for (some aspect of) the mind and the other standing for (some aspect of) the world, where 
the determinations of the determinable differ only in the ordering of favored terms. There are only 
two ways to order terms in a two-term relation, and that is why there are two and only two DOFs. 
An adequate theory of DOF must reveal DOF as such to be a determinable relation of this kind.34 
Call this the basic criterion of adequacy for a theory of DOF.  
It is because of the basic criterion of adequacy that no one has ever tried to mix a normative 
and descriptive account of DOF, so that e.g. the thetic DOF is a matter of truth being a norm for 
belief whilst the telic DOF is a matter of desires conspiring (with beliefs etc.) to cause intentional 
actions. Arbitrarily mixing and matching normative and causal relations between mind and world 
won‘t help to display the unity of practical and theoretical thought. If DOF is to live up to its 
                                                 
33 No theorist explicitly claims that there must be two and only DOFs. But it has never occurred to any theorist to deal 
with some third, fourth, nth DOF, nor has occurred to one to mention the possibility of there being some third, fourth, 
nth DOF. The only exception is Zangwill (1998) who treats the idea as a replacement for traditional DOF theories (that 
is: to propose some third, fourth, nth DOF would be to change the subject). 
34 Couldn‘t an account of DOF just point out some differences between belief and desire? No. Suppose the theorist says 
―Beliefs X and desires Y; the thetic DOF consists in X-ing and the telic DOF consists in Y-ing.‖ We have no clue here 
as to why X-ing and Y-ing deserve treatment under a common heading, or how they cash out the image of symmetry 
that justifies talk of DOFs. Couldn‘t an account of DOF just point out a property that beliefs have that desires do not 
have, as Zangwill (1998: 177) suggests that Stalnaker (1987: 80) does? (Arguably, this is what Smith tried to do.) Again, 
no. We do not say that an object that is not male is therefore of the female gender; similarly, we do not say that a mental 
state that fails to have the thetic DOF therefore has the telic DOF. 
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promise (and its name) then the two DOFs must be shown to be the same kind of normative 
relation between mind and world, although ―pointing‖ in opposite directions.  
One might object that the basic criterion of adequacy is too strong. The basic criterion of 
adequacy requires the two DOFs to differ only in the ordering of favored terms in one and the same 
schematic determinable relation. But surely it‘s permissible to add qualifications on one side of the 
account and not the other, so long as the core ‗Ought-to-Fit‘ relation is recognizably the same in both 
cases. Platts, for example, qualified the telic side of his account with the term ―crudely‖, the idea 
presumably being that not every telic attitude ought to be realized, in the relevant sense of ‗ought‘. 
What‘s wrong with a mildly lopsided account like Platts‘s? 
Such qualifications confuse our understanding of the underlying genus or determinable. 
Suppose, for example, that the thetic DOF is a matter of a mental state actually standing in some 
determination of the ‗Ought-to-Fit‘ relation, whilst the telic DOF rather consists in a mental state‘s 
liability to stand in some determination of the ‗Ought-to-Fit‘ relation in certain circumstances (and not 
others). To say that these are both DOFs in the same sense of DOF as such would be like saying 
that being male and being liable to be female are both determinations of gender. The DOF theorist 
claims that there is a clearly unified genus or determinable – DOF as such – of which there are two 
and only two species or determinations. Either the genus or determinable is of the form of a 
relation, or it is of the form of a liability to stand in a relation, but the DOF theorist cannot have it 
both ways. As it happens, DOF theorists agree that every belief has the thetic DOF; beliefs are not 
merely liable to stand in a normative relation to the world, but always do so. We may conclude that 
the telic DOF is also a normative relation, and not a mere liability to stand in a normative relation in 
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certain circumstances. The basic criterion of adequacy stands, and lopsided accounts like Platts‘s are 
ruled out.35 
We can work out what the concept of DOF is for by examining DOF theorists‘ judgments 
as to which attitudes are thetic or telic. On the thetic side, there is resounding agreement: ―Belief, 
belief, and again we say belief‖ say the various theorists.36 But when we turn to the telic side, there is 
widespread disagreement. Anscombe (if she has a theory of DOF) says that intention is the 
paradigmatic telic attitude; Platts says desire is; Searle says desire and intention are; Smith and 
Humberstone say a wide range of pro-attitudes are; Velleman‘s secret theory says that choice is (and 
Velleman thinks that choices are a species of belief).37 What explains the agreement on the thetic side 
and the disagreement on the telic side? 
On the thetic side, the agreement can be explained by a common interest in what is usually 
called the ‗aim of belief‘. Belief seems to have a kind of internal axiology – ―aiming at truth‖ – which 
merits investigation and explanation.38 On the telic side, one‘s preferred philosophy of action makes 
all the difference to what one says. Searle, Smith and Velleman go on to use their reflections on 
DOF in the service of illuminating the nature of intentional action, according to their preferred 
theories of it, and Platts and Humberstone‘s choices of telic attitude are plausibly read as a gesture 
towards the Humean and Davidsonian traditions of action theory. None of the theorists 
acknowledges an interest in a broader theory of DOF according to which, say, merely affective or 
evaluative attitudes (i.e. ones that do not have an essential connection to intentional action) end up 
classified as telic. So let us proceed on the assumption that illuminating the internal axiology of 
belief (―aiming at truth‖) is one theoretical goal of the DOF theorist, and illuminating the internal 
                                                 
35 The basic criterion of adequacy does not preclude there being many asymmetries that follow from the account of DOF. 
It just limits the asymmetries admissible in the core account to an asymmetry in the ordering of terms in one and the 
same determinable relation. 
36 Here we are ignoring Velleman‘s theory of modes of regard, as it is not a theory of DOF as such. 
37 Velleman (2000: 25-26). 
38 For interpretations of the ―aim of belief‖ see e.g. Velleman (2000); Wedgwood (2002); Shah (2003). 
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axiology of telic attitudes, in terms of their essential role in intentional action (―aiming at realization‖), 
is the other theoretical goal of the DOF theorist. 
1.4 PROBLEMS WITH ASYMMETRY OF ACCOUNT 
There is an internal tension between the logical structure and theoretical goals of an adequate theory 
of DOF. The basic criterion of adequacy pulls towards symmetry of account, whilst the theoretical 
goals pull towards asymmetry of account. In this section I will outline three problems for normative 
theories of DOF that rely on this internal tension, and which together give reason to think that the 
very idea of DOF is a hopeless one. 
1.4.1 Problem One: Kind of Normativity 
The first problem for any normative theory of DOF is in specifying what kind of norm or 
normativity is at issue. Different kinds of norm have very different properties. If the proposed 
account of DOF is to meet the basic criterion of adequacy then the kind of norm or normativity 
must be made out to be of the same kind in the thetic and telic cases. It won‘t do, for instance, to 
say that one DOF is a matter of individualistic-evaluative normativity, and the other is a matter of 
biological-teleological normativity, unless one has a general theory of normativity that unites these 
two (a tall order). This simplifies our methodology. If a kind of norm doesn‘t work on the thetic or 
telic side then we have reason to discard it. Let us run through the options.  
 We cannot appeal to teleological norms, for that is what we started with in the 
―metaphorical‖ slogans. We want an account of what it means to say that beliefs ‗aim at truth‘ and 
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telic attitudes ‗aim at realization‘ that reveals these ‗aims‘ as somehow the same kind of relation to 
the world, although of symmetrically reflected determinations. 
We saw in Platt‘s case that the telic norm cannot be a moral norm, for some of our desires 
are morally reprehensible no matter the circumstances. In any case that would make the thetic norm 
an implausibly moralistic proposal concerning the ethics of belief, reminiscent of Clifford‘s talk of 
the ―sins against Mankind‖ involved in believing without evidence.39 
The thetic norm cannot be a non-moral evaluative norm consequent on an individual‘s or 
group‘s (actual or ideal) evaluation, for as Humberstone argues, it might be wonderful (for oneself, 
or everyone) to believe something false, and this would not mean that the false belief is not mistaken 
in the way that an adequate theory of DOF tries to explain.40  
For similar reasons we cannot appeal to a teleological norm in the form of a biological 
imperative drawn from theories of natural selection: it might be wonderful for survival to believe 
something false (on some, or many occasions) and it might be wonderful for survival to not realize 
some of one‘s desires or intentions (on some, or many occasions).41  
Perhaps we could appeal to the normativity characteristic of reasons. Suppose we define thetic 
attitudes as those to which reasons for belief apply, and telic attitudes as those that supply reasons 
for action, on the assumption that one should believe what one has reason to believe and do what 
one has reason to do. This would risk endorsing the suggestion that is (perhaps) implicit in Platts‘s 
account: namely that there is a kind of attitude (e.g. desire) that by its very nature supplies reasons 
for action whenever one has an attitude of that kind. The suggestion seems too strong: it needs 
qualification on the telic side, which makes for an asymmetry between the thetic and telic DOFs that 
flouts the basic criterion of adequacy. Apart from this asymmetry, this ‗reasons-based‘ approach to 
                                                 
39 Clifford (1999). 
40 Humberstone (1992: 68). 
41 I will discuss the reasons to reject this view of the relevant kind of normativity in more detail in Chapter 2. 
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the normativity characteristic of DOF seems circular. The thetic DOF is defined in terms of reasons 
for thetic attitudes, for instance. If we have an independent grasp on the unity and difference of 
reasons for action and reasons for belief, we won‘t need a DOF theory to illuminate the unity and 
difference between them. If we don‘t, then adding the word ‗reason‘ to the account won‘t help to 
relieve our ignorance. 
Perhaps we could appeal to norms of rationality. According to this suggestion, beliefs ought 
to fit the world because having true beliefs constitutes, or at least greatly promotes, (maximal) 
rationality on the part of the believer, and desires or intentions ought to be fulfilled for the same 
reason. But again, circularity threatens. Two kinds of rationality must be made out if we are to make 
sense of the unity and difference of the two DOFs. If we have an independent grasp on the unity 
and difference of practical and theoretical rationality, we won‘t need a DOF theory to illuminate the 
unity and difference between them. If we don‘t, then adding the word ‗rationality‘ to the account 
won‘t help to relieve our ignorance. 
We are fast running out of options. Having found reason to discard bare teleological norms, 
moral norms, non-moral evaluative norms, evolutionary-teleological norms, norms consequent on 
possession of a reason, and norms of rationality, all that seems left is something akin to Anscombe‘s 
own suggestion: the kind of normativity involved is that of a bare standard of correctness. According to 
this suggestion, considering a mental state and its object, if the mental state has the thetic DOF, then 
the mental state is correct iff it matches its object, and if the mental state has the telic DOF, then the 
object is correct iff it matches the mental state, and either of these (mental state or object, 
respectively) is incorrect otherwise. 
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We might wonder, with Rosen, whether standards of correctness are norms at all.42 The fact 
that there is a correct way to play the Hammerklavier sonata (where this standard allows of many 
artistic interpretations, but does not, for instance, allow rearranging the notes) does not by itself 
seem to have any consequences for whether I ought to play it correctly here and now, or what I 
ought to do if I happen to play it incorrectly. Sometimes I may have reason to play it incorrectly: 
Rosen‘s example is playing incorrectly to amuse someone. Certainly, having botched the opening, 
there is no obvious requirement to immediately start over. This makes it seem as if standards of 
correctness are merely descriptive features of the world. Call the difficulty of making plausible the 
claim that standards of correctness are genuine norms ―Rosen‘s challenge‖. 
The correct thing to say in response to Rosen‘s challenge is, I think, that standards of 
correctness are a kind of limiting case of normativity. They are extremely bare with regard to their 
intrinsic connection to reasons for action or robust norms of conduct.43  But they do articulate 
something more than a mere description: there is some difference between false sentences and false 
beliefs that is expressed by the claim that false beliefs are (in themselves) incorrect, whilst false 
sentences are neither (in themselves) correct nor incorrect. Rosen‘s example itself seems to involve a 
standard of correctness of this bare type – namely doing what‘s required to succeed at amusing one‘s 
audience – even though this requires flouting whatever standard of correctness is embodied in the 
score. The standard of correctness implicit in the performance is internal to it in some way: it might 
well conflict with what one ought to do when all things are considered (e.g. perhaps one ought not 
to take these means to the end, given the lack of respect they show to the great composer). But there 
                                                 
42 Rosen (2001). 
43 Rosen himself is in two minds about whether to call standards of correctness norms. Although they do not have any 
obvious connection to what one ought to do (where what one ought to do is a paradigmatic case of normativity), they 
do represent what he calls ―operative standards‖, which, like the laws of etiquette, can provide one with reasons for 
action, although on a contingent basis. 
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is no obvious reason to think that this internal standard of correctness must therefore be a merely 
descriptive feature of one‘s will. 
Rosen‘s challenge would perhaps be difficult to meet if we had to assimilate all forms of 
normativity to norms of conduct. Although our clearest understanding of norms (arguably) comes 
from norms of conduct, there is no obvious reason why a norm must have direct consequences for 
what one ought to do, where ‗do‘ carries the sense of intentional action, if it is to be called a norm at 
all. The term ‗norm‘ is somewhat fungible. That said, I do think there is something right about 
Rosen‘s challenge, and we will return to this point in §1.4.4. For now it is enough to note that if a 
normative theorist of DOF is to meet the basic criterion of adequacy, then the most plausible 
candidate for the kind of normativity involved is that of a standard of correctness. If Rosen‘s 
challenge is a good one, and standards of correctness are not norms, then hopes for an adequate 
normative theory of DOF are dim indeed. 
1.4.2 Problem Two: Asymmetry of Application 
The second problem for normative theories of DOF is that the proposed thetic and telic DOFs will 
fail to have the same universality of application. This gives us reason to think that they are not 
reflected determinations of one and the same determinable normative relation. 
Humberstone notes that the DOF theorist‘s interest on the thetic side is in the sense in 
which every belief ―ought to fit‖ the world.44 There may be instrumental reasons to have a false belief, 
but the DOF theorist has no particular interest in those.45 There may also be evidential reasons to 
                                                 
44 The thetic norm could be stronger: perhaps every belief ought to be a case of knowledge. Nothing in the present chapter 
turns on this difference, so I will deal with the weaker case of truth, which is a standard for belief to which all the actual 
normative DOF theorists agree. In Chapter 2 I argue that if mere beliefs are imperfect exercises of the fallible capacity 
for knowledge, then the standard of correctness for belief is knowledge, or something very much like it. 
45 Humberstone (1992: 68) 
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adopt a false belief, as when a false conclusion is what all the available evidence happens to point to, 
but the DOF theorist has no particular interest in such evidential reasons either. Her particular 
interest is in the normative sense in which all beliefs ―ought to fit‖ the world (i.e. be true) regardless 
of how this norm figures in more comprehensive calculations of what one ought to believe (in some 
more comprehensive sense of ‗ought‘).  
All thetic attitudes ought to fit the world, in the relevant sense of ‗ought‘, but the telic norm 
does not have the same universality of application. Anscombe‘s example of this is the man who 
wants to buy shark tackle in Oxford – no matter what he does, he won‘t buy shark tackle, because 
there aren‘t any shark tackle shops.46 Truly predicating an actual normative failing (or success) of 
some object requires that the object exist. According to Anscombe, the shark tackle man‘s intention 
has a kind of action as its object. But although he does various other things, in such a case the man 
never even starts to buy shark tackle. His ―action‖ of buying shark tackle is akin to the person who 
intends to walk to the edge of the world and sets off in some (any) direction: such a person is not 
walking to the edge of the world, she merely thinks she is. Without delving into theories of 
reference, we might call this a failure of reference. As far as the shark-tackle man‘s attitudes are 
concerned, it makes no sense to say that whatever is represented by the attitude is as it ought to be 
or not, because whatever is represented doesn‘t exist.47 
The problem here is just the ordinary fallibility of our states of mind. The world makes sense 
and does not tolerate falsehood or contradiction, so given some intentional mental state with the 
thetic DOF and a corresponding truth or falsehood regarding the object of that mental state, the 
thetic norm always applies and it always makes sense to apply it. Our psychology, on the other hand, 
                                                 
46 This isn‘t true for all times: http://replay.web.archive.org/20060518011854/http://bobstackleandbait.co.uk/  
47 Loose talk helps to cover this problem over. DOF theorists sometimes say that ―the world‖ is assessed as having a 
failing in it iff it does not match the content of my desire, yet if one tries to narrow in on that part of the world that ought 
to match the determinate content of an impossible-to-fulfill desire, it is nowhere to be found. The problem can perhaps 
be sidestepped by countenancing the existence of states of affairs defined by means of negated propositions, but no 
DOF theorist supposes that their view commits them to such wildly adventurous ontology. 
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is notoriously fallible: we can desire or intend to do things that are impossible, and we can have 
various telic attitudes that conflict with each other, producing an impossible goal by implication. 
Nothing guarantees that the objects of our mental states exist, or can exist, so the telic norm does 
not always apply, and it does not always make sense to apply it.48 Given this asymmetry, we have 
reason to think that the basic criterion of adequacy can‘t be met, because the proposed DOFs differ 
in more ways than the ordering of favored terms in one and the same determinable normative 
relation. Our psychology is just too feeble to fund a symmetrical telic norm that measures up to the 
Almighty Norm of Truth. 
Could one restore the required symmetry of account by restricting the telic DOF to mental 
states that have objects that exist? The idea here would be to compensate for the asymmetry of 
application by drastically narrowing the range of telic attitudes. Only desires or intentions whose 
objects exist, for instance, would have the telic DOF and be telic attitudes; many desires and 
intentions (like the shark-tackle man‘s intention) would fail to be telic attitudes. Whether this 
suggestion is workable or not seems to depend on the kind of object at issue. If the objects of telic 
attitudes are e.g. states of affairs individuated by the content of the relevant telic attitude, then the 
telic norm would always be trivially satisfied on this view. In order for the telic norm to not be 
trivial, it would have to be possible for the object of a telic attitude to exist without matching the 
content of the telic attitude, so that it can sometimes be judged as not being as it ought to be relative 
to that telic attitude. The attempt or performance seems like a good candidate object to play this role, 
given the DOF theorist‘s interest in intentional action. Suppose that actual existing attempts or 
performances are the objects of telic attitudes. Telic attitudes would then set the determinate content 
of the normative standard for actual attempts or performances, and many desires and intentions 
                                                 
48 I take it that a kind of failure of reference is what Anscombe is gesturing towards when she talks of the order to clench 
one‘s teeth ―falling to the ground‖ when it is given to the man with no teeth. See Anscombe (1957: 56-57). 
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would fail to be telic attitudes, because the possessor of the attitude is not actually engaged in an 
attempt or performance.  
This response to the problem of asymmetry of application is extremely distant from 
traditional DOF theory. The deep symmetry we expected to see between two paradigmatic kinds of 
mental state has now been transferred to a deep commonality shared by thetic attitudes and 
performances: namely the way that they can both be as they ought to be, or not. An understanding 
of performances now seems importantly prior to an understanding of telic attitudes, as whether or 
not a mental state possesses the telic DOF depends on the existence of an actual performance. The 
view is in fact Anscombe‘s, and I do not think it is a DOF theory at all. We will consider the view in 
§1.5. 
1.4.3 Problem Three: Asymmetry of Form or Content of Thetic and Telic Attitudes 
The third problem for normative theories of DOF is that even if the asymmetry of application is 
superable, thetic and telic attitudes themselves display asymmetries that cause trouble for the basic 
criterion of adequacy. These asymmetries make for a kind of dialectical progression, where what is 
distinctive about telic attitudes is progressively weakened under pressure from the basic criterion of 
adequacy, until what is left is useless for the theoretical goals of the DOF theorist. Let us walk 
through the dialectical stages.  
We begin with the thought noted in §1.3: that one theoretical goal of the DOF theorist is to 
illuminate the essential role of telic attitudes in intentional action. The theorist must then decide on 
the logical form of telic attitudes as well as deciding which attitudes (e.g. desires, intentions, 
whatever) are telic. Anscombe is straightforward in this regard. She takes intentions to be essentially 
involved in intentional action and takes intentions to have kinds of action as their objects. For 
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Anscombe, the basic logical form of intention is an intention to A. It would a mistake to render this 
thought in terms of an intention that-p, for kinds of action are not propositions.49 If the DOF 
theorist follows Anscombe in this, then the theory will not meet the basic criterion of adequacy. A 
formal difference in relata is good reason to think that the thetic and telic DOFs are not reflected 
determinations of one and the same determinable relation. 
 A (philosophically) natural response is to make sure that the logical form of telic attitudes is 
that of a propositional attitude. There will be no intentions to A, but only telic attitudes that-p, and in 
this regard telic attitudes will be just like thetic attitudes. This is the route taken by all the DOF 
theorists in §1.2. The theorist then faces a difficult choice. In principle, beliefs seem to be able to 
range over any content that-p. The theorist must then choose whether to say that telic attitudes 
similarly range over any content, or whether to say that their contents are essentially restricted in 
some way. 
There are good theoretical reasons to restrict the contents proper to telic attitudes. 
Intentional action involves distinctive features that require an account. For instance, as Anscombe 
(and others) have noted, when one acts intentionally one seems to know without observation or 
inference what one is doing.50 It is also a traditional view that practical thought involves representing 
oneself as cause of the object of practical thought. Given that telic attitudes are supposed to be 
essentially involved in intentional action, and that the account of DOF is supposed to illuminate this 
feature of the telic, it seems quite natural to say that a telic attitude that-p must include reference to 
bearer of the attitude (e.g. ―I‖) or must include reference to a kind of action (e.g. ―that I do A‖) or 
otherwise include some content that represents the bearer of the attitude as cause of what is to 
happen, so as to help explain how telic attitudes are essentially involved in these distinctive features 
                                                 
49 See also Baier (1970, 1977) on this point. 
50 Anscombe (1957: 11). 
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of intentional action. Of the theorists in §1.2, only Velleman explicitly endorses this route (and only 
in his secret theory): he says that telic attitudes must be self-referential, and suggests that they always 
include reference to what one is going to do.51 The problem is that if the theorist claims that the 
contents of telic attitudes are essentially restricted in some way, then the theory will not meet the basic 
criterion of adequacy. An essential difference in range of possible contents provides good reason to 
think that the thetic and telic DOFs are not reflected determinations of one and the same 
determinable relation. 
A further (philosophically) natural response is to drop the claim that it is essential to telic 
attitudes to have any essential connection to intentional action, by virtue of form or content. Some 
philosophers say that God can intend that 2+2=4, which makes it seem as if it is not essential to 
intentions to refer to the subject or a kind of action: why should telic attitudes be any different? It 
may then be allowed that for us telic attitudes have (or tend to have) contents that refer to the 
subject or a kind of action, but this would not follow from the nature of the telic DOF. In formal 
terms, this move could be accomplished by containing the account of DOF within the scope of the 
consequent of a conditional. The account of DOF would begin with a phrase such as ―For all 
propositional attitudes A and all propositions p, if the subject bears A to p then …‖ The fact that the 
antecedent of the conditional is only fulfilled by creatures like us for some contents on the telic side 
(such as those that refer to the subject or a kind of action) will then be a contingent fact, whose 
explanation will be found in some other aspect of the case, such as what we tend to think about 
when we think a telic thought. 
The problem with this final stage of the dialectic is precisely that it gives up on one of the 
theoretical goals of the DOF theorist identified in §1.3. According to the suggestion, telic attitudes 
can (in principle) range over any content. If so, then there is no reason why even we feeble creatures 
                                                 
51 Velleman (2007: 109). 
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cannot have a telic attitude with the content that e.g. 2+2=4. Such an attitude might not have 
anything to do with intentional action, but that is now beside the point. (Recall that we are dealing 
with normative theories of DOF: appeal to the causal role of telic attitudes in intentional action is 
irrelevant to their classification as telic.) 
The DOF theorist may refine her conception of telic attitudes so as to satisfy the basic 
criterion of adequacy, but only at the cost of jettisoning what is distinctive about the telic – namely 
some essential connection to intentional action, by virtue of form or content – and so jettisoning 
one of the theoretical goals of DOF theory. And if the DOF theorist gives up on illuminating the 
essential connection of telic attitudes to intentional action, she has no reason to bother with an 
account of DOF. She may as well change the subject. 
1.4.4 Where DOF Theory Goes Wrong 
The problems above provide good reason to think that the very idea of DOF is a hopeless one. We 
should not try to make out the Almighty Thetic Norm of Truth as of the same kind (though a 
reflected determination) as the feeble telic norm of satisfaction. We would do better, and learn more, 
were we to leave the intuitions of deep, exhaustive symmetry between the two DOFs behind, and 
attend directly to our subject matter: namely, practical and theoretical thought.  
Where does DOF theory go wrong? I think the answer is found in the slogans with which 
we began. There doesn‘t seem to be anything prima facie odd in saying that beliefs ought to fit the 
world, but there is something prima facie odd about saying that the world ought to fit one‘s telic 
attitudes just because one has them: namely that this is a markedly petulant way of talking. Suppose 
that I want (intend, etc.) to fit into last year‘s jeans, but sadly this is no longer possible, and I exclaim 
―These jeans ought to fit me, but they don‘t!‖ Let us suppose further that I make clear that I intend 
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to pass normative judgment on the jeans by saying this, rather than merely to describe them and to 
express my disappointment about, or aesthetic reaction to, this state of affairs. What would make 
sense of such a judgment as legitimate, and not petulant? We do not suppose the jeans were designed 
to fit my end, however large it may get, so we cannot make sense of the judgment as one of 
malfunction, deterioration or poor design or construction. Yet the only other way to make sense of 
the judgment seems to be to attribute to the jeans an underlying capacity to potentially fulfill the 
relevant normative requirement. They would have to be made of magical animate lycra, and have a 
capacity to change themselves to fit my (enlarged) end, not to mention a capacity to be sensitive to 
when this is required, if we were to treat them as a normative subject, of whom we could legitimately 
make this kind of normative demand. This is why my judgment is petulant. The judgment involves 
treating the jeans as if they were the kind of thing that could do and ought to do (or could have 
done and ought to have done) something about the relevant failure, based on some actual or 
potential cognition of the (imminent) failure. The jeans are not that kind of thing. 
 What we have exposed in this example is a mild form of an ―ought implies can‖ principle. 
The norms characteristic of DOF must conform to this principle, on pain of petulance on the telic 
side. The sense of ‗can‘ here does not simply mean possible development from one state into 
another state by some definite time in the future, for it is surely possible that the jeans could have 
had a history whereby they ended up fitting my enlarged end, just as the world could have had a 
history that ended up fitting most of my desires. The sense of ‗can‘ at issue is one that attaches to a 
normative subject and is distinctively cognitive: it applies to something that can, in some sense, be 
sensitive to the requirements of the norm and conform itself to them.52 
                                                 
52 It may well be impossible for a normative subject to recognize and fulfill the relevant normative demand in some 
particular case. But it would be thoroughly ridiculous to apply this kind of norm to some subject who in general lacks the 
capacity to recognize and fulfill the kind of demand in question. I leave open the analogous possibility that, for instance, 
a moral subject might be subject to various moral demands by virtue of their general capacity to recognize moral 
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If the norms characteristic of DOF are not petulant, then in order to make this clear, on the 
telic side the DOF theorist would do well to follow Anscombe and require telic attitudes to 
represent action, because states of affairs and such-like do not have the required capacities. That said, 
actions don‘t do anything themselves, so they can‘t be the subject of the normative demand either. 
The subject of whom the demand is made on the telic side is the agent, who fulfils the demand in her 
action, by virtue of her capacity to act. Similarly on the thetic side: although we said above that there 
is nothing prima facie odd about saying that beliefs (plural) ought to fit the world, there is something 
prima facie odd about saying that this false belief ought to fit the world. Beliefs are individuated by 
their content: this belief can‘t change to meet the requirements of the norm, but can only be 
discarded. Mental states do not possess capacities to change themselves so as to fit the world. So the 
normative subject of whom the demand is made on the thetic side is ultimately the believer, who fulfils 
the demand in her belief concerning whether p, by virtue of her capacity to be sensitive to the truth 
and adjust her beliefs accordingly. 
 Once we have identified the proper subject of the normative demands, we see immediately 
that the opposition between mind and world, found in the opening slogans in §1.1 and the diagrams 
in §1.3, is a bogus one. On the thetic side it makes some sense to talk about the mind on one side (as 
representing) and the world on the other (as represented), because the failures to meet the 
requirements of the norm are all tallied up on the side of a normative subject with a certain capacity 
(the capacity to be sensitive to the truth). But on the telic side, the opposition between mind and 
world breaks down. The part of the world that is to be assessed on the telic side is not some non-
mental chunk of the world (nor some mental chunk treated ‗as other‘, or as external to the subject) 
that may or may not have the capacity to be sensitive to and meet the requirements of the telic 
                                                                                                                                                             
requirements, without thereby recognizing all the requirements (all at once), or being able to fulfill them all in some 
morally nasty situation. 
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norm: that would risk petulance. The part of the world that is to be assessed on the telic side is the 
mind in action, because it is the thinking subject who has the requisite capacities. In no case is the 
world considered as external to the mind the object of the telic norm. This then is the deeper 
diagnosis of why the very idea of DOF is a hopeless one: in trying to treat intentional action as 
something external to the mind, so as to line up symmetrically with the sense in which the objects of 
belief are external to the mind, DOF theories evict half their subject matter from their theories. 
The sense in which ought implies can for the thetic and telic norms explains how Rosen‘s 
challenge from §1.4.1 is on the right track. The relevant kind of norms, if they are not to be petulant, 
must have some direct connection to activity or action. The sense of ―action‖ here need not be that of 
intentional action. A broader sense of activity or action is available and appropriate: namely that of 
the exercise of a capacity to be sensitive to and meet the requirements of a norm. (I will legitimate 
this broader sense of ‗capacity‘ in Chapter 2.) 
1.5 ANSCOMBE’S BASIC INSIGHT 
1.5.1 Anscombe Was Not a DOF Theorist 
One of the main attractions of DOF theory is its promise to tell us something about the essence of 
thetic and telic attitudes. Given the asymmetries outlined in §§1.4.1-1.4.3 we should not expect DOF 
to play the same kind of constitutive role in the thetic and telic arenas. While it may make sense to 
define beliefs as those mental states that are correct or as they ought to be iff they are true, nothing 
nearly as strong and helpful to our understanding will be forthcoming with regard to telic attitudes, 
because of the qualifications required on the telic side. 
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It is worth returning to Anscombe at this point, because she is entirely explicit about the 
relevant asymmetries, and accepts them. This gives us good reason to think that Anscombe was not, 
after all, a DOF theorist. Anscombe says of the shark-tackle man that we would not say he had 
made a mistake in performance, precisely because there are no shark tackle shops in Oxford. She 
accepts the asymmetry (of application of the relevant norm) because she was not trying to spell out 
an essential difference between belief and intention by appeal to the general application a third kind 
of thing – a DOF – which those two states of mind have in common, although in symmetrically 
reflected determinations. Rather she was simply trying to point out an essential difference between 
belief and intention.  
If one looks for something like symmetry of constitutive roles in Anscombe, one will find it 
in a different place. Anscombe‘s basic insight is that what beliefs have in common with another 
thing is a standard of correctness against which a distinctive kind of mistake may be measured. 
Beliefs do not have this in common with another kind of state of mind, but rather with an event: 
namely a performance. If one is tempted to define beliefs in terms of a constitutive normative 
standard, then the lesson to draw from Anscombe is that one might define some events in a similar 
way. Those events would be actions that would be intentional actions were they to succeed, and the 
constitutive standard would be success (doing what one has in mind to do). Let us call these events 
telic events. Starting with an account of telic events, one could then work backwards to define telic 
attitudes: telic attitudes are those attitudes that set the determinate content of the standard of 
correctness for actual performances that are occurring (or have occurred, or will occur) on particular 
occasions. In the light of this reading of Anscombe, there is good reason to think that desires cannot 
play the role that telic attitudes are supposed to perform. Desires do not set standards of correctness 
for performances directly. There is no mistake, for instance, if I fail to fulfill my grisly and 
unwelcome desire to murder out of curiosity (it‘s not like getting stage fright). It is only if I decide, 
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or otherwise intend, to fulfill the grisly desire that a mistake might be in the offing. The DOF 
theorists were, for this reason, wrong to follow Platts in supposing that Anscombe was writing 
about the difference between belief and desire.53 
One might object: ―Didn‘t Anscombe say that intentions and orders have one relation to 
what they represent that records (beliefs) do not share, and didn‘t she say that records (beliefs) have 
another relation to what they represent that intentions and orders do not share, and didn‘t she imply 
that the relations have something in common?‖ Yes, she said and implied all that. But she never said 
that these relations cash out an image of symmetry. The image of symmetry was an unfortunate 
imposition on her view that (I believe) first occurred in Searle‘s reading of Anscombe, and was then 
picked up by Platts, and through Platts, the rest of the DOF theorists. Mind and world do seem to 
exhaust the options for relata in some deep logical space, even if that logical space is hard to specify. 
But in the surrounding passages, Anscombe is very clear that her opposition is between judgment 
and performance; she never puts the opposition in terms of mind and world. It is far from obvious 
that judgments and performances exhaust the options for fundamental and distinctive kinds of 
mistake (thought, reason, knowledge etc.), and Anscombe never claimed that they do, or that they 
do by virtue of some kind of deep reflected symmetry. 
The possibility that an understanding of telic events might be prior to our understanding of 
telic attitudes explains why Anscombe herself (uncommonly) thinks we should start with what 
someone actually does (the telic event as such), rather than with some mental something-or-other, 
when examining the nature of practical thought.54 Yet no latter-day DOF theorist takes seriously the 
idea that an event might be constituted as the kind of event it is by the application of a norm to it. 
Instead they focus on the idea that while one kind of attitude (belief) is constituted by being subject to 
                                                 
53 Of course, intentions do not set standards of correctness just by themselves either: it is only if there is a corresponding 
telic event (past, future or present) that they do. 
54 Anscombe (1957: 9). 
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the authority of the relevant state of affairs, another kind of attitude (the telic attitude) is constituted 
by its authority to set a norm for a state of affairs, or its ability to generate a state of affairs that the 
agent (in some sense) likes. The task then is to account for the authority or to describe the ability, 
and to come up with clever enabling conditions clauses to cover the obvious (and as we have seen, 
only to be expected) failures of authority or ability. Anscombe‘s alternative promises a kind of 
universality of account that DOF theory cannot match. If one focuses on actual telic events, there 
will be no failures of reference on the telic side: for all telic events, a constitutive standard of 
correctness is applicable, just as for all beliefs, a constitutive standard of correctness is applicable. So 
one can offer a general constitutive account of these aspects of the mental in terms of the potential 
for mistakes, without the litter of qualifications, caveats and escape clauses that can make it seem 
implausible that one has uncovered something both unitary and fundamental.  
Anscombe‘s basic insight is subtle, startling and original. We are quite happy in thinking that 
theoretical thought primarily manifests itself in a kind of state: belief. Anscombe‘s view suggests that 
practical thought primarily manifests itself in a kind of event: the telic event. In what follows I will 
explain Anscombe‘s distinction between mistakes in judgment and mistakes in performance, and 
then consider how it might be put to use in an account of these two elements of the nature of the 
mind. In doing so, I give up on intuitions that guide DOF theory, but that is as it should be. 
1.5.2 Mistakes in Judgment and Mistakes in Performance 
Anscombe‘s story of the shopper and the detective is supposed to illustrate the difference between 
mistakes in judgment and mistakes in performance: the detective makes a mistake in judgment, 
whilst the shopper makes a mistake in performance. But what exactly is the difference between the 
two, and how should it be understood?  
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Here we must be careful. Judging seems to be something one does, so there is a risk of 
conflating the two kinds of mistake by subsuming mistakes in judgment under the category of 
mistakes in performance. Anscombe‘s example is particularly unhelpful in this regard. The 
detective‘s aim is to investigate and record the contents of the shopping cart, so many or all of his 
mistakes in judgment will presumably explain, or be explained by (or perhaps even be) mistakes in 
his performance of investigating and recording. Coming from the other side, there is some 
temptation to subsume mistakes in performance under the category of mistakes in judgment. The 
etymology of ‗mistake‘ itself suggests that mistakes must involve taking one thing to be another, 
which looks to be a purely theoretical error, as it were. Certainly the shopper‘s mistakes in 
performance seem to be explained by his mistakes in judgment (e.g. about whether this is butter); 
they might even be constituted by them, as he may have done everything else with perfect grace. 
 To avoid the potential confusion involved in thinking of judgment as a performance, I will 
change Anscombe‘s terminology and use the term ‗mistaken belief‘ instead of ‗mistake in judgment‘. 
The difference between the two kinds of mistake can then be clarified by attending to a difference 
between being and doing. Being mistaken about whether p, by virtue of one‘s false belief that p, is 
something that one is. Fouling up the shopping trip, by virtue of picking up margarine instead of 
butter, is, by way of contrast, something that one does. Acquiring a false belief that p is something 
that can just happen to you (e.g. in idle observation), or it can be something one does in the progress 
of a performance with an explicitly cognitive end, as when one adds up sums incorrectly. In either 
case one ends up being mistaken, where the state of being mistaken is to be distinguished from the 
process of coming to be in the state. Mistakes in performance made during inquiry are then to be 
distinguished from the state of being mistaken itself just by the fact that mistakes in performance are 
not states, but rather activities or actions.  
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 It would not threaten the distinction between mistaken beliefs and mistakes in performance 
if they always accompanied each other, but it would help if we could get a clear grasp of cases where 
one mistake is present independently of the other kind. We seem to be able to make sense of 
mistaken beliefs in isolation from mistakes in performance, because it seems quite possible to 
acquire false beliefs without any explicit performance being implicated in the acquisition. Idle 
observation and being raised to believe something false seem like plausible candidate cases here. Can 
mistakes in performance be made sense of in isolation from mistaken beliefs? Humberstone says 
that all mistakes in performance are attributable to false belief.55 Anscombe does not agree with this 
common view. Consider the following example she gives: 
But is there not possible another case in which a man is simply not doing what he says? As when I say 
to myself ‗Now I press Button A‘ – pressing Button B – a thing which can certainly happen. This I 
will call the direct falsification of what I say. And here, to use Theophrastus‘ expression again, the 
mistake is not one of judgment but of performance.56 
 
The case is a direct falsification because it is not explained by a mistaken belief. This point is perhaps 
obscured by Anscombe‘s description of the case. If she pressed Button B instead of Button A, one 
might think this cries out for explanation in terms of e.g. a false belief that Button A is Button B. 
But all Anscombe needs for a clear example of the direct falsification of what one says is a case in 
she does not press Button A but does something else instead. A case of mere clumsiness or lack of 
grace – as when she stubs her thumb on the side of the phone booth machine (or on Button B) – 
can be one where she directly falsifies what she said she was doing whilst having no false beliefs 
about means to her ends, where the Button A is, where her thumb was when she began etc. As 
Anscombe says, this is ―a thing which can certainly happen.‖ Call a mistake in performance that is 
not explained by false belief a basic mistake in performance. (I will legitimate the concept of a basic 
mistake in performance in Chapter 3.) 
                                                 
55 Humberstone (1992: 68). 
56 Anscombe (1957: 57). 
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There is an important difference between the temporality of mistakes in performance and 
mistaken beliefs. When one believes something false, one is mistaken about whether p for the entire 
duration of one‘s belief that p. Because mistakes in performance are things one does, they must be, 
in some sense, complete and irrevocable, because at some stage one must have done them. But 
whilst one is still doing something, one need not have made a mistake. Having fouled up the first 
shopping trip, the shopper (who still needs butter) must try again. But there is no mistake (yet) when 
he is halfway through his ordeal: he is, as it were, still making the mistake.57 
We now have some idea of the difference between mistaken beliefs and mistakes in 
performance; but what unites them? Anscombe introduces the shopper and the detective and her 
example of a ―direct falsification‖ of what is said immediately before her claim that modern 
philosophy is blind to the possibility of there being two kinds of knowledge.58 Later she makes a 
cryptic remark to the effect that mistakes in performance help to resolve an apparent paradox 
concerning whether practical knowledge can be knowledge of what is not the case.59 Given these 
passages, it is plausible that Anscombe thinks that the unity of mistaken beliefs and mistakes in 
performance is somehow bound up with the unity of practical and theoretical knowledge. 
I confess that I do not know how Anscombe thinks that mistakes in performance help to 
resolve the paradoxical idea that practical knowledge can be knowledge of what is not the case.  But 
we do not need to work this out in order to exploit her basic insight. The distinction between 
mistaken beliefs and mistakes in performance provides us with a general picture of mental activity as 
partially constituted by norms, against which distinctive kinds of mistake may be measured, 
coordinate with distinctive kinds of activity (where ‗activity‘ includes e.g. being of a certain state of 
                                                 
57 There are, of course, limits to the plausibility of claims that a ‗mistake‘ is not yet an irrevocable mistake because one 
and the same performance is still in progress. It would be a bad joke if, having left the store without butter, the shopper 
were to respond to his wife‘s criticism by saying ―What are you going on about? I haven‘t finished yet.‖ 
58 Anscombe (1957: 57). 
59 Anscombe (1957: 82). 
 47 
mind, and doing what one has in mind to do). Anscombe does not herself develop this picture into a 
general view of the metaphysics of mind required to make sense of such mistakes, nor she does she 
address difficult questions about how such a development might proceed. So let us turn to the 
prospects and puzzles involved in developing Anscombe‘s basic insight into a general account, on 
the understanding that the resultant view, though inspired by Anscombe, is not an exposition of her 
view, but something new. 
1.6 PROSPECTS AND PUZZLES 
I have suggested that Anscombe‘s basic insight can be used to construct an account of certain 
fundamental aspects of the mind – beliefs and telic events – in terms of (partially) constitutive 
standards of correctness, against which a distinctive kind of mistake may be measured. This 
promises a powerful general argument for the claim that the mind is essentially normative, and a 
distinctive and novel account of the nature and structure of intentional action. Let me conclude by 
summarizing some puzzles that such a project faces.  
 The first puzzle is in explaining precisely what it means to say that fundamental features of 
the mind, like beliefs and telic events, are partially constituted by norms. Beliefs seem like a 
paradigmatic exercise of a power of thought. So do telic events: they are ‗the mind in action‘ (as we 
put it in §1.4.4 above). It is difficult to see how norms could enter into the constitution of a power 
or its exercises. If we are to develop Anscombe‘s insight into a general account of the nature of the 
mind, and to argue that the mind is essentially normative, we need a general account of a kind of 
power that is essentially normative. 
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The second puzzle is in explaining what mistakes in performance and mistaken beliefs have 
in common. As mentioned above in §1.5.2, there is some danger of conflating the two kinds of 
mistake, or subsuming one under the category of the other. We need to keep them apart if we are to 
remain true to Anscombe‘s basic insight, yet we also need to explain what they have in common, 
else the project will be open to the same sort of objection as that faced by DOF theory: namely, that 
there is nothing unitary and deep here to discover. We cannot easily appeal to Anscombe‘s cryptic 
remarks about knowledge to explain what unites the mistakes: those remarks are (for me at least) too 
cryptic. So we need a general account of what a mistake is that can make sense of both the unity and 
difference of mistaken beliefs and mistakes in performance. 
The third puzzle is in determining the relationship between the standards of correctness for 
belief and telic events and what we might ‗external accord‘ with those standards. For ease of 
presentation I have assumed that the standard of correctness for belief is truth and the standard of 
correctness for telic events is success. But merely true beliefs may be accidentally true, and merely 
successful performances may be accidentally successful performances, and these seem like 
degenerate cases that are in merely external accord with the relevant standards. If we say that the 
standards of correctness are non-accidental truth and success, for which there is no possibility of 
‗merely external‘ accord, then we come close to saying that the standard of correctness in the case of 
belief is knowledge, and in the case of telic events, practical knowledge. A satisfactory development of 
Anscombe‘s basic insight would clear up this question of whether the standards against which 
mistakes are measured allow for external accord or not, and if not, whether beliefs and telic events 
do in fact ‗aim at knowledge‘. (Clearing up this question will not amount to an account of practical 
knowledge, but it will in some sense be a propaedeutic to such an account, and a propaedeutic to 
deciphering Anscombe‘s cryptic remarks about the relationship between practical knowledge and 
mistakes in performance.) 
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 In Chapter 2 I offer solutions to these puzzles. I solve the first two puzzles by offering a 
general account of fallible capacities: powers of thought that issue in perfect and imperfect exercises, 
where the imperfect exercises are mistakes. This account will be applied in a general argument for 
the essential normativity of the mind, given the pre-theoretically plausible claim that we make 
mistakes. I solve the third puzzle by showing why the relevant standards of correctness do not allow 
for external accord, so that beliefs and telic events do aim at (something like) knowledge. 
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2.0  WHY THE MIND IS ESSENTIALLY NORMATIVE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the most familiar aspects of our mental lives is the fact that we make mistakes. Mistakes are 
things we make, not things that happen to us. In this chapter I develop these two thoughts into an 
argument for what I call the Normativist Claim: 
  
 The Normativist Claim Norms are essential to having a mind (like ours).60 
 
I will call those who believe this claim ‗normativists‘. If the Normativist Claim is true, then the large 
number of naturalist views that aim to reduce or otherwise do without norms in their accounts of 
the nature of the mind must fail to adequately capture their subject matter.61 That‘s a startling 
conclusion. For this reason alone, any contemporary philosopher of mind ought to be interested in 
whether and why the Normativist Claim is true or false. 
                                                 
60 I should note at the outset that the Normativist Claim is implicitly restricted to minds like ours. Most normativists think 
that the Normativist Claim applies to the minds of imagined rational Martians; some (like me) suspect that it also applies 
to the minds of many non-rational animals. But most contemporary normativists don‘t think that the Normativist Claim 
applies to e.g. God‘s mind. I will be more specific about what I mean by ―minds like ours‖ when we get to my argument 
for the Normativist Claim. 
61 Who aims to do without norms? Pretty much everybody. Analytic functionalists like Jackson (1998) and Shoemaker 
(2003) aim to do without norms. Computational theorists of mind like Fodor (2008) and Rey (1997) also aim to do 
without norms. Even philosophers of mind with teleofunctionalist sympathies like Dretske (1995), Millikan (1984) and 
Papineau (1993) could be said to aim to do without norms at the relevant (metaphysically fundamental) level of analysis. 
The list goes on and on. Searle (1983) counts as an exception, if only because he treats direction of fit as an 
unanalyzable, primitive and apparently normative term. 
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 The chapter has the following structure. In §2.2 I identify a promising argument schema for 
the Normativist Claim. Applications of the argument schema require an account of an essentially 
normative power of thought. In §2.3 I outline an account of an essentially normative power of 
thought – a fallible capacity – and compare it to Aristotle‘s conception of a rational capacity. In §2.4 I 
argue that the mind is essentially normative, because the fallible capacity to know is essential to 
minds (like ours), and the fallible capacity to know cannot be reduced to something non-normative. 
In §2.5 I consider how the account of fallible capacities solves the puzzles raised in Chapter 1. 
2.2 AN ARGUMENT SCHEMA FOR THE ESSENTIAL NORMATIVITY OF THE 
MIND 
Normativists tend to argue for the Normativist Claim by applying the following argument schema: 
 
Schematic Argument for Normative Essentialism 
 [or SANE for short] 
 P1 Y is essential to having a mind (like ours). 
P2 A true and adequate statement of the essence (or metaphysically fundamental nature) 
of Y must use normative terms.  
C1 So norms are essential to having a mind (like ours).  
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Y could be a mental property like concept possession, but it could also be a property of Y-ity, such as 
conceptuality, or it could be a property of engaging in the Y kind of activity, such as conceptual activity.62 
For example, Nick Zangwill (1995) has argued that propositional attitudes are essential to having a mind 
and that propositional attitudes have normative essences that cannot be explained in non-normative 
terms. Ralph Wedgwood (2007a, 2007b) has argued that concepts are essential to intentional thought 
and that concepts are possessed by virtue of possession of rational dispositions that cannot be 
specified in non-normative terms.63 64  
SANE depends on some understanding of the difference between normative and non-
normative terms. Roughly, normative terms directly invoke a conception of how something ought to 
be, over and above mere description of how it is. Drawing the distinction between normative and 
non-normative terms more precisely than this is notoriously difficult to do. I will follow the bulk of 
the literature in listing paradigmatic normative terms rather than trying for a general account of the 
normative / non-normative divide. Terms like ‗ought‘ and ‗correct‘ count as paradigmatic normative 
terms. Terms like ‗is disposed to‘, ‗belief‘ and ‗desire‘ do not.65 
There is a dialectical problem for SANE: it risks begging the question in P2. Consider a 
reductive naturalist philosopher of mind who is loathe to accept the Normativist Claim. She might 
                                                 
62 What a ―true and adequate statement of essence‖ amounts to I don‘t really know. I am not primarily a metaphysician, 
although I have been forced to dabble. In what follows I am dodging the questions of whether there‘s no such thing as 
essence, or no such thing as true and adequate statement of essence. See Kit Fine (1994a, 1994b, 1995) for helpful 
(preliminary) work on the ground rules for statements of essence. 
63 SANE is found in the work of other normativists apart from Zangwill and Wedgwood. Brandom (2000), for instance, 
is often cited as a key contemporary normativist, and his work can be read on the model of an application of SANE. 
Brandom argues that participation in a socially-mediated practice of commitment and entitlement is essential to having a 
mind, and that commitment and entitlement are normative statuses that cannot be reduced to something non-normative. 
Commitment and entitlement, and the kind of activity appropriate to them, are Brandom‘s substitutions for Y. But 
Brandom doesn‘t do metaphysics in any straightforward sense, so the words ―essential to having a mind‖, as he would 
employ them (were he to ever use them) would require a difficult non-metaphysical interpretation. I won‘t address 
Brandom directly in this paper, as it would take us far afield. 
64 Wedgwood (2007a: 172) might object to the second premise of SANE, but only because of qualms about the 
difference between normative terms and ―mentioning normative properties‖. I ride roughshod over some of the 
subtleties here in order to bring out the common theme. 
65 So even if Zangwill is right that belief and desire have normative essences, the normativist cannot presuppose that 
‗belief‘ and ‗desire‘ are normative terms. If SANE is to be even mildly persuasive, the normative terms that figure in P2 
must be clearly normative, in a sense that is relatively uncontested. 
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accept that minds like ours are subject to mental norms, or assessable in terms of mental norms, 
where mental norms are epistemic norms, or perhaps norms of practical rationality, or perhaps 
norms of proper mental function more generally. She might even accept that minds like ours are 
necessarily subject to, or assessable in terms of, mental norms. Where she balks is at the claim that 
true and adequate statements of the essence of minds like ours must include normative terms. There 
are a number of understandable reasons why one might balk in this way. For example, one might 
think that norms are not causally efficacious, and also think that only terms that refer to causally 
efficacious things should figure in true and adequate statements of essence. (Many physicalists think 
that something like this is true, and have related doubts about mental causation, given the causal 
closure of the physical.)66 Such a reductive naturalist might well accept, at least for the sake of 
argument, that SANE is a valid argument schema.67 She might well accept a version of P1: suppose 
she thinks that representation is essential to minds like ours. But she is likely to find particular versions 
of P2 question-begging. If Y (e.g. representation) is indeed essential to having a mind, then 
explaining Y in non-normative terms is precisely what the reductive naturalist aims to do.68 
Applications of SANE wouldn‘t beg the question if there were support for P2 that were 
independent of accepting the Normativist Claim. But so far, no normativist has been able to come 
up with the required independent support.69 Wedgwood provides a good example of the dialectical 
                                                 
66 See for instance Kim (1993). 
67 In what follows I assume that SANE is a valid argument schema. This requires a very strong reading of P2. P2 does 
not merely make an epistemological point about us. It‘s not just that we (stupid monkeys) must use normative terms in 
stating the essence of Y, because of some idiosyncratic epistemological or linguistic limitations. Rather anyone (even 
God) who aimed to truly and adequately state the essence of Y would have to use normative terms in doing so. 
68 My use of the term ‗reductive naturalist‘ is somewhat non-standard. Reductive naturalists in philosophy of mind 
typically aim to explain the nature of the mind without appeal to psychological terms. They don‘t aim to explain the nature 
of the mind in non-normative terms, except insofar as that is a consequence of explaining the nature of the mind in non-
psychological terms. I explain the particular sense of reduction in more detail in §2.4.2.  
69 Zangwill (1998) argues that analytic functionalist accounts of the nature of the mind fail to account for systematic 
irrationality and causal deviance, and concludes that we need to accept the Normativist Claim. But he never actually 
argues that the failure of analytic functionalism implies the truth of his version of P2. Other reductive projects might 
succeed where analytic functionalism fails, in which case we don‘t need to accept Zangwill‘s P2, and so don‘t need to 
accept the Normativist Claim. Zangwill indirectly acknowledges this point. He notes that his attack of analytic 
 54 
difficulties here. He argues that rational dispositions must be specified in normative terms, and that 
concepts are possessed by virtue of possession of particular rational dispositions. But there‘s a big 
difference between saying that concepts can be possessed by virtue of possession of a particular 
rational disposition, and saying that they must be possessed this way. Even granting that rational 
dispositions must be specified in normative terms, and that they can ground concept possession, one 
might still wonder: why can‘t irrational, or non-rational, dispositions ground concept possession? 
When Wedgwood considers this kind of possibility, he says the following: 
 …it seems to me doubtful that one‘s possession of a concept can rest on an irrational disposition… 
concept possession is a cognitive power or ability, not a cognitive defect or liability.
70
 
 
Wedgwood says this because he thinks that when we employ a concept in thought, we exercise the 
very same kind of cognitive power that a perfectly rational subject would exercise in employing the 
very same concept. But he doesn‘t actually have a good argument for the claim that being like the 
perfectly rational subject in this way is the only way to possess a cognitive power, or to possess a 
concept.71 Georges Rey has a direct response to Wedgwood that brings out very well how the move 
to cognitive powers is no help, dialectically speaking. Rey says this: 
…it does rather beg the question to suppose that concept possession must be the kind of ―power‖ or 
―ability‖ that couldn‘t be a ―defect‖ or ―liability‖. The question is why we should think that it is a 
power that needs intrinsically to be described in any normative terms at all.
72
 
 
I think that Rey‘s question is an excellent one, and it deserves a direct answer. If the normativists are 
to move the dialectic along, they need to explain how there could even be a kind of power that 
                                                                                                                                                             
functionalism doesn‘t touch teleofunctionalism or Bill Lycan‘s ‗homunctionalism‘. Given that Millikan‘s earlier work on 
teleofunctionalism sketches a reduction of mental norms to a kind of evolutionary advantage, Zangwill hasn‘t given 
independent support for the view that normative terms must be used in true and adequate statements of the essence of 
the mind. In his most recent work Zangwill says that he just wants to speculate on the consequences of accepting the 
Normativist Claim, rather than arguing that it must be accepted. See Zangwill (2005, 2010). 
70 Wedgwood (2007b: 168-9). 
71 Wedgwood (2007a: 172) does say that a perfectly rational subject could explain our errors in concept-use to us. But 
this does not show that our powers of thought must be of the same metaphysical kind as those of the perfectly rational 
subject. The perfectly rational subject could explain our errors precisely in terms of a metaphysical difference in the kind 
of causal power at work, if concept possession can in fact be grounded in many ways, and not only by (approximating 
to) manifesting a rational disposition. 
72 Rey (2007: 77). 
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―needs intrinsically‖ to be described in normative terms, and then argue that the mind‘s essential 
powers are of that kind. It‘s not enough to gesture towards an idealized perfectly rational subject and 
say that our powers of thought are ―like that‖. There‘s a clear sense in which we‘re obviously not 
―like that‖. We bumble about like idiots. It‘s a substantive claim, and one that‘s hard to defend, to 
say that the bumblings of an idiot must be of the same metaphysical kind as the perfectly rational 
thoughts of an angel, or the perfectly rational deeds of a phronimos.73  
In what follows I will try to turn our familiar bumbling into a virtue of a normativist 
account, so as to answer Rey‘s question directly, so as move the dialectic along. The answer goes as 
follows. There are indeed powers that need intrinsically to be described in normative terms. These 
powers are what I will call fallible capacities: capacities that admit of both perfect and imperfect 
exercises, where (some of) the imperfect exercises are mistakes. The mind‘s essential capacities are of 
this kind, and this is why the mind is essentially normative. 
2.3 CAPACITIES, FALLIBLE CAPACITIES AND RATIONAL CAPACITIES 
2.3.1 Capacities 
Thinking is something that minds, by their very nature, do. ―Capacity talk‖ is, for me at least, just a 
way to talk about such essential causal powers of minds, like the capacity to think. Let me say a few 
words about ―capacity talk‖ before proceeding to the account of fallible capacities.74 
                                                 
73 In the context of a discussion about practical thought, Setiya (2007: 64) makes essentially the same point: ―Why accept 
that the motivation of imperfectly rational beings, like us, must be explained in each case by its resemblance to good 
practical thought, as though our failures are mere perturbations of a system that is otherwise ideal?‖ 
74 I use the terms ‗power‘, ‗causal power‘, ‗ability‘ and ‗capacity‘ interchangeably. Sometimes the word ‗disposition‘ might 
also do. Many views of dispositions are indistinguishable from views about capacities etc. Views about dispositions differ 
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 Capacities, as I understand them, are possessed by individuals, have conditions of exercise, 
and are individuated by what they are capacities to do.75 We can both be moved to tears, and in that 
sense we share a capacity, but what moves you to tears need not be what moves me to tears (the 
conditions of exercise differ for you and me).76 Capacities explain their exercises as non-accidental 
(in some sense of ―no accident‖). Capacity-specifications have an infinitive form: one has a capacity 
to A. But no hefty metaphysical lessons should be read off from the grammatical form of these 
specifications: some capacities are capacities to engage in activities or processes whilst others are 
capacities to be in states. 
 Determinative exercises of the capacity to A are exercises that are determinations of A: cases or 
ways for A to be wholly manifested in some state or episode. Walking jauntily to the left is a 
determination of walking, for example. Capacities exhibit a distinctive unity of explanatory power in 
their determinative exercises. We do not explain the hot knife‘s action on nearby heatable objects by 
citing one capacity to heat butter; another capacity to heat bread a bit on Mondays; and so on. 
Arbitrarily isolating a subset of determinative exercises of a capacity in this way does not 
automatically serve to individuate a distinct capacity; neither does arbitrarily isolating subsets of 
conditions of exercise, such as being held on one or other side of the butter. That said, it is harmless 
to talk profligately about the number of capacities that something possesses, and to sort them into 
kinds according to arbitrary modes and conditions, so long as it is remembered that this is not a 
good guide to individuation. I shall engage in such profligacy often in what follows, on the 
assumption that some happy middle ground is available between the view that we each have one 
                                                                                                                                                             
from views about capacities to the extent that they include some notion of comparative quantity (e.g. if I am disposed to 
A, then A is something I can do, but moreover I tend to A more often than not.) 
75 By ‗individuals‘ I mean to encompass e.g. individual groups, associations etc. 
76 If I can do a two-meter long jump on Earth, but you can only do one on the Moon, isn‘t it true that I have a capacity 
that you don‘t? In the sense of potential range of determinative exercises, you can do something that I can‘t, but in both 
cases the exercise of the capacity to jump two-meters is an exercise of the capacity to jump (as one wills) and that is 
something that we share. ―Capacity talk‖ is often used to compare ranges of potential determinative exercises, but it is 
important to note that not every colloquial difference corresponds to a difference in capacity. 
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capacity to do stuff (with an infinite number of more or less specific determinative exercises) and the 
view that we each have an infinite number of more or less specific capacities (one for each halfway-
plausible verb phrase, such as ―to crawl doggedly across the road in response to heartbreak on a 
Saturday night‖). 
Is it prejudicial to conceive of mental activity in terms of the exercise of capacities? Talk of 
capacities and their exercise fits seamlessly with most accounts of the nature of the mind. It does 
conflict with the view that, strictly speaking, there are no causal powers possessed by objects, but 
only instantiations of properties and relations at various times according to exceptionless laws of 
nature. There is a considerable body of literature supporting the view that we cannot do without the 
concept of objects possessing and exercising causal powers.77 I defer to such literature in defense of 
the very idea of a causal power. Capacity talk is just a way to talk about such causal powers. 
2.3.2 Fallible Capacities 
All capacities have perfect (i.e. determinative) exercises.78 Fallible capacities have perfect and imperfect 
exercises. Perfect exercises of the fallible capacity to A are exercises that are determinations of A. 
Imperfect exercises of the fallible capacity to A are exercises that are not determinations of A.  
 Are there any such imperfect exercises of capacities? Consider a baseball player practicing 
catches. The ball flies high, she positions herself under it, it‘s an easy catch, and she catches it 
smoothly. This seems ground enough to say that she has the capacity to catch balls of that type. 
Consider the next case. The ball flies just as high, she positions herself under it the same way, it‘s the 
                                                 
77 For example, coming from the direction of philosophy of science, see Cartwright (1994), Machamer, Darden and 
Craver (2000). Coming from direction of literature on dispositions and abilities, see Mumford (1998), Molnar (2003). 
78 The phrasing here is correct, but slightly misleading. If there are non-fallible processual capacities, then they will have 
perfect determinative exercises as well as grammatically-imperfect exercises, even if they have no normatively-imperfect 
exercises. See below for a description of processual capacities.  
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same kind of easy catch, and yet she fumbles it. She was in the right conditions of exercise for her 
capacity, given that the conditions were the same as for the first catch, and she didn‘t lose the 
capacity momentarily, only to magically regain it again when she makes the next catch. So on the 
face of it, the fumbled catch presents us with an imperfect exercise of her capacity to catch balls of 
that type. Such things happen all the time. 
There will of course be an explanation of the failure: perhaps she dropped her glove-hand a 
little at the last moment whilst checking third base, and then couldn‘t bring it back up in time when 
she looked back.79 (A coach might point this out: it could be the basis for improving her technique.) 
The case is nevertheless distinct from other forms of failure to do something one has a capacity to 
do because the source of the failure is found in the catcher herself and her exercise of her powers, 
such as they are.  
There are other cases where failure to catch a ball may be attributed to external or internal 
interference, as when someone pushes the catcher (external interference), or a sudden heart attack or 
hiccup perverts the progress of what otherwise would have been a smooth catch (internal 
interference). Cases of interference provide a merely grammatical sense of imperfection: the same 
sense in which anything that takes time to do can be interrupted by something alien and so left 
incomplete. (It is grammatical imperfection because one can truly say: ―X was A-ing but did not 
A.‖) Failure may also be attributed to prevention, as when someone prevents the catcher from getting 
near the ball at all. But cases of interference and prevention aren‘t cases of an imperfect exercise of a 
capacity to catch high-flying balls, where the imperfection has a normative, rather than merely 
grammatical, significance. In cases of interference, it is not a normatively-imperfect exercise if the 
                                                 
79 Shouldn‘t this imply that the conditions of exercise weren‘t the same? No. Conditions of exercise for a capacity are 
external to the exercise itself, but catching a ball is an activity that includes certain kinds of preparation within its scope, 
so those preparatory activities cannot be considered conditions of exercise. Otherwise no one could catch a ball until the 
conditions of exercise were such that they had already caught it. 
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catcher couldn‘t be expected to know about the interference, so as to try and do something about it. 
We might say that the exercise was (rudely) interrupted, but it seems false (and mean) to say that it was 
imperfect, in a sense that traces the imperfection to some failing in the catcher and the exercise of her 
powers.80 Cases of prevention are defined by the fact that they prevent exercise of the relevant 
capacity. So normatively-imperfect exercises of capacities represent a third category of failure to do 
something one has the capacity to do, distinct from both prevention and interference. Let us label this 
third category that of mistakes. 
 Mistakes have not been acknowledged as a distinct category of failure by most contemporary 
views about dispositions or abilities.81 Fara (2008) comes close: he classifies the case of a seasoned 
golfer failing to make an easy putt as a case of a ―masked‖ ability, where some sudden gust of wind 
or distraction explains the failure. The case of distraction looks similar to the second of our ball-
catching examples.82 But Fara says that masked abilities are abilities that the agent fails to exercise for 
some reason, despite being in appropriate circumstances for the exercise, and despite the agent 
trying to exercise the relevant ability. This commits Fara to the view that whatever the golfer does is 
not, in any sense, an exercise of his ability to sink easy putts, and perhaps to the view that abilities are 
only exercised when they are exercised perfectly.83 This latter commitment is found in most 
contemporary views about dispositions and abilities: according to contemporary views, every 
                                                 
80 It may be a different matter if the catcher saw the person coming, or if catching whilst dodging, or fighting, (or 
hiccupping) is a part of exercising the relevant skill.  
81 See for example Armstrong, Martin & Place (1996), Lewis (1997), Manley & Wasserman (2008), Mumford (1998), and 
Ryle (1963). See Bird (2012) for some indirect reflections about the relationship between linguistic/conceptual analysis 
and the relevant metaphysical thesis concerning perfect (determinative) exercises.  
82 The case of a sudden gust of wind employs the merely grammatical sense of imperfection, for the gusts of wind are 
sudden, and so are unknowable ahead of time. Things are different with prevailing winds: golfers are expected to account 
for them, and doing so is a test of their skill. The same is true of (most) distractions: a certain degree of steady care and 
attention is part of golfing (well). This issue receives brief further discussion towards the end of Chapter 3. 
83 In Fara‘s official definition of masking, the crucial condition is that the agent fails at whatever she is trying to do, rather 
than that she fails to exercise the relevant ability. This definition could accommodate mistakes as cases of ―masking‖. 
But elsewhere Fara is relatively clear that he does not think the ability has been exercised in such cases: the failure to 
achieve the end is a failure to exercise the relevant ability when the ability is masked. Fara‘s identification of these two 
failures would be explained by adherence to the claim that abilities are only exercised when they are exercised perfectly. 
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exercise of the disposition or ability to A must be a perfect (i.e. determinative) exercise.84 If we 
countenance mistakes, we move beyond contemporary views in this regard. There are cases of 
failure where the baseball player‘s capacity to catch easy balls is exercised in the circumstances – but 
imperfectly so – for missing an easy ball is not a case or a way of catching an easy ball. 
 The very idea of capacities with imperfect exercises may seem outrageous and outlandish, 
especially as it flies in the face of contemporary wisdom about dispositions and abilities. We can ease 
our way into the idea by considering the merely grammatical sense of imperfection I mentioned 
before. Consider capacities whose exercises take time to resolve into their proper end state: for 
example, the capacity to walk across the road. Until one has crossed the road there is no state or 
episode that is a determination of what the capacity is a capacity to do, for the capacity is not merely 
a capacity to be walking with a certain goal in mind, but to actually get to the other side. Yet 
considered at some time before the proper resolution has been reached, it would be bizarre to credit 
some other capacity with the progress to date. So if there are capacities that are capacities to do 
something that takes time to reach its proper resolution – call these processual capacities – then there 
are capacities that have exercises that are not determinations of what the capacity is a capacity to do. 
So far I have characterized both fallible and processual capacities in negative terms: as 
capacities that have imperfect exercises that are not determinative exercises. Having eased our way 
into the idea of the general class of capacities with imperfect exercises, we need a positive way to 
distinguish processual from fallible capacities.85 We cannot rest content with the mere labels 
―grammatical imperfection‖ and ―normative imperfection‖. We need to understand what the labels 
mean.  
                                                 
84 I think commitment to this claim is the source of problems about ―masking‖, ―finking‖ etc. The importance of such 
cases stems from the fact that the logical category employed in the analysis of dispositions is too narrow. 
85 Note that a capacity can be both fallible and processual, as the capacity to catch balls is. The terms ‗fallible‘ and 
‗processual‘ mark possibilities for exercise of a capacity, not wholly distinct classes of capacity. 
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A logical relation is required to make sense of which episodes and states count as exercises 
of a capacity and which do not. When we deal with perfect exercises of capacities, the logical 
relation is easy to specify: perfect exercises will be species of some genus, or determinations of some 
determinable, where the genus or determinable is whatever the capacity is specified as a capacity to 
do. For example, the chameleon‘s change of its skin-color to blue, so as to blend into a blue 
environment, is a perfect exercise of its capacity to change its skin-color to blend into its 
environment. When we deal with the grammatically-imperfect exercises of processual capacities, the 
logical relations found in mereology seem appropriate. Walking halfway across the road is not a species 
or determination of walking all the way, but when all goes well it is a part of walking all the way. We 
need to sketch a similar logical relation that is characteristic of normatively-imperfect exercises of 
fallible capacities. 
 The answer I have hit upon (with help from Aristotle) is this: the logical relation is one of 
preclusion, in the sense of mutual temporal non-compossibility.86 Normatively-imperfect exercises of 
fallible capacities are determinate ways of falling short of a perfect exercise, where falling short in 
that determinate way is not attributable to interference, and falling short in that determinate way 
precludes a perfect exercise on that occasion and in that regard. For instance, in the case of the 
fumbled catch, an inadequate ordering of preparatory activities precludes perfection. (Remember 
how the catcher dropped her glove hand, so that she couldn’t bring it back up in time to catch the 
ball.) Supposing that false belief or inadequately justified true belief is an imperfect exercise of the 
fallible capacity to know, an inadequate ordering of epistemic grounds precludes knowing the 
relevant truth on that occasion and in that regard. Every mistake consists in an inappropriate or 
inadequate ordering of some kind of activity, in a suitably broad sense of activity. We know this 
                                                 
86 Apart from Aristotle (1995), credit is also due to Kimhi (forthcoming), McDowell (2011), and Rödl (2007), who all 
develop Aristotle‘s conception of a ‗two-way‘ rational capacity to a greater or lesser degree.  
 62 
because in each case of such imperfection, one can in principle give an explanation of why the 
exercise goes wrong that consists in pointing out how the relevant ordering of activity precludes 
perfection on that occasion and in that regard. If we couldn‘t explain how the ordering of activity 
precluded perfection, we would have good reason to suppose that the failure wasn‘t with the bearer 
of the capacity in the way relevant to attribution of a mistake; it would rather constitute some 
problem with interference or conditions of exercise.87 
Preclusion is local to an individual occasion and regard. Consider a pedestrian who walks 
halfway across the road, dances back from an approaching bus, and then completes her journey, ―all 
in one go‖ (as we say). What this pedestrian did need not be a mistake because it did not preclude 
her getting all the way across ―all in one go‖. It could have been a mistake, had she been squashed, 
or (less gruesomely) driven to squander a genuine opportunity by retreating to the curb, so that she 
had to try again. (What is meant by ‗try again‘ here is part of the subject matter of Chapter 3.) 
I have invoked Aristotle. We should see what the great man had to say about capacities that 
admit of two kinds of exercise, if only to help illuminate the nature of the current proposal. 
2.3.3 Aristotle on Rational Capacities 
The first philosopher to have developed the idea of capacities that admit of two genuinely different 
kinds of exercise is Aristotle.88 In Metaphysics Theta Aristotle distinguishes non-rational capacities 
from rational capacities in terms of the number and kinds of exercise of which they admit. The 
                                                 
87 There is a difficulty about omissions. Some mistakes consist in, for instance, not paying enough attention or care to 
what one is doing given one‘s knowledge of circumstances, and it is hard to see how an omission could be part of an 
inappropriately-ordered activity. Chapter 3 sketches a solution to the problem for the case of intentional action. 
88 See Beere (2010) and Makin (2006) for excellent commentaries on Aristotle‘s distinction between one-way non-
rational capacities and two-way rational capacities. The exposition of Aristotle in this section is my own, although I have 
benefitted from both Beere and Makin‘s work in coming to this interpretation.  
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current proposal is inspired by Aristotle‘s distinction, but it is not identical with it, so it will help to 
point out the similarities and differences. 
According to Aristotle, non-rational capacities are ―one-way‖ capacities in that there is only 
one kind of exercise of the capacity. Aristotle‘s example is the capacity hot rocks have to heat 
heatable things, like cold water. Should the bearer of an active non-rational capacity meet with a 
suitable patient in the conditions of exercise for that capacity it invariably produces the associated 
change in the patient. Something similar, suitably transformed, holds for passive capacities, such as 
the capacity to be heated. The claim about invariable affection is not as crazy as it may seem. 
Aristotle thinks that a proper understanding of what the capacity is a capacity to do already includes 
understanding of the appropriate conditions for the relevant exercise of the capacity – the capacity is 
to heat under certain conditions, not to heat whilst wrapped in an insulating bag – so there is no 
need to qualify claims about whether the capacity will be exercised with clauses such as ―provided 
nothing external hinders it from acting‖ (see 1048a5 and 1048a20).89  
 Rational capacities are ―two-way‖ capacities in that there are two opposed kinds of exercise 
of the capacity. Aristotle‘s examples are arts such as building and medicine. The one who can build 
or heal knows how to produce a building or health, but such knowledge consists in grasp of a logos 
or rational account, and so is by implication knowledge of the privation of structural integrity or 
health. If you can heal, for instance, you know the order of health, and so know the steps towards 
                                                 
89 The insulating bag is a bad example. A hot thing in an insulating bag will heat the insulating bag (a little bit) even if it 
fails to heat further things via the material mediation of the insulating bag. This suggests the interesting conclusion that 
inanimate things never fail to do something they have a capacity to do when in the conditions of exercise for that 
capacity. The hot thing heats even if it doesn‘t heat this heatable object, or heat this heatable object sufficiently for X (e.g. 
up to 25 degrees). If this is right, then no inanimate object has a processual capacity, for these could be interrupted by 
something alien so as to result in a failure. In fact, the last claim seems plausible. Processual capacities must have a 
proper end point for their exercises. It is not in the nature of a rock to hang around near a heatable object long enough 
to accomplish some arbitrarily limited change, so in that sense whether it does or not is an accident as far as the rock and 
its powers are concerned. It is in the nature of animals to hang around in an environment until they have accomplished 
some (more or less arbitrarily) limited change. Nothing hangs on whether inanimate objects have processual capacities or 
not, so I do not pursue the matter in this chapter. 
 64 
health, and by reversing an order of reasoning towards health you know the steps away from health 
as well. Should the bearer of a rational capacity meet with a suitable patient in suitable conditions of 
exercise for the capacity we cannot tell what will happen unless we know something more about the 
bearer of the capacity: namely, what she desires or chooses to do with her knowledge. Should the 
healer desire to heal, healing will ensue; should she desire to harm, illness (in the sense of privation 
of health) will ensue; should she desire neither to heal nor to harm, no exercise of the capacity will 
ensue. Aristotle also says that rational capacities are more properly capacities to produce one of the 
opposed contraries, and only ―in a way incidentally‖ capacities to produce the other.90 His reason for 
saying that rational capacities are ―positively valenced‖ towards one exercise rather than the other is 
that rational understanding is of some unified thing in itself (e.g. health) and the knowledge one has 
of the contrary is by means of negation or privation of the relevant unity. We cannot understand, for 
instance, illness in all its variety except by relating it to health, but we can understand health on its 
own terms as the flourishing of some organism. 
 For present purposes, the most important structural feature of rational capacities is that they 
are defined by their ―positive valence‖ towards an ideal unity. The capacity to heal is a capacity to heal 
(simpliciter), not a capacity to heal or harm. It was mentioned above that we do not postulate distinct 
capacities willy-nilly because that would do violence to the unity of explanatory power that capacities 
exhibit. In the case of rational capacities, that unity of explanatory power is of a special kind. One 
does not have a capacity to harm (through medical knowledge) that is different from one‘s capacity 
to heal (through medical knowledge), because to suppose that one does would be to violate the 
special unity of explanatory power that rational capacities exhibit: the single unified order of 
reasoning involved, and the privilege of one of a pair of contraries (health, not illness) in delimiting 
                                                 
90 Aristotle (1995: 1046b13). 
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the nature of that order of reasoning and associated capacities that apply cognitive grasp of that 
order in action. 
Fallible capacities are similar to Aristotle‘s rational capacities in that they defined by their 
―positive valence‖ towards an ideal unity, where the ideally unified activity is contrary to indefinitely 
many ways of falling short of that ideal unity.91 But Aristotle‘s conception of rational capacities is 
different to the present proposal in a number of ways. The first difference is that our rational 
capacities presuppose the presence and exercise of fallible capacities. The surgeon who desires to 
harm may fumble his vicious scalpel incision, making his exercise of his capacity to heal doubly 
incidental: incidental by the lights of the kind of exercise of his knowledge in play (harming, not 
healing) and incidental by the lights of the fallibility of this capacity (fumbling, not cutting). The 
second difference is that it would be quite wrong to say that e.g. whenever a thinking subject 
believes what‘s false she desires to believe what‘s false. The element that determines what went wrong 
or right in some exercise of a fallible capacity will be internal to the bearer of a fallible capacity in an 
interesting way (consider again the baseball catcher‘s inappropriate ordering of her preparatory 
activity), but usually the internal explanation need not invoke desire. The third difference is that 
non-rational animals seem to have fallible capacities (as witnessed by many America’s Funniest Home 
Videos entries) and at least as far as Aristotle‘s official definitions go, non-rational animals could not 
have rational capacities.92 
Differences aside, Aristotle‘s analysis of kinds of capacity provides us with a model for how 
to resist the idea that there is a way to render the operations of one kind of capacity in terms of the 
operations of some number of capacities of a different kind. The interesting aspect of Aristotle‘s 
views about the metaphysics of capacities is that no combination of one-way capacities could 
                                                 
91 Here it is important to stress that ‗activity‘ does service for activity, process, state, etc. 
92 Makin (2006) suggests that this is merely an oversight on Aristotle‘s part, and fills in an account on his behalf. 
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account for the unity of explanation found in the explanation of someone‘s healing or harming as 
the exercise of her rational two-way capacity to heal. It is by exploiting an analogous unity of 
explanation that we will resist the urge to reduction in the case of fallible capacities that are essential 
to having a mind (like ours).93 
2.3.4 Two Important Features of Fallible Capacities 
Let me highlight two features of fallible capacities that will be important for my argument for the 
Normativist Claim. 
2.3.4.1 Fallible Capacities Set Standards of Correctness 
The first important feature is that fallible capacities set standards of correctness. It follows from the 
fact of an imperfect exercise that there are grounds for criticism of what was done. It would be 
unintelligible for someone who understands the criticism to deny its relevance to what she ought to 
have done on that occasion in that regard, even if the mistake doesn‘t register significantly on some 
other normative or evaluative measure (e.g. the measure of justice, or glamorousness). I will mark 
this normativity by saying that a fallible capacity sets a standard of correctness for the bearer of the 
                                                 
93 Why only analogous? Apart from the differences noted, I am not sure that Aristotle, were he introduced to the 
contemporary terminology, would agree that rational capacities are essentially normative. Pace Hippocrates, there need be 
nothing wrong or incorrect with the incidental exercise of a surgeon‘s capacity to heal in some case. Aristotle is very clear 
that something else – namely desire – dictates what one does with a rational capacity. I suspect Aristotle would say that 
correct desire also dictates what one ought to do with a rational capacity. Certainly there is no indication in Metaphysics 
Theta that desire, or exercise of the capacity, ought to tend towards promotion of the relevant unity (e.g. promoting 
health) rather than its privation (not even prima facie). The standards for correct desire may come completely apart from 
the ideal unities of which we can have knowledge that can be applied in action. 
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capacity in her exercises of that capacity. The exercise of a fallible capacity is correct iff it is a perfect 
exercise and it is incorrect iff it is a normatively-imperfect exercise.94 
 There are no intermediate degrees of partial correctness or incorrectness for the standard of 
correctness set by a fallible capacity. This may seem counterintuitive. If I make some minor mistake 
and fail to catch a ball, but very nearly catch it, isn‘t that better than making a more drastic mistake 
where I do not even come close to success? If I have some evidence for a false belief, isn‘t that 
better than having no evidence at all? The answers to these questions are to one side of the question 
of whether the relevant fallible capacity was exercised imperfectly or not. The standard of 
correctness set by a fallible capacity concerns only this question. As noted in Chapter 1, a false belief 
is mistaken regardless of one‘s evidence for it.95 Similarly, a fumbled catch is a failure, regardless of 
how close one came to success. The criticism relevant to imperfect exercises of fallible capacities is, 
first and foremost, concerned with what is required for perfect exercise and what precludes perfect 
exercise, not with makes for better imitation of, or approximation to, perfect exercise. 
This does not mean that there couldn‘t also be a standard of excellence that admits of many 
degrees of partial fulfillment that applies to the relevant exercises. But any such standard of 
excellence would be distinct from the standard of correctness, precisely because it allows of many 
degrees of partial fulfillment. Consider my fallible capacity to write a neat letter ‗g‘ for instance.96 I 
can write a letter ‗g‘ that is very messy; suppose this is a normatively-imperfect exercise of the fallible 
capacity to write a neat letter ‗g‘. If I write a slightly messy letter ‗g‘, that seems to approach closer to a 
                                                 
94 If the future is genuinely open, such that the Law of the Excluded Middle fails for some things that are (at the 
moment) still developing in time, then fallible processual capacities allow a middle ground that is neither correct nor 
incorrect whilst the exercise is still in progress, because the occasion hasn‘t yet resolved one way or the other. 
95 In the present context we are also assuming that an accidentally true belief is also mistaken in the relevant sense of 
‗mistaken‘. I will justify this classification of accidentally true beliefs in §2.5. 
96 Particular thanks are due to Kieran Setiya for the example and for pushing me to address this point in more detail. 
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normative standard of writing a neat letter ‗g‘ than writing the very messy letter ‗g‘ did.97 The nature 
of the capacity itself may seem to set a standard of excellence that can be met or fulfilled to varying 
degrees in these imperfect exercises. 98 If it does, the standard of excellence must be distinct from the 
standard of correctness set by the capacity. The standard of correctness is not met or fulfilled in 
either case, because in neither case is a neat letter ‗g‘ produced: I didn‘t do what was required. The 
purported standard of excellence is met or fulfilled in both cases (to some degree, but met or 
fulfilled nonetheless). Based on the property of being met or fulfilled, Leibniz‘s Law dictates that the 
standard of correctness and the standard of excellence must be distinct. 
2.3.4.2 Fallible Capacities are Essentially Normative 
The second important feature is that fallible capacities are themselves essentially normative. 
Although preclusion is a symmetrical relation, fallible capacities are not indifferently related to their 
mutually incompatible exercises. Suppose we have a fallible capacity to know, where cases of false or 
inadequately justified belief (cases of ―mere belief‖) are the imperfect exercises that preclude 
knowing on some occasion in some regard. This fallible capacity to know, by its very nature, is not 
indifferently related to its mutually incompatible exercises. It is a fallible capacity to know, not a 
fallible capacity to merely believe. If it were a fallible capacity to merely believe, then mere belief would 
be the perfect correct exercise, and knowing would be the imperfect incorrect exercise, for which 
the bearer of the capacity would be liable for criticism. (―You ended up knowing, you fool! You‘re 
supposed to merely believe! Now let‘s see what you did wrong…‖) The structure of a fallible 
capacity is such that it already includes within itself a positive normative assessment of one of a pair 
                                                 
97 The standard need not be an ideal of perfection, such as the Form of Neat ‗G‘ that is unrealizable by mere mortals, 
because it requires a perfect circle as a part. There may be many neat ‗g‘s that I have produced in my life. 
98 In fact, although the neat letter ‗g‘ provides a model to which one may approximate by degree, I think there is no 
standard of excellence here. Neatness only matters as subordinated to some further end. Doctors know this; that is why 
they sign prescriptions the way they do. A better example would be approximating to the behavior of the phronimos. 
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of mutually opposed contraries, because that one of the pair (e.g. knowing) is what the capacity is 
individuated as a capacity to do, not the other. Similarly, when we explain a state or completed 
episode as an exercise of the fallible capacity to A, and there is no interference, we already assess the 
state or episode as correct or incorrect depending on whether or not it is a determination of A.  
 When I say that fallible capacities are essentially normative I mean to invoke the same gloss 
on ―essential normativity‖ that SANE invokes: I mean that a true and adequate statement of the 
essence of a fallible capacity must use normative terms. This invites a direct objection. Someone 
might grant that norms necessarily follow from possession of a fallible capacity, and yet still wonder 
why we can‘t state the essence of a fallible capacity without using normative terms. Consider the 
fallible capacity to know, for instance. The terms ‗correct‘ and ‗criticism‘ seem like normative terms, 
but the terms ‗know,‘ ‗mere belief,‘ ‗determinative exercise‘ and ‗preclusion‘ seem like 
epistemological or logical terms, rather than distinctively normative ones. So why can‘t we just use 
epistemological and logical terms to truly and adequately state the essence of the fallible capacity to 
know, without going on to talk about standards of correctness, possibilities for criticism and so on?99  
The normative aspect of a fallible capacity cannot be so easily separated from its nature. 
Consider the difference between the fallible capacity to know and the disjunctively-specified capacity 
to know or merely believe. The disjunctively-specified capacity is, in itself, indifferent to its mutually 
incompatible exercises, but its exercises are co-extensive with those of the fallible capacity to know. 
If we had reason to, we could perhaps haul in some principle from elsewhere that serves to privilege 
one type of exercise of this disjunctively-specified capacity over the other (i.e. privileging knowing 
over merely-believing). But we couldn‘t say that any normative privilege flows from the nature of the 
disjunctively-specified capacity itself.  
                                                 
99 Horwich (1998) makes this kind of objection with regard to the sense in which truth is normative for belief. 
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If we do not think of fallible capacities as essentially normative, then I think we cannot tell the 
difference between a fallible capacity that explains the relevant normative privilege by reference to 
its own nature, and a disjunctively-specified capacity that does not explain any normative privilege, 
but requires supplementation from elsewhere. The individuation of a fallible capacity is not clearly 
prior to the determination of which of the two classes of exercise should be normatively privileged. 
Rather, the individuation of a fallible capacity is the normative privileging of one class of exercise 
over the other. The difference between fallible capacities and disjunctively-specified capacities 
consists in the essential normativity of the former. Another way of putting the same point: the 
normative term one must use in stating the essence of a fallible capacity is not ‗correct‘ or ‗criticism‘, 
but rather ‗privilege‘ or ‗valence‘. 
Schroeder (2003) anticipates the kind of (very abstract) normativity at work here. He argues 
that a genuinely normative account of the mind must not only divide cases of mental activity into 
exclusive classes, but also provide a ―force-maker‖: a normative valuing of at least one set of cases 
over the others. He calls this giving ―normative oomph‖ to the merely logical division of cases. He 
also notes that sometimes, such as when one is considering the division of people into courageous 
and cowardly, the distinction between division of cases and normative force-maker may collapse. 
Fallible capacities are like that too. The ―normative oomph‖ is not just conjoined with the 
individuation of perfect and imperfect exercises; it is the individuation. 
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2.4 THE MIND IS ESSENTIALLY NORMATIVE 
2.4.1 An Application of SANE 
Now we are in a position to argue for the Normativist Claim. It is part of an ordinary conception of 
the nature of our minds that we have a capacity to know that p, even if for many substitutions for p, 
individual knowing subjects are not or cannot be in a position to know that p. It‘s also part of an 
ordinary conception of the nature of our minds that we can have mere beliefs, as when one adds up 
sums incorrectly, or jumps to a conclusion, thus precluding knowledge in oneself (whilst one 
continues to maintain the mere belief on the relevant bad epistemic grounds). Knowledge and mere 
belief seem to have a common source, in term of the power(s) of thought of which they are 
manifestations. When one adds up sums correctly and comes to know, and when one adds up sums 
incorrectly and comes to merely believe, it certainly does not seem as if one suddenly switches from 
employing one set of powers (the cognitive ones) to another set of powers (the ones liable to error). 
What‘s more, our cognitive powers seem normatively-oriented towards knowing rather than merely 
believing: in every case, knowledge seems like a cognitive success, and mere belief seems like a 
cognitive failure.100 These features of our minds don‘t seem like mere accidents of our nature as 
minded beings; they are pervasive in our mental lives, and central to our mental lives. To that extent 
they seem essential to what it is to have a mind like ours. Call these features collectively ‗the 
appearances‘. If we accept the appearances, then a capacity to know, a liability to merely believe, a 
connection between these two in terms of some common source, and some kind of (apparently) 
                                                 
100 Of course, one might not care that one has failed, cognitively speaking, and sometimes it might be right not to care. 
The present point concerns the sense in which our cognitive powers are oriented towards knowledge regardless of our 
(contingent) cares and obligations. This marks a point of continuity with the concerns of direction of fit theorists in 
Chapter 1. 
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normative orientation of the common source towards knowing must appear in an adequate account 
of the nature of the mind. 
 It will help to give names to some of the key elements of the appearances: 
 
Capacity The capacity to know is essential to minds like ours. 
Unity  Our powers of knowing and merely believing have a common source. 
Privilege Our powers of knowing and merely believing are normatively-
oriented towards knowledge as cognitive success. 
 
Let‘s go back to SANE. I would like to substitute the fallible capacity to know for Y and say that 
that is essential to minds like ours. Substituting the fallible capacity to know for Y is my way of doing 
justice to the appearances. Here is the proposed application of SANE with the appropriate 
substitution: 
 
 Kim’s version of SANE, for Bumbling Epistemic Agents 
 [or Kim-SANE, for short] 
 P3 The fallible capacity to know is essential to having a mind (like ours). 
P4 A true and adequate statement of the essence (or metaphysically fundamental nature) 
of the fallible capacity to know must use normative terms. 
C2 So norms are essential to having a mind (like ours).  
 
Kim-SANE is intended as just one example of a general argumentative strategy. The overarching 
theme of the strategy is this: if the potential for mistakes (whether epistemic mistakes or not) is 
essential to minds like ours then the Normativist Claim is true. Knowledge is here used as an 
 73 
example, but other substitutions, such as representation, or self-movement, or non-accidentally true 
belief (supposing that is different from knowledge) could work too. Because knowledge is used here 
as an example of a quite flexible argumentative strategy, I will for the moment ignore opponents to 
Kim-SANE who would reject the claim that the capacity to know (whether fallible or not) is essential 
to minds like ours. (I will return to this point in §2.4.3.1.) 
 Given this flexibility, what exactly do I mean by ‗minds like ours‘? I mean this: complicated 
minds that have a complex internal order and structure to their mental activity, which can potentially 
be interfered with. On many views, God‘s mental activity is (blessedly) simple, and cannot be 
interfered with, so God‘s mind is not a mind like ours. Some less divine minds might also be 
(blessedly) simple. Fodor (1987) has argued for the metaphysical possibility of a ‗punctate mind‘ 
whose mental life consists in manifesting one atomic representation (e.g. DOG). Although punctate 
minds can presumably be messed with somehow, they have no internal order or structure to their 
representational activity, so they are not minds like ours.101 I leave it open how far the phrase ‗minds 
like ours‘ extends when we consider simpler and simpler non-rational creatures.  
 I assume that Kim-SANE has a valid argument form. As I argued in §2.3.4.2, fallible 
capacities are essentially normative, so the defense of Kim-SANE looks to rest on P3 as the crucial 
premise rather than P4. In one sense that‘s right, and in another sense that‘s wrong. P3 is intended 
as an intuitive and ecumenical way of capturing the appearances. My account of fallible capacities 
provides one reading of P3. For the sake of argument I leave open the option of a reductive reading 
of P3, where the fallible capacity to know is explained (away) in terms of non-fallible capacities. In 
                                                 
101 Incidentally, no punctate mind makes a mistake, given that all mistakes consist in inappropriate ordering of some kind 
of activity. 
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what follows my primary dialectical opponent will be just such a reductionist, who accepts the 
appearances, and so accepts P3, but disputes its meaning by rejecting P4.102 
2.4.2 Prospects for Reductionism 
Reductionism is my name for the view that accepts the appearances but claims to be able to explain 
the appearances in non-normative terms, within an explanatory framework of non-fallible capacities. 
(My use of the term ‗capacities‘ here and in what follows is intended to apply to any way of talking 
about the mind‘s powers of thought: it covers talk of capacities, abilities, functions, bundles of 
dispositions etc.) The reductionist accepts P3, but offers a reductive account of what it is to possess 
the fallible capacity to know, and so rejects P4. I should stress that reductionism accepts Privilege. 
The reductionist merely proposes to explain Privilege in non-normative terms at some metaphysically 
fundamental level.103 
That‘s a very general description of reductionism. For the sake of ease of presentation, it will 
help to have a more specific example. Some non-reductive physicalists count as reductionists in my 
sense of the term.104 Although non-reductive physicalists reject any direct reduction of the mental to 
the physical, they do tend to explain the nature of the mind by reference to mental activities that 
have a purpose, or proper function, and they also explain proper function in non-normative terms. 
                                                 
102 One might reject P3 outright because one thinks that it isn‘t essential to minds to do anything, let alone fall into error. 
I suspect that some medieval substance dualists think this: according to them, to have a mind is to be a mental 
substance, and no capacity, let alone a fallible capacity, is essential to what it is to be a mental substance. (Caveat: I am 
wary of speculating on who actually subscribed to this position given my limited knowledge of medieval philosophy of 
mind, so perhaps this is a straw man view.) I don‘t have any arguments against this kind of view: I just assume it‘s false. 
As I said before, thinking is something that minds, by their very nature, do. (―By their very nature‖ here means: according 
to an essence; not a mere consequence, however necessary, of something‘s essence.) 
103 ‗Reduction‘ here does not refer to the reduction of the mental to the physical, as it usually does in philosophy of mind, 
but to the reduction of normative to the non-normative. 
104 For example, Millikan (1984); van Gulick (2002, 2006); Dretske (1991). Davidson (2001) doesn‘t count for present 
purposes as his views on the constitutive ideal of rationality are often read as implying the normativity of the mind. See 
Schoeder (2003) for a dissenting opinion on this last point. 
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Millikan‘s earlier work provides a good sketch of how to explain proper function in non-normative 
terms.105 She says that norms of thought are biological norms of proper function, and sketches a 
reduction of proper function to historical-evolutionary explanation: a thing‘s proper function is 
something that explains why that kind of thing is here today.106 In the present context, the idea 
would be that mere beliefs can be explained as failures of proper function. According to the 
reductionist, mere beliefs are malfunctions, where malfunctions can be explained in non-normative 
terms as states or episodes that are ultimately not conducive to the promotion of some non-
normative measure that generates proper functions (e.g. evolutionary advantage, or a kind of 
stability, or perhaps maximal desire satisfaction). The overall reductive strategy promises to be 
extremely powerful, dialectically-speaking. The two-step process – of explaining mere beliefs as 
malfunctions, and then explaining malfunctions in non-normative terms – promises to account for 
the appearances at the same time as explaining why we might have been led by the appearances to 
think that the mind is essentially normative, when in fact it isn‘t. 
Let me outline two problems that give reason to think that reductionism fails. The problems 
concern Unity and Privilege, respectively. 
2.4.2.1 Problems Explaining Unity: a Conjunctive Account of Knowledge is Required 
The reductionist accepts the appearances, so she owes us an explanation of Unity. The theory of 
fallible capacities explains the common source of knowledge and mere belief by tracing them both 
to the fallible capacity to know. But the reductionist is committed to reducing fallible capacities to an 
explanatory framework of non-fallible capacities, so she must be able to explain Unity within a 
                                                 
105 Millikan (1984). 
106 That‘s not the only way to reduce proper function to non-normative terms. See van Gulick (2006) for a sketch of 
how to reduce proper function to a contribution to stability that meets certain non-normatively-specified criteria, with 
less of an emphasis on history. I will focus on Millikan‘s sketch rather than van Gulick‘s, as it directly exploits intuitively 
familiar ideas like evolutionary advantage. 
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framework of non-fallible capacities alone. Could she trace knowledge and mere belief to a 
disjunctively-specified capacity, such as the non-fallible capacity to know or merely believe? That won‘t 
help. Disjunctively-specified capacities do not presuppose or explain any unity of their disjuncts.107 It 
seems the only halfway-plausible option for the reductionist is to posit a common denominator. For 
instance she could trace knowledge and mere belief to the non-fallible capacity to believe, and then 
analyze knowledge as perfect exercise of the non-fallible capacity to believe that is conjoined with 
extra conditions, such as presence of justification and truth of the belief (plus reliability, safety, 
stability, or what-have-you).  
Williamson (2000) has argued against such conjunctive accounts of knowledge. Williamson‘s 
basic claim is that knowledge is a mental state, but belief plus extra conditions is not: it is rather a 
―metaphysical hybrid‖ of mental state conjoined with extra non-mental condition(s).108 I agree with 
Williamson, but I won‘t repeat his arguments here: it is enough to note that those who aim to do 
without norms must fight Williamson as well as me. (Good luck to them, and may the best 
philosopher win.) 
Williamson‘s worries aside, I think that there is a relatively clear sense in which a conjunctive 
account of knowledge, even if true, could not explain Unity. Unity is not just the claim that mere 
belief and knowledge share a common element. It is rather the claim that mere belief and knowledge 
share a common source, in terms of the power(s) of thought manifested in both. But the source of 
knowledge in us is not the non-fallible capacity to believe. The non-fallible capacity to believe is 
indifferent to the further conditions proposed by the conjunctive analysis of knowledge.  
                                                 
107 For example, my capacity to joke or be poisoned does not have a common source. If it did, and we were trying to 
account for that common source, we would at very least want to know what the common denominator is, over and 
above the (parasitic) posit of a disjunctively-specified capacity to joke or be poisoned. 
108 The term ‗metaphysical hybrid‘ comes from Williamson (1995). 
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I do not think this is a mere quibble about the meaning of the terms ‗common element‘ and 
‗common source‘. The proposed further conditions required for knowledge may be accidentally 
conjoined with belief in given cases, as Gettier (1963) brought to our attention. Gettier cases suggest 
that the proposed elements required for knowledge (on the simplest analysis e.g. justification and 
truth) must be non-accidentally unified with belief on given occasions if the would-be knower is to 
know, rather than to merely believe. Various proposals have been put forward as to how explain 
what ―non-accidental unification‖ amounts to here, in terms of being the product of reliable 
dispositions, manifesting certain counterfactually robust properties, being caused ―in the right way‖ 
etc.109 Now whatever the reductionist proposes to respond to Gettier cases, in order to explain how 
the elements are non-accidentally unified on given occasions when a thinking subject knows that p, it 
deserves to be called a capacity in our (extended) sense of the term. Capacities just are the things that 
explain their perfect exercises as non-accidental. For capacities that unify various elements into a 
whole of a quite different order, this includes explaining how the elements are bound up with one 
another in a non-accidental fashion on a given occasion of perfect exercise of that capacity. But 
positing a capacity to unify-the-required-elements-so-as-to-know (or a capacity to-be-in-states-
where-one-is-unified-so-as-to-know) does not explain Unity in terms of a common source; it rather 
explains why one might have (mistakenly) thought there was a common source, when knowing has 
one source – the non-fallible capacity to unify-the-required-elements-so-as-to-know – and mere 
believing has another – the non-fallible capacity to believe.110 
Now rejecting Unity and explaining why one might have thought Unity was true is of course 
an option for the opponent to Kim-SANE. The line between explaining something in other terms 
                                                 
109 See for example Goldman (1967); Dretske (1989); Nozick (1981). 
110 The alternative is to just accept that whatever qualifies a belief as knowledge does not deserve to be called a capacity 
in our (extended) sense of the term. According to this position, it is an accident, as far as or powers of thought are 
concerned, whether our beliefs are blessed with the (honorific) title of ‗knowledge‘ on individual occasions or not. I have 
not been able to determine whether anyone in the existing literature unblushingly subscribes to this position. As far as I 
can tell, there is nothing to distinguish this position from skepticism. 
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and explaining it away is often not very clear when considering various self-styled ―reductive‖ 
proposals in philosophy of mind. But I think that taking this option would make a real 
(metaphysical) mystery of why mere beliefs – just as such – are cognitive errors, given that they are 
exercises of a capacity that is – just as such – indifferent to cognitive error. In any case, in the 
present context, reductionists in my sense of the term aim to explain the appearances, not to explain 
them away: the appearances form a real constraint on what the reductionist says, the way that the 
phenomena of chemistry form a real constraint on proposed reductions of chemistry to fundamental 
physics.111 So the conjunctive analysis of knowledge is bad news for the reductionist: it makes it 
thoroughly mysterious how we could make sense of knowledge and mere belief as having a common 
source, rather than being (more or less distantly) related by common elements.112 
2.4.2.2 Problems Reducing Privilege: Extensional Adequacy 
The reductionist owes us an account of Privilege. Now the norms at work in Privilege are discrete and 
perfectly general: every case of knowing is a cognitive success, every mere belief a cognitive failure. 
There isn‘t a middle ground with regard to the judgment of cognitive success or failure. Put in terms 
of my own vocabulary: a particular exercise of the fallible capacity to know, whether perfect or 
imperfect, may well register on some other normative measure that allows partial degrees of 
fulfillment, but the standards of correctness set by fallible capacities themselves don‘t allow any 
intermediate stages between divine perfection and abysmal imperfection. Relative to this norm, there 
                                                 
111 In terms of real constraint on reduction in philosophy of mind, mental causation is a good example of something that 
is not treated as a real constraint. Most folks think that chemical reactions are perfectly real: that is why the phenomena 
of chemistry form a real constraint on proposed reductions of chemistry to fundamental physics. But in philosophy of 
mind, reductionists about mental causation typically think it is a myth. The primary goal then is not to explain what 
mental causation is, but to explain it away. 
112 By way of analogy: consider the appearances that raw opium and heroin are coming into the USA in large quantities 
and seem to have a common source. Suppose one is told that the opium is supplied by warlords from Afghanistan, but 
in certain circumstances Colombian drug-lords buy choice shipments of opium from the warlords, refine it into heroin 
in Colombia, and then smuggle it into the USA. This is not an explanation of the appearance of a common source; it is 
at best an explanation of why the appearance is misleading (perhaps because of the common element).  
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are no prizes for second (third, nth) place, even if one has e.g. partial evidence for a true belief that 
doesn‘t constitute knowledge.  
By contrast, the norms of proper function to which the reductionist typically appeals do 
admit of partial degrees of fulfillment. A heart can pump blood more or less well; a memory system 
can function more or less well; a belief can contribute more or less to flourishing or desire 
satisfaction or an overall world-view. If the norms characteristic of knowledge and mere belief are to 
be reduced to norms of proper function, the reductionist needs to derive extensionally-adequate 
sharp dividing lines from norms of proper function, so that the malfunctions she identifies will 
capture all and only the mere beliefs. It‘s very hard to see how any such derivation would go.  
To derive the requisite sharp dividing lines, the reductionist will have to say that mere beliefs 
are exercises of a capacity that have a position below a certain threshold on the relevant non-
normatively-specified measure that admits of many degrees of partial fulfillment. Presumably, given 
the requirement to account for Unity within an explanatory framework of non-fallible capacities 
alone, the capacity here is the non-fallible capacity to believe. If it could be carried out, securing the 
claim of co-reference between mere beliefs and exercises of the non-fallible capacity to believe that 
figure below the relevant threshold would be the first step in an adequate and respectable reduction. 
But I think this first step can‘t be carried out. It isn‘t difficult to come up with particular examples 
where mere belief is more conducive to promoting some non-normative measure than knowledge is. 
Sometimes it serves our goals and purposes very well to believe something false, or to believe 
something for bad reasons. The same goes for evolutionary advantage. There are even identifiable 
stable classes of such exceptions.113 So the reductionist will misclassify many mere beliefs as cases of 
                                                 
113 Here one might consider false or badly grounded beliefs about the Gods, or about the Neighbors, that serve to unite 
a community, where systematic mere belief confers an advantage on members of that community that knowledge would 
not confer. It could even be quite normal for a species of animal to represent something as basic as food very 
inaccurately, so as to save time and resources that would be wasted in pursuit of more complete, reliable or accurate 
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proper function, rather than malfunction, because, as a matter of fact, they have a position above the 
relevant threshold on the relevant non-normatively-specified measure that admits of many degrees 
of partial fulfillment. 
One might object that this is only true of impossibly crude reductionist accounts. 
Evolutionary advantage (or desire satisfaction, or whatever) is the ultimate non-normative measure 
that generates proper functions. But proper function is supposed to be distinct from the ultimate 
measure, and it is surely possible that on a suitably sophisticated account our capacity to believe 
could have e.g. the proper function of issuing in knowledge, even if in many cases mere belief would 
better serve the relevant end. The first thing to note about this kind of response is that it doesn‘t 
touch the underlying problem about how to derive the requisite sharp dividing lines from a measure 
that admits of degrees of partial fulfillment; it just assumes that this can be done. The second thing 
to note is that in the present context, the claim that knowledge is the proper function of our capacity 
to believe is an empirical claim, and one whose best support seems to come from armchair-bound a 
priori speculation.114  
Comfortably nestled in my own armchair, I would like to offer the following (bold) counter-
hypothesis. Nothing dictates that a true and adequate statement of proper function must have a 
logically simple form. Evolution has no special fetish for logical simplicity: most aspects, parts and 
subsystems of a creature have evolved to serve many functions, rather than just one function 
specifiable in a logically simple term. Given that knowledge helps in some cases and not others, a 
                                                                                                                                                             
representation. (Great White sharks apparently eat most anything that is in front of them: no need for accurate 
representation there. The same goes for us and fast or genetically modified food. If we had to know what we eat in any 
but the barest detail, we would soon perish.) 
114 Consider for example Velleman (2000) who claims that belief aims at truth, as it has been designed to do so by 
evolution. Velleman never bothers to consider the most obvious rejoinder to this empirical hypothesis: that belief aims 
at truth only in certain conditions, and at falsity in others. Or consider Papineau (1993) who says that belief has the 
normal function of being true, even though it may have the special function of being false. Papineau never tries to 
specify how one justifies the claim that being true is the normal function, or what the difference between normal and 
special functions amounts to. 
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more plausible empirical hypothesis is that the proper function of our capacity to believe is to issue 
in knowledge in those cases where knowledge helps and to issue in mere belief in those cases where 
mere belief helps. Perhaps it makes sense for evolution to produce a crude mechanism of belief that 
only has one goal in the short term. But over time, we should expect a mechanism initially designed 
to aim at knowledge to develop and become sensitive to those stable cases where mere belief would 
better serve the end of e.g. reproductive success. So it just isn‘t true that our capacity to believe is 
simply oriented towards knowledge, in the non-normative sense of orientation to which the 
reductionist appeals. And so the reductionist will still end up misclassifying some mere beliefs as 
cases of proper function. 
A variation on the last objection draws on parallels between the present logical difficulties 
and those that emerge from the literature on the value of knowledge. Pritchard (2007) describes 
primary, secondary and tertiary value problems that emerge from considering the value of 
knowledge. The primary problem is to account for why knowledge is more valuable than mere true 
belief. The secondary value problem is to account for why knowledge is more valuable than any 
epistemic standing that falls short of knowledge. The tertiary value problem is described as follows: 
… one could … argue for a tertiary value problem which demands that the difference in value between 
knowledge and that which falls short of knowledge must be one of kind and not merely degree. The 
rationale for the tertiary value problem is that a response to the secondary value problem leaves it 
open whether the difference in value between knowledge and that which falls short of knowledge is 
merely a matter of degree. If the difference is merely one of degree, however, then this leaves it 
unclear why it is knowledge, specifically, that is of distinctive value to us. That is, why is it the point on 
the continuum of epistemic value that knowledge marks that is of special interest to us?115 
 
A further challenge to the reductionist could then be put in the form of Pritchard‘s final question, 
where ―special interest to us‖ is replaced with ―special importance relative to the reductionist‘s non-
normative measure‖. The problem would not be to justify the claim that specifications of the proper 
function of belief must be logically simple, but to justify the claim that knowledge is the proper 
                                                 
115 Pritchard (2007:105n5). 
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function of belief rather than, say, maximally justified belief relative to cost-benefit analyses of time 
and resources spent inquiring. I can see no empirical grounds of the kind to which the reductionist 
appeals that could justify such a claim.116 
2.4.3 Reasons for Rejecting P3 
The problems outlined in §2.4.2.1 and §2.4.2.2 give us good reason to think that reductionism fails. 
One cannot accept the appearances and offer a satisfactory account of the fallible capacity to know 
made out solely within an explanatory framework of non-fallible capacities. Now I should stress that 
I expect that most opponents to Kim-SANE would simply accept that no reduction of the kind I am 
imagining could possibly succeed. They will accept this because they also reject P3. Let me consider 
what I take to be the two main reasons for rejecting P3. 
2.4.3.1 Rejecting P3 on the Basic of Rejecting Capacity 
One might reject P3 because one thinks it sets the bar for mindedness too high. The capacity to 
know may be an idealistic high standard imposed on us by dead Germans; perhaps the power to 
believe things that are non-accidentally true is a more appropriate standard for something that is 
essential to (contemporary Anglo-American) minds like ours. Or perhaps even that is too high: 
perhaps the power to represent a bare aspect the world is a more realistic standard for identifying 
something essential to minds like ours. It doesn‘t really matter where we choose the set the bar for 
mindedness, because Kim-SANE can be reformulated to accommodate the ―new appearances‖.  
                                                 
116 It may be noted in passing that some questions in the literature on the value of knowledge may mistake ―value to us‖ 
for the kind of abstract normativity that is characteristic of a fallible capacity, and that this is the source of some of the 
puzzlement in the area. I will not develop this thought here. 
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All the plausible proposed substitutes have what seem to be deformed instances. Contrasting 
to the case of non-accidentally believing the truth is the case of accidentally believing the truth, or 
believing the false. Contrasting to the case of representation is the case of misrepresentation. As 
with knowledge and mere belief, the new appearances will be that (a) we can exercise the relevant 
power(s) successfully; (b) we can exercise the relevant power(s) unsuccessfully (c) the successful and 
unsuccessful exercises have some common source; and (d) there is a normative orientation of the 
power(s) towards one kind of exercise (the successful kind) rather than the other. We can then 
construct a new version of Kim-SANE that substitutes the fallible capacity to believe the truth, or to 
represent (or whatever) in place of the fallible capacity to know to capture the new appearances. 
Corresponding to Capacity, Unity, and Privilege will be Capacity*, Unity*, and Privilege*, which are 
formed by substitution of the appropriate perfect and imperfect exercises (e.g. representation and 
misrepresentation) for knowledge and mere belief. 
I think that the prospects for reduction are no better once the bar for mindedness has been 
lowered. The problems raised against reduction of Unity and Privilege are quite general and do not 
depend on anything specific to the nature of knowledge or mere belief. Even Williamson‘s basic 
point could be transformed to apply to the fallible capacity to represent, for example, if we allow 
that representing (successfully) is a mental state, and tokening a mental content conjoined with extra 
conditions is not.  
One might think that there is a damaging disanalogy that blocks generalization of Kim-
SANE, because knowledge implies rationality, and simpler substitutions don‘t seem to require 
rationality (that‘s part of the reason why e.g. representation lowers the bar for mindedness). But the 
arguments against reductionism don‘t exploit any particular claims about the nature of rationality, or 
how it relates knowledge and mere belief. All that is required for the style of argument to go through 
is a certain unity of cognitive activity that applies at the level of the whole being. This is just the kind 
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of unity according to which it makes sense e.g. to say that the whole being is representing or 
misrepresenting some aspect of its environment, but not doing both at the same time in the same 
way in the same regard. Now facts about rationality presumably do explain (at least partly) the 
conditions in which mere belief precludes knowledge and vice versa. But the coordinate account of 
the conditions in which misrepresenting precludes representing (and vice versa) is by-the-by: we can 
ignore the conditions, so long as it is granted that representing and misrepresenting do (sometimes) 
exclude each other in a way that validates the associated appearances. And this surely has to be 
granted for any recognizable account of what it is to be a thinking being.117 
What I have offered here is of course a mere sketch of a generalization of Kim-SANE. But I 
think it‘s clear that opponents to the Normativist Claim cannot easily avoid the conclusion of Kim-
SANE simply by rejecting Capacity. For if any mental capacity that has (apparently) deformed 
exercises is essential to minds like ours, then a revised version of Kim-SANE will give reason to 
think that the mind is essentially normative. And it is generally accepted that the possibility of 
misrepresentation is something that any adequate account of the mind would have to accommodate and 
explain.118 Given the generality of problems with reductionism outlined in §2.4.2.1 and §2.4.2.2, any 
deep resistance to Kim-SANE will have to rest on something other than the truth of Capacity. 
2.4.3.2 Rejecting P3 on the Basis of Non-Fallibilism about Capacities 
At this stage, an opponent to Kim-SANE might be tempted to simply back up and insist on the 
generally accepted philosophical wisdom that there are only non-fallible capacities, so there can‘t be 
any fallible capacities in the sense I have described. This would be a way of rejecting P3 directly, on 
my reading of it: call it non-fallibilism about capacities.  
                                                 
117 Fodor (1987) rejects this claim, but as far as I can tell he seems to be alone in doing so. 
118 See e.g. Dretske (1986, 1981, 1995); Fodor (2008); Neander (1995); Millikan (2004). For an excellent article 
demolishing Fodor‘s attempts to avoid troubles with misrepresentation see Baker (1991). 
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 The non-fallibilist about capacities claims that there is only one kind of causal power: the 
non-fallible kind. Many philosophers assume this, but I haven‘t yet seen a really compelling 
argument for the claim. Appeal to parsimony won‘t help motivate non-fallibilism about capacities. 
It‘s true that we shouldn‘t multiply entities beyond necessity, but Ockham‘s Razor only applies here 
if it isn‘t necessary that we explain mistakes. It‘s also worth noting that nothing I have said turns on 
a distinction between mental and physical capacities. I am quite happy to say that fallible capacities 
are, in some sense, physical capacities, so no simple appeal to physicalism can be used to motivate 
non-fallibilism about capacities.119 Nor can a simple appeal to modern conceptions of laws of nature 
be used to motivate non-fallibilism about capacities. There are obviously many fascinating questions 
about the relationship between capacities and laws of nature, where laws of nature are conceived of 
as equations relating quantities and distributions (over time and space) of fundamental physical 
forces. But laws, so conceived, do not obviously attribute causal powers to anything. The question of 
whether fallible capacities are compatible with such laws is posterior to the question of whether any 
capacity is compatible with such laws. 
Non-fallibilism about capacities is recognizable as the main source of resistance to other 
elements of the appearances. In §2.4.2.1 I said that there is a sense in which the reductionist who 
offers a conjunctive account of knowledge rejects Unity rather than explaining it, for instance. But 
the reductionist was forced to the conjunctive account precisely because she was committed to non-
fallibilism about capacities.120 Similarly, we find resistance to Privilege that is recognizably based on 
                                                 
119 It is for this reason that it doesn‘t matter if the reductive naturalist proposes to reduce mental fallible capacities to 
some set of physical fallible capacities. If there are physical fallible capacities, then they are essentially normative, because 
the normative term ‗valence‘ or ‗privilege‘ must be used in a true and adequate statement of their essence. The lines of 
debate here cut across more traditional lines of debate between physicalists and their opponents. 
120 Rejecting Unity is, I think, an extremely popular position, for without the conceptual resources made possible by the 
concept of a fallible capacity, it is very difficult to see how Unity could possibly be true. This point is forcefully made by 
Rödl (2007). It is because philosophers do not realize that fallible capacities provide a conceptual tool that is different 
from a merely-disjunctive capacity that McDowell, for instance, is usually classified as a disjunctivist, when his own view 
is closer to present proposal than might otherwise be apparent. See McDowell (2011) for an endorsement of the claim 
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commitment to non-fallibilism about capacities. Consider Dretske‘s remarks about the normativity 
implicit in deformed instances of mental activity: 
The only fault with fallacious reasoning, the only thing wrong or bad about mistaken judgments is that 
we don‘t like them… This, though, leaves the normativity of false belief and fallacious reasoning in 
the same place as the normativity of foul weather and bad table manners – in the attitudes, purposes, 
and beliefs of the people who make judgments about the weather and table behavior.121 
 
Dretske‘s remarks here are, I take it, representative of a fairly common attitude to norms in 
contemporary philosophy of mind. The attitude is this: norms of any kind must be founded on the 
intentions and desires of individual agents in some way.122 But Dretske is not like Aristotle in 
thinking that we all desire to know; treating norms as founded on desire is a way of rejecting the 
generality of Privilege. In adopting this attitude Dretske ignores the concerns of e.g. the direction of 
fit theorists from Chapter 1, who aimed to account for the perfectly general normativity apparently 
present in the operation of our capacity for belief, one of whose marks was precisely the way it could 
come apart from contingent individual or collective desire or endorsement. I think we should take a 
short line with Dretske‘s kind of (flippant?) objection to the idea that there is some perfectly general 
norm at work in the case of knowledge and mere belief, such that knowledge is a cognitive success 
and mere belief is a cognitive failure. The view that the only kind of normativity is that based on 
desire or intention is only plausible if one takes for granted that there are no fallible capacities, in the 
sense I have described. It is on this ground that the normativist ought to make her stand, at the level 
of claims about the metaphysics of capacities, and the possibility of a capacity that allows 
normatively-imperfect exercises. 
                                                                                                                                                             
that perception is an exercise of a fallible capacity for knowledge. McDowell‘s characterization of fallible capacities is 
more abstract than mine: for him, what I have called a processual capacity would fall into the same class (i.e. capacities 
that have non-determinative exercises). 
121 Dretske (2000: 248). 
122 If the view of intentional action proposed in Chapter 3 is correct, then intentions presuppose the more abstract 
normativity characteristic of fallible capacities. 
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 Now I don‘t have a direct response to non-fallibilism about capacities. I don‘t myself have 
an argument for the modally-strong claim that there must be fallible capacities. There is extra work to 
be done here. But I have already shown how the appearances give us reason to think that there are 
fallible capacities, because the appearances can‘t be accounted for within an explanatory framework 
of non-fallible capacities alone. And I think there is a little more to say on the issue. Non-fallibilism 
about capacities can only give us an alienated conception of the causal powers of the thinking being. 
All malfunctions of things that possess only non-fallible capacities are attributable to 
prevention or (external or internal) interference.123 But as I have described them, no mistake is 
attributable to prevention or interference. That‘s the point of mistakes: they are a third category of 
failure, distinct from both prevention and interference. So mistakes cannot be accommodated by the 
non-fallibilist about capacities. They can only be eliminated. 
Eliminating mistakes from one‘s ontology flies in the face of what I described at the opening 
of this chapter as one of the most familiar aspects of our mental lives. I think the best the non-
fallibilist about capacities can do to accommodate our experience of error is to say that the concept 
of a mistake, as I have described it, is a more or less defective folk concept that picks out a range of 
cases of internal interference by cognitive subsystems. This is the sort of route that an analytic 
functionalist might take, when puzzled as to where to find something in the system of non-fallible 
capacities (the realm of causal law, narrowly construed) that realizes the platitudes enshrined in the 
folk concept of a mistake. The relevant cases of internal interference by cognitive subsystems will 
presumably be distinguished from cases like the hiccup by the fact that the cognitive subsystems 
                                                 
123 Malfunctions of things that possess only non-fallible capacities are usually cases of loss of capacity, as when some 
part snaps, splits, melts or otherwise loses its form, or else they are cases of functioning poorly (e.g. doing the same 
thing, but slower, or less accurately, or less effectively). Losses of capacity are attributable to external or internal 
interference: e.g. excessive heat melted the capacitor; excessive pressure snapped the bridge support; etc. Poor function 
is attributable to external or internal interference or being in inappropriate conditions of exercise for the relevant 
capacity: e.g. the computer loads slowly because weighed down with malware; the drill drills slowly because of 
intermittent electrical current and an excess of rust, etc. 
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involved are normally enlisted in the service of some task, like catching a ball or producing 
knowledge, and hiccups (and so on) are not. But apart from being normally enlisted in the service of 
some task, the relevant cases of internal interference that (supposedly) roughly correspond to the 
folk concept of a mistake will be just like hiccups.  
I am doubtful about an appeal to internal interference in this context. In one innocuous 
sense, to say that one cognitive subsystem coordinates badly with another is a way of explaining a 
mistake. We often trace the source of a mistake to inattentiveness or overexcitement, for example. 
But at the level of the whole being, to say that one‘s attention system or excitement system interferes 
with one‘s powers, or prevents one from being in the conditions of exercise for one‘s powers, is a 
bit like a craftsman blaming her tools. If mistakes are a real phenomenon, as I think they are, then an 
appeal to interference is inappropriate when we explain the cat‘s mistake when it sizes up the jump it 
can make, wiggles its tail, leaps, and falls short. To think that the cat‘s powers have been interfered 
with by its cognitive subsystems in such a case risks conceiving of the cat as a kind of God 
imprisoned in a mechanical body, such that if it could only be free of the relevant interference and 
limitation, it would do what it set its mind to do. This is an alienated picture of the causal powers of 
the cat, where its way of doing something interferes with its (imagined?) power to do something. 
Similarly for our cognitive powers: to suppose that, whilst a knowing subject is at her leisure, her 
attention system (for instance) interferes with her capacity to know is to think of the knowing subject 
as a kind of God, imprisoned in a mechanical mind, such that if she could only be free of the 
relevant interference and limitation, she would know rather than merely believe. This is an alienated 
picture of the causal powers of the knowing subject, where her way of doing something interferes 
with her (imagined?) power to do something. 
Non-fallibilists about capacities think that, when it comes down to it, no one really makes a 
mistake in the sense I have described. It must be admitted that the claim that no one makes mistakes 
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has a lot going for it, rhetorically speaking: consider how it can be exploited by religious gurus or 
motivational speakers. But I just don‘t think it‘s true. Of course, what I think is plainly true not 
going to impress an opponent to Kim-SANE, but I think it does shift the burden of proof onto the 
right issues, and away from the ones that made Georges Rey cry foul against Wedgwood. Now that 
we normativists have a conceptual tool with enough structure to it to support the Normativist Claim 
without begging the wrong questions against naturalists like Georges Rey and company, we can get on 
with the more important project of finding ways to stop begging the right questions against them. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
Kim-SANE is based (rather unblushingly) on the appearances, but it does offer a simple and elegant 
explanation of how it is possible to make mistakes in one‘s mental life. It is worth noting that this 
question has, in one form or another, been the bugbear of the dominant positions in philosophy of 
mind for at least the last few decades.124 The phenomenon of misrepresentation has persistently 
resisted satisfactory analysis within the confines of an explanatory framework of non-fallible 
capacities. I offer the following (predictable) diagnosis: the problem is with commitment to non-
fallibilism about capacities, and a poverty of explanatory resources. 
My aim in the chapter was to argue for the essential normativity of the mind, but there are 
some recognizable ways in which I have fallen short of that goal. In particular, although fallible 
capacities explain how mistakes are possible, I have not addressed the legitimation project of 
showing how fallible capacities themselves are (metaphysically) possible. Part of the difficulty is that 
                                                 
124 See note 59 above for relevant references. Millikan (1995) considers defusing the problem of accounting for 
misrepresentation by broadening the conception of the bearer of the relevant capacity to the ―head-world‖ system. See 
McDowell (2004) for a response to Millikan that brings out the source of her (despairing? certainly peculiar) move as 
commitment to what I have been calling non-fallibilism about capacities. 
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the concept of a fallible capacity has not received a lot of attention in the existing literature, so it is 
difficult to know precisely how to proceed, and which metaphysical issues to address first.125 But I 
think the preceding discussion is sufficient to justify the claim that there is room for a normativist 
metaphysics of mind, of a kind that can take the phenomenon of error in its stride, and that the 
legitimation project is worth trying, albeit on another occasion. 
2.6 PUZZLES SOLVED AND UNSOLVED 
The account of fallible capacities offered in §2.3.2 above solves the first of the puzzles left over 
from Chapter 1. It is hard to see how there could even be an essentially normative power of 
thought. But once one broadens one‘s horizons to include fallible as well as non-fallible capacities, 
one can see both how an essentially normative power of thought might be possible and what its 
essential normativity would consist in.  
The account of fallible capacities also offers a solution to the second of the puzzles left over 
from Chapter 1, though perhaps not a very satisfying one. What mistaken beliefs and mistakes in 
performance have in common is that they are both normatively-imperfect exercises of fallible 
capacities. Where they differ is in the particular fallible capacity of which they are a normatively-
imperfect exercise. But no account has been given of how to individuate capacities, beyond noting 
that not every difference in capacity-specification corresponds to a difference in capacity. In this 
respect, I think we must look to the phenomena for the relevant differences, and in Chapter 3, I 
offer an extended meditation on the nature of the fallible capacity to do what one has in mind to do, 
by way of starting in on this (large) project on the practical side. 
                                                 
125 To my knowledge, Rödl (2007) and McDowell (2011) are the only ones to have done so. 
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 What of the third puzzle left over from Chapter 1? The third puzzle was whether the 
standard of correctness for beliefs is truth, just as such, or something more robust, like knowledge, 
and similarly for telic events and success. In closing I would like to offer a brief argument for the 
claim that the standards of correctness set by fallible capacities do not allow for what I described in 
Chapter 1 as ―external accord‖.  
 The standards of correctness set by fallible capacities do not allow external accord because 
capacities explain their perfect exercises as non-accidental. Consider the fallible capacity to know. 
There is no such thing as knowing by accident, relative to the fallible capacity to know. One may of 
course discover an unexpected truth, and in that sense one may come to know something by 
accident, but that is a quite different sense of ‗accident‘. If one has taken up a definite epistemic 
stance with regard to the truth of p, but the stance one has taken is merely accidentally united with 
the truth, then one precludes knowledge in oneself whilst believing the truth on the relevant (bad) 
epistemic grounds. The standard of correctness has not been met. 
Knowledge is a high standard for cognitive activity, and might be thought to be a special 
case. What about apparently less demanding capacities, like the fallible capacity to believe the truth? 
Isn‘t it plainly possible to believe the truth by accident relative to this capacity, as when I believe that 
the lottery numbers will be 4, 8, 15, 16, 23, 42 and the numbers turn out to be that way (and no one 
cheats)? Hasn‘t the standard of correctness been met, albeit merely accidentally? The same point 
applies. There is such a thing as believing the truth by accident relative to the bare (fallible?) capacity 
to believe, because that capacity is indifferent to the truth of what is believed. But in its perfect 
exercises, the imagined fallible capacity to believe the truth unites elements in the non-accidental way 
discussed in §2.4.2.1. We might flag this with a convention of ugly hyphenation, saying that it is 
really the fallible capacity to believe-the-truth, and not the fallible capacity to believe (i.e. to believe 
something that might happen to be true). Or we could make up a new word for the relevant unity of 
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elements. Regardless, the basic point stands: there is no such thing as believing-the-truth by accident, 
relative to the fallible capacity to believe-the-truth. When one believes that the lottery numbers will 
be 4, 8, 15, 16, 23, 42 it might appear that one is perfectly exercising the fallible capacity to believe-
the-truth. But the appearance is deceptive: one is actually precluding perfect exercise of that capacity 
in oneself on that occasion. Given that the standards of correctness set by fallible capacities do not 
allow external accord, there is a sense in which beliefs and telic events aim at (something like) 
knowledge, in the sense of non-accidental unity of what one has in mind with what is the case. 
 93 
3.0  THE ANTINOMY OF BASIC ACTION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
It can seem mere common sense to suppose that there must be some things that agents simply do 
intentionally, without the mediation of doing anything else intentionally. Call these basic actions. An 
orthodox position in philosophy of action accepts that every intentional action decomposes into a 
set of basic actions: basic actions are the ―practical atoms‖ out of which all the more interesting 
(more complex) intentional actions are made. Michael Thompson has constructed a powerful 
argument against the very idea of basic actions, based on little more than common sense 
considerations about the continuity of time. The disagreement between the orthodox view and 
Thompson‘s has the look and feel of an antinomy: what I call the antinomy of basic action.  
 I have sympathy for both poles of the antinomy, but they cannot be true together. I dispute 
the claims of necessity. It is neither the case that there must be basic actions in every case of 
intentional action, nor is it the case that there must not be. Neither necessity holds because (for the 
most part, and within certain constraints) it is up to individual agents themselves to settle how to 
carve up the instrumental joints of what they have in mind to do. 
 The chapter has the following structure. In §3.2 I summarize the orthodox position of basic 
action theorists, and Thompson‘s argument against the very idea of basic actions, and outline why 
neither position is, as it stands, an attractive one. In §3.3 I argue against Thompson‘s dialectically 
stronger position. Over the course of the argument a positive view of the nature of intentional 
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action emerges, where the individual agent‘s practical conception of what she is doing is of prime 
importance. In §3.4 I consider one key respect in which the positive view is best accommodated by 
the theory of fallible capacities outlined in Chapter 2. 
3.2 THE ANTINOMY OF BASIC ACTION 
3.2.1 Basic Action and Practical Atomism 
At what point does the will get involved in changing the world? If one takes the wording of the 
question seriously, and believes that the will gets involved in changing the world immediately, at some 
point, then one believes in basic actions.126 
Basic action theories take many forms, but they all agree that there are some actions (or for 
Davidsonians, descriptions of actions) that are immediate in some special way. Theories are 
individuated by their account of the kind of mediation in question. Some say the mediation is causal 
(basic actions cause non-basic actions, and are themselves not caused by any other actions); others 
say it is instrumental (basic actions are compositional or constitutive means to non-basic actions, and 
are themselves not performed by any other means); yet others say it is psychological (basic actions 
are e.g. thought of as means to non-basic actions, and are themselves not sustained by any thought of 
distinct means). Theories also differentiate themselves in non-essential ways by making further 
claims about how to recognize basic actions in the wild, independently of their definition: it is 
                                                 
126 Throughout this paper the interest is in the intentional actions of thinking subjects, rather than the actions of pistons, 
slugs and acids. I will often omit the qualifier ‗intentionally‘. The reader may fill in the word ‗intentionally‘ where 
required. 
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variously claimed that they are volitions, or neural events, or bodily movements, or (graceful skilful) 
things done ‗all in one go‘.127  
Basic action theorists are united in thinking that the will must get involved in changing the 
world in or through something immediate: the mediated, non-basic actions cannot come to be except 
via the mediation of some basic (immediate) action(s). The reason for this necessity is often left 
quite opaque but is usually supposed to have something to do with a vicious regress suited to the 
kind of mediation in question. As Danto claims, it couldn‘t be that every action is caused by another 
action of the same agent. Or as Davidson claims, it couldn‘t be that every true description of an 
action under which it is intentional makes reference to a contingently achieved effect of the action. 
Or as Hornsby claims, it couldn‘t be that an agent has an infinite number of beliefs about her means 
to her ends, or has an infinite number of ‗items of knowledge‘ about how to achieve her end. To the 
extent that the viciousness of the regresses is left implicit, as it usually is, the question of exactly why 
causes, or thought of contingent effects, or beliefs about means, or ‗items of knowledge‘, can‘t go on 
forever is left to the reader‘s imagination. (Perhaps the reason is too obvious for words.) 
The traditional basic action theorist is a kind of practical atomist. Practical atomists believe that 
all non-basic actions, which pre-theoretically encompass all the interesting actions in which humans 
engage, must be e.g. caused by, or constituted by, or composed of (or otherwise essentially mediated 
by) basic actions.128 If true, this promises a certain simplification of a philosophical account of 
agency. For a practical atomist, practical thought of non-basic action may be supposed to mirror the 
metaphysics of the case, whereby non-basic ―molecules‖ are grounded in relations with, or between, 
basic ―atoms‖. When an agent does A by doing B (intentionally), and B is a basic action, the agent 
                                                 
127 Examples of basic action theories include Danto (1965), Goldman (1970); Davidson (2001); Hornsby (1980); Ginet 
(1990). 
128 Or for Davidsonians: non-basic action descriptions, usually of contingently achieved effects of what is done, are 
essentially mediated by basic action descriptions 
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thinks that, for example, doing B will cause A (mirroring causation) or that doing B is doing A 
(mirroring constitution) or that doing B is a part of doing A (mirroring composition). The 
simplification is this: under the supposition that all basic actions are intentional, once we have an 
account of the metaphysically fundamental relationship between an agent and her basic actions, then 
the non-basic actions will fall into place with some minimal theory-jiggling, exploiting the kind of 
thoughts and relations described (and perhaps some extra conditions of knowledge, skill or 
reliability) to extend the status of intentional action from the basic to the non-basic case.  
 I do not think it is an overstatement to say that belief in basic action, and the kind of 
practical atomism that usually accompanies it, represents an orthodox position in contemporary 
philosophy of action. Given this, it would be remarkable (and of some philosophical interest) if a 
simple argument could show that belief in basic action is deeply mistaken, and so that the 
metaphysical foundations of much contemporary philosophy of action are rotten. I shall present an 
argument that purports to do that in just a moment. 
In what follows, unless otherwise noted, I shall assume that an instrumental conception of 
basic action is the most promising (and will refer to instrumentally basic action by the term ―basic 
action‖). Basic actions are things an agent does intentionally without doing them by doing anything 
else intentionally as means to that end. The assumption is made partly for ease of exposition, but 
also because many philosophers treat instrumentally basic action as the most promising kind, 
because thought of means to ends promises to unite the various kinds of mediation appealed to 
(causation, composition etc.) under a common heading. I won‘t try to sketch how such a project of 
unification might go and I will make no further assumptions about how to recognize basic actions in 
the wild independently of their definition. 
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3.2.2 Thompson’s Argument against Basic Action 
Michael Thompson has a deceptively simple argument against the very idea of basic action that relies 
on little more than an appeal to the continuity of time.129 Take an intentional movement from A to 
C as a representative example of a supposedly basic action that takes some time to complete. (In 
order to address Thompson on his strongest ground, we may concede this restriction of our choice 
of basic action to those that take time to complete, even though some actions don‘t obviously take 
time to complete. Certainly actions that take time to complete are the central cases.) Because the 
action takes time, it must have parts that also take time. These parts are (or could intelligibly be) 
rationalized by the whole. That is to say, one could intelligibly ask of someone moving from A to C 
―Why are you moving from A to B?‖, where B is a point that is halfway on the way to C, provoking 
a rationalization such as ―Because I am moving from A to C‖. If one can appropriately ask this 
question and receive an intelligible rationalizing reply, then one could ask the same kind of question 
of the movement halfway to B, provoking a similar rationalization, whether in terms of moving to B, 
or C, or some further point beyond C. Thompson notes that in the minimal cases such questions 
would be rather strange ―conversationally speaking‖ but could be seen as less strange under the 
supposition that the tiny movement is all of the action that the questioner can see. Given that the 
questions and answers are intelligible, Thompson‘s conclusion is that we have no reason to deny that 
the parts discussed are intentional actions in their own right. After all, they are distinct from the 
action of which they are a part, yet they serve the whole as compositional means, and they are 
rationalized in just the same way that more obvious ―macro-cases‖ of compositional means are 
                                                 
129 Why continuity of time, rather than continuity of space? I think Thompson‘s argument can be read as following 
Aristotle‘s practice of using movement as the clearest example of determinate change. All that is required for 
Thompson‘s style of argument is an intentional action that is a determinate change that occurs over time, and the change 
need not be change in location for the parts to be rationalizable in terms of the whole. (This is perhaps what sapient 
chameleons might say to each other in the spirit of Thompson‘s argument: ―I say old chap, why are you changing from 
blue to green?‖; ―Because I am changing from blue to yellow.‖) 
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rationalized, and they too can serve as rational ground for still smaller parts. So there are further 
rational grounds, all the way down, and the supposedly ―basic‖ action is not so basic after all. 
Whenever one performs an intentional action one performs an infinite number of component 
intentional actions. Another way to state the same conclusion: there are no basic actions, only more 
basic ones. 
3.2.3 The Antinomy of Basic Action 
We seem to have wandered into the middle of an antinomy: what we might call the antinomy of basic 
action. On the one hand we have the basic action theorists with their (often inchoate)130 horror of the 
infinite, and on the other we have Thompson with his (barely repressed)131 disdain for the 
immediate. Yet if there is something peculiar in the idea that the will engages with the world ―all of a 
sudden‖ in a bang, or at an immediate point, there is also something peculiar in the idea that any 
change that is formally subsumed by a change the agent has in mind to make is thereby a bona-fide 
intentional action in its own right. As will become apparent, I have qualified sympathy for both 
positions: I think there is something right, and something wrong, with both poles of the antinomy. 
Let me make some brief remarks about what is wrong with the poles of the antinomy, by way of 
motivating subsequent discussion. 
                                                 
130 Danto (1965) is representative in this regard. He suggests that it is absurd to think of the agent as always having to do 
an infinite number of things first before they do the thing they have in mind to do, but that is all he has to say about the 
matter. One wonders how he would deal with Zeno‘s paradoxes. 
131 As Thompson (2008) puts it, he is tempted to adopt the manner of Quine and declare himself deep amongst the 
―don‘t cares‖ when considering the limit that supposedly marks off basic (immediate) action from non-basic (mediated) 
action. 
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 Traditional basic action theory seems to depend on a thesis about the limitations of practical 
thought.132 The practical atomist does not merely claim that many cases of intentional action do 
decompose into a set of basic actions, but that every case of intentional action must decompose into 
a set of basic actions. What could explain the necessity here? Suppose I hear of the practical 
atomists‘ claim, and desire to perform a metaphysical feat to prove them wrong: I will straighten my 
finger by means of an infinite number of compositional stages, and the stages will themselves be 
performed by means of an infinite number of further compositional stages, and so on ad infinitum. I 
will perform an infinite number of intentional actions, none of them basic, in under a second (or so 
the circus advertisement reads).133 By virtue of what will the practical atomist deny that I have 
carried out my metaphysical feat? She does not deny that determinate changes, such as a change 
from having a bent finger to having a straight one, are continuously divisible into infinitely many 
parts. She also accepts that agents can turn anything they know about to their purposes, so long as 
what they know is (causally or constitutively or compositionally) relevant to those purposes.134 It 
seems that the only plausible explanation for the limitation must come from some claim about 
limitations on powers of practical thought: agents (like us) just can’t encompass that many means to 
an end in practical thought, even if we have (silly, philosophical) reason to. 
 Although there are many senses in which we are limited as thinkers, I do not think that this 
supposed limitation on practical thought is one of them. Take proof by mathematical induction as a 
(less silly) case in point. It is possible for me to prove something by mathematical induction ―in my 
                                                 
132 Hornsby (1980) says that an agent cannot have an infinite number of ‗items of knowledge‘ about how she does 
something, for instance. She also claims that beliefs about means to ends just run out at some stage. But she doesn‘t tell 
us why either claim is supposed to be true, or why the associated regresses are vicious. 
133 Of course I will not pause between the stages, because physiology prevents me, but that is beside the point. The feat 
is not that impressive when you actually see it performed. There are no refunds at the philosophical circus. 
134 Even causal deviance can be legitimated once it is known about. Consider the traditional case of external causal 
deviance, where I aim at my enemy with a gun, miss, but make enough noise to stampede a herd of elephants that 
obligingly trample my enemy to death. Now that I know about them, I can enlist the elephants on my side when I aim to 
do in the next enemy. The same is true of Davidson‘s mountaineer, once he comes to know about the physiological 
reactions that can make him let go of a rope when he desires to let go of a rope. 
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head‖ without writing anything down. In doing so it seems that I have thought of an infinite number 
of objects in the infinite series that my proof exploits.135 But not only that: the point of 
encompassing the members of the series is instrumental; each is a step in my proof. Here is a case in 
which there are an infinite number of means envisaged and taken to my end; precisely so, for if I 
missed one or more of them, my proof would be incomplete. (Another way of putting the same 
point; the ellipsis, as employed in written representations of proofs by mathematical induction, is not 
a representation of something left out of the proof but of something present in it.) 
I do not pretend that this point is decisive: the nature of proof by mathematical induction, 
and of thoughts of infinite series, is a deep and difficult topic. But I think it is an unattractive feature 
of traditional basic action theory that it requires some (usually unmentioned, unmotivated) thesis 
about the limitations of practical thought. Until we are sure that there is such a limitation, and have a 
good idea of what kind of limitation it is, and have good reason to think that it applies in every case, 
we should avoid this presumption when theorizing about the nature of intentional agency. 
Baier (1972: 282) provides another reason for resisting the claim that there must, in every 
case, be basic actions. She argues that we have good reason to think that there are cases where an 
agent does two things intentionally, each by doing the other. If possible, then neither action is basic 
because of their mutual instrumental dependence. Baier further argues that there are plausible cases 
of such mutual dependence at the purportedly basic level: her case is typing the letter ‗s‘ by making a 
finger movement, where one also, at the same time, makes the finger movement by typing the letter 
‗s‘. I will not pass judgment on the plausibility of Baier‘s case as a counterexample. Regardless of the 
plausibility of the particular example, it is very hard to see how to argue persuasively for the claim 
that no cases of mutual dependence could ever occur at a level that might cause trouble for the 
                                                 
135 I haven‘t imagined or paid special attention to the elements of the proof, one by one, but only a Cartesian Theater picture 
of the mind would require one to trot elements of thought past a more or less imaginative and attentive audience. 
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traditional basic action theorist‘s claim. Although we have an intuitive grasp on means to ends, we 
do not have a generally accepted analysis of ‗means to an end‘ that rules out cases of symmetric 
means-end dependence. Until we are sure that mutual dependence of means is impossible at some 
appropriately fundamental level of analysis of means to ends, and that every intentional action must 
be performed, one way or another, by means of some second action that is, so to speak, 
instrumentally independent of the first, we should avoid this presumption when theorizing about the 
nature of intentional agency.136 
There is yet another reason to avoid the practical atomist‘s position: it risks making cases of 
basic mistakes rather mysterious. In Chapter 1, Anscombe provided an example of a basic mistake, 
where an agent simply missed pressing the button she meant to press, without the mediation of any 
false belief, and without it being a case of doing something else perfectly well, and without it being a 
case of interruption by (internal or external) interference. But the practical atomist doesn‘t seem to 
have the conceptual resources readily available to make sense of this case. Recall that the practical 
atomist requires basic actions to be intentional. It is because basic actions are intentional that they are 
a good candidate for being the foundation of practically-atomistic account of intentional agency: the 
intentionality of the basic parts can be transmitted to the larger wholes by means of thoughts about 
instrumental relations between the parts and the wholes, when those thoughts are reliable and true 
(or perhaps even: when those thoughts constitute knowledge). Intentional action carries with it the 
implication of success – doing something one has in mind to do. Accordingly, basic action is a perfect 
case of the will getting to grips with the world, even if only in an action that is quite small and 
limited in scope. If there is an imperfect case of the will getting to grips with the world, due to false 
beliefs, lack of grace or skill, or contingent interference, then either the thing that is imperfect is a 
                                                 
136 The metaphysical feat mentioned earlier might qualify as a case in point. One might object that I can only perform an 
infinite number of non-basic actions by straightening my finger as a basic action. The rejoinder is, of course, that I also 
perform the purportedly basic action of straightening my finger by performing the infinite number of non-basic actions. 
 102 
non-basic (unintentional) action, or else there is no action at all (that is, something may happen, but the 
will does not express itself, however perfectly or imperfectly, in action).  
What could a basic mistake be under such a practically-atomistic conception of intentional 
agency? Either it isn‘t any kind of expression of the will, or else there is a kind of expression of the 
will that isn‘t in the form of (basic or non-basic) action. Now, as I will explain in §3.4, basic action 
theorists ought to acknowledge another form of expression of the will anyway: they ought to 
acknowledge that doing A intentionally is ―processual‖ expression of the will that is not (yet) any 
kind of action. But I will also argue that the expression of the will characteristic of a basic mistake is 
not the same as that of doing A intentionally, because doing A intentionally is temporally-
incomplete, and basic mistakes are a kind of temporally-complete expression of the will that I call a 
―deformed particular‖. These claims won‘t make much sense in advance of more detailed 
explanation: for the moment, consider the problem of accounting for basic mistakes a promissory 
note on why one should avoid the position of the traditional basic action theorist, just as it stands. 
Let us turn to Thompson‘s pole of the antinomy. Here I have rather less to say. What is 
wrong with Thompson‘s view is that it seems to mistake formal play at rationalization for our actual 
practice of rationalization, where we have particular reasons for making the claims we make. For it is 
surely not merely conversationally speaking that Thompson‘s rationalizations concerning tiny 
geometrically-identified movements are odd: they seem to bridge the gap that exists between our 
actual practice of rationalizing actions and (somewhat nerdy) geometrical banter (Why is the chicken 
moving half a trillionth of the way across the road? To get a trillionth of the way across the road. 
Supposing the chicken sapient, this is a paradigm of rationalization for Thompson.)  
If it is possible to have a view that avoids the unattractive elements of traditional basic action 
theory and Thompson‘s view then I think we should try for it. Where to start? Thompson‘s position 
is dialectically stronger. His regress serves to make his point explicitly: it is (it is supposed) a 
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completely ordinary feature of the continuity of time that supports his conclusion that there are no 
basic actions. By contrast, the support that the basic action theorist‘s regress offers for their 
conclusion is only as strong as the case made for the viciousness of the regress, and this viciousness 
is usually left implicit, so to that extent it is unclear whether the relevant regress constitutes a reductio 
or is simply a real feature of the case that we ought to accept. If our aim is to steer for a position 
somewhere in the middle, we should start with Thompson‘s dialectically stronger position, and then 
turn to the mysteries of basic action theory. The bulk of the chapter will consist in responses to 
Thompson‘s regress. In the course of responding to the regress a positive view will emerge that will 
also help us understand what is right, and wrong, about Thompson‘s view, and what is right, and 
wrong, about traditional basic action theory. 
3.3 RESISTING THOMPSON’S REGRESS 
The obvious point at which to resist Thompson‘s regress is the claim that we have no reason to 
deny that the relevant parts are intentional actions in just the same way that the encompassing 
supposedly ―basic‖ action is supposed to be. In what follows I shall assume that the appropriateness 
of Anscombe‘s special question ―Why?‖, understood as a demand for reasons for action, delimits 
the domain of intentional action. If the question is not properly applicable to something the agent is 
doing then (whatever else it is) that thing is not an intentional action.137 With reference to 
Thompson‘s regress in particular, Anscombe‘s special question ―Why are you moving from A to 
B?‖, understood as a demand for reasons for action, must be shown to have application to the 
                                                 
137 The question may be applicable when the agent has no particular reason for acting, beyond the null-reason provided 
by the answer ―No reason, I just thought I would.‖ 
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movement from A to B, no matter how small the part (and movement) described happens to be, if 
Thompson‘s argument is to be successful. 
3.3.1 Thompson’s Argument is Inconclusive 
Anscombe says that her special question ―Why?‖ is denied application when the agent is completely 
unaware of whatever is asked about. When we ask for reasons for action we ask after something the 
agent has in mind to do: if she is completely unaware of the aspect in question, then obviously she 
doesn‘t have that in mind at all. But it is hard to deny that Thompson‘s agent is aware of going 
halfway (quarter-way etc.) in some sense of ‗aware‘. Everyone who has a minimal grasp of the nature 
of movement knows that one must go halfway if one goes all the way. Even those who are not au 
fait with the concept of division might be able to see or imagine that one goes halfway (this far) when 
one goes all the way (that far).  
That said, it makes a difference how the agent is aware of moving to the halfway point. There 
are many cases where one may truly observe or infer (or predict or remember) that one is (or will be 
or has been) centrally involved in some change, such that one is aware of the change in some sense, 
whilst also truly claiming that one does not intend to do that, and does not do that intentionally, and 
does not have any reasons for doing that. Anscombe takes it that the kind of practical awareness of 
what one is doing that is relevant to demands for reasons for action is so far divorced from other 
ways of knowing what one is doing that her special question ―Why?‖ is denied application when the 
agent must have recourse to observation or inference in order to answer it.138 Anscombe‘s claim here 
is bound up with her conception of practical knowledge as distinct from other kinds. There is some 
puzzle about whether such non-observational, non-inferential practical knowledge is knowledge of 
                                                 
138 Anscombe (1957: 13-14; 49-51). 
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what one is actually doing or only knowledge of what one has in mind to do (whether or not one is 
actually doing that).139 We can dodge the puzzle, for we only need the weaker claim. We need not 
delve into what Anscombe means by ―practical knowledge‖ in order to appreciate the plausibility of 
the claim that it is not by observing or inferring that an agent knows what she has in mind to do in 
the way that is relevant to demands for reasons for action. Even if I need a moment to become alert 
and find the words to express what I have in mind to do as I drive (quite habitually, with a minimum 
of care and attention) to work, I do not look at my current movements, nor infer from some premise 
(―Well it‘s 8.50am on a Monday morning…‖) in order to work out that what I have in mind to do 
(here, now and thus) is to drive to work. The same is true of all those actions undertaken (habitually, 
perhaps with a minimum of care and attention) as compositional means to the end of driving to 
work: taking the shortcut, speeding through the stop sign, cutting that guy off at the lights etc. 
To capture our subject matter by stipulation, let us say that if the agent has it in mind to do 
something, such that demands for reasons for action apply to what she has in mind to do in the way 
that interests philosophers of action, then the agent intends to do that, and that various expressions 
of her intent express her practical conception of what she is doing and how. The agent intentionally 
driving to work intends to drive to work, intends to take the shortcut etc. etc. According to the 
stipulation, it is only of those things that the agent intends to do that a demand for reasons for 
action is appropriate: the agent‘s intentions capture all the things that the agent has in mind to do in 
the relevant sense. So we may ask a driver many questions about her driving, but it is inappropriate 
(or anyway, missing the agent‘s point) to demand a reason why she is dribbling snot out of one 
nostril (unless she intends to be gross, or intends not to be). In order to not beg questions against 
Thompson‘s (unorthodox) approach to the subject of intentional action, I hereby stipulate that I 
                                                 
139 Davidson‘s carbon copier is the standard case for beating up some puzzlement about this issue – see Davidson (2001: 
92). 
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make no further assumptions about the nature of intention and its ―psychological reality‖.140 
Presence of intention is, for present purposes, just a device explicitly designed to coordinate with the 
appropriateness of Anscombe‘s special question ―Why?‖ and the presence of practical awareness of 
what one has in mind to do. (In particular, there is no implicit suggestion that intentions are 
occurrent psychological states, whatever ‗occurrent‘ means in this context.) 
The stipulation is sufficient to show that Thompson‘s argument is inconclusive. For 
although we know that the agent in question intends to move from A to C and does so intentionally, 
and although it is reasonable to suppose that the agent knows that there must be some halfway-
point B on the way to C, we do not know how the agent knows this, or whether the agent intends to 
move from A to B. If the agent knows about the halfway point only by means of observation or 
inference, then (following Anscombe) she is not practically aware of the halfway point. Thompson‘s 
argument is inconclusive because he has not shown that the agent knows about the halfway point 
otherwise than by observation or inference. 
Now it might be objected that the agent who intends to move from A to C must intend to 
move from A to B. For, it might be said, agents (at least those who are halfway rational and 
knowledgeable about such matters) must intend the necessary means to their ends, and going halfway is 
a necessary (compositional) means to going all the way. So it would be unintelligible (or anyway, 
                                                 
140 What do I mean by ―psychological reality‖ here? For example: nothing is claimed about whether such intentions are 
beliefs, or desires, or combinations of belief and desire, or more nebulous states (or habits, or frames, or aspects) of 
mind: the stipulation is supposed to be as ecumenical as possible. Nothing is claimed about whether the adoption of 
such intentions requires a specially-attentive act of consciousness or a decisive furrowing of the brow: probably many 
things the agent intends to do are adopted as means or as ends quite automatically and habitually (or perhaps as a 
function of having learned a skill or having been raised a certain way), without any obvious feeling or sign that marks 
their adoption. Nothing is claimed about whether one must adopt an intention prior to executing it: perhaps some 
intentional actions have the intention in the action, such that no relevant, prior, psychologically-distinct state can be 
pointed out apart from the fact of doing the thing (for this or that reason). Nothing is (yet) claimed about whether the 
adoption of one intention must be accompanied by the adoption of some others: perhaps if I intend to move from A to 
C I must intend to go halfway, but then again, perhaps not. It is claimed that if one intends to Φ one knows that one 
intends to Φ without recourse to observation or inference. 
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incredible) to suppose that an agent who intends to move from A to C might not intend to move 
from A to B, at least according to our permissive (stipulative) use of ‗intention‘. 
The objection fails because it needs to be shown that the movement from A to B is a 
necessary means rather than a mere necessary aspect (part, presupposition, consequence) of what is 
done. Even granting that agents must intend the necessary means to their ends, agents need not 
intend all the necessary aspects of something they intend to do.  
Suppose I am pounding a nail into a board to fix it to a post, and suppose further that 
there‘s no way in the circumstances to hammer without making noise, and that I know this, and that 
a would-be questioner cannot see any of the movement I am making, but can hear the godawful 
racket. Just as Thompson‘s question ―Why are you moving from A to B?‖ makes some sense when 
the questioner cannot see all of what the agent is doing, it would be perfectly natural 
―conversationally-speaking‖ for the questioner in the hammering case to ask ―Why are you making 
that godawful racket?‖ as if that were something that I really meant to be doing. But I don‘t 
conceive of making a godawful racket as promoting any of my ends, nor do I conceive of it as 
desirable in any particular way (nor do I think it manifests justice, or some other intrinsic value). To 
that extent I don‘t have a reason for making a godawful racket (not even the null reason: ―I just 
thought I would‖). Making a godawful racket is accidental to my intent, although it is something I 
am doing, and it is something I must do if I am to hammer. The fact that it is a necessary aspect of 
what I am doing (perhaps even one I must know about) does not show that it is something I do 
intentionally, or that it is a necessary means to some end of mine, or that it guides or delimits my 
activity in any interesting way.141 
                                                 
141 The antecedent aptness of a question about what one is doing ought to be distinguished from an important feature of 
discourse whereby aspects of what one is doing may be brought to one‘s attention by a question and thus incorporated into 
one‘s practical conception of what one is doing (whether one likes it or not). Thus Cavell (2001: 232) notes that when 
one is ignorant of an aspect, that aspect is not part of what one is doing, but once someone has asked a question like 
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 The hammering case exhibits systematic similarities with the tiny movements from A to B 
that we are considering. When I respond to the question ―Why are you making a godawful racket?‖ 
by saying ―Because I am hammering in a nail‖ I do not rationalize what was asked about. Such a 
response does not use the ‗because‘ of rationalization, but rather the ‗because‘ of (something like) 
mere efficient causal explanation. (We might say the hammerer‘s response provides a starting point for 
a conversation about reasons for action, rather than providing a reason for action, because the 
questioner has latched onto some aspect of the case that is accidental to the agent‘s intent and the 
particular instrumental order the agent has in mind to pursue.) Similarly, we might say of the agent 
who responds to the question ―Why are you moving from A to B?‖ with the answer ―Because I‘m 
moving from A to C‖ that she does not (or at least: need not) rationalize what was asked about. 
Such a response does not use the ‗because‘ of rationalization, but rather the ‗because‘ of (something 
like) mere formal causal explanation, exploiting the ratio 2:1 to explain why she goes halfway to C. 
What seems to go missing in Thompson‘s argument is the connection between intentional 
action and having particular reasons for doing whatever one does intentionally. The hammerer is 
practically indifferent to making a godawful racket – he neither intends to make one, nor intends not to 
– because he has no particular reason to make a godawful racket. (Should he realize he is pissing off 
the neighbors thereby, he might then intend to do so, for the reason that they deserve it). To the 
extent that it is up to the hammerer whether or not he intends to make a godawful racket, so too 
might an agent moving from here to there think that it is up to her whether or not moving to any 
particular point short of her final destination is an intentional movement or not. And in some cases 
                                                                                                                                                             
―Why are you making that godawful racket?‖ one‘s action cannot continue to have just the same character that it did 
before one was aware of the fact of disturbance. To continue to hammer the nail in after the question would no longer be 
to merely fix a board to a post, but to fix a board to a post despite the irritation it causes one’s neighbor. Our topic is rather 
sparser than the question of how one‘s will bears on the will of others. We are interested in the agent‘s relationship to 
what they do as such. Later we can consider the agent‘s relationship to changing their mind about what to do by taking 
into consideration what they come to know (of the will of others, and of the circumstances of action) in the course of 
their deed. For the moment, when considering whether a question ―Why are you doing X?‖ is apt or not, we suppose 
that the case is morally neutral and hold the agent‘s end (and knowledge) fixed at the time the question is asked. 
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(particularly for short or arbitrarily chosen trajectories) she may not see any particular reason to 
think that a movement from A to B is an intentional movement of hers. She can say (truthfully) that 
she is practically indifferent to the movement, because it is open to her to treat the movement as 
one of the many aspects of the case – such as neurons firing, muscle contractions, the precise 
placement of her foot, accompanying noises, and movement of air that is in the way – that in some 
sense take care of themselves. 
3.3.2 Thompson’s Conclusion is False 
In response to our stipulative use of ‗intention‘, Thompson needs to secure the conclusion that 
whenever an agent intends to move to C, she also intends to move to B (which is halfway on the 
way from A to C) and intends to move to AA (which is halfway on the way from A to B) and so on. 
The preceding discussion should be sufficient, I think, to raise doubts about the claim that particular 
practical thoughts, such as the intention to do A (rather than X, or any of the other particular things 
one might do), just do reach down to further particular practical thoughts, such as the intention to 
do B, where doing B is a proper part of doing A. Can we do any better than this in resisting the 
thought that there are no basic actions? 
We can if we consider that intentional actions need not be perfectly articulated in their parts. 
We allow that someone who intentionally crossed the Sahara may have unintentionally fallen and 
rolled down a sand-dune during some part of her movement, without thereby ruining the 
intentionality of the movement across the Sahara as a whole. It does not seem to matter when or 
where the accidents occur so long as they aren‘t overwhelming: people get off on the wrong foot, 
stumble, and fall exhausted across finish lines yet still manage to win races. An argument against 
Thompson‘s conclusion then takes the following form. We imagine a case in which such an accident 
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occurs at the beginning of a movement, such that the agent moves from A to B but does not move 
from A to B intentionally, and yet does move from A to C intentionally (she gets off on the wrong 
foot and then rescues the movement overall from utter disaster). For what is an overwhelming 
accident – the kind that destroys intentionality – with regard to one movement need not be 
overwhelming with regard to another. 
It may be objected that this argument turns on a bad analogy. Although we can make sense 
of the movement across the Sahara as an intentional movement that encompasses some 
embarrassing unintentional mistakes, pratfalls, and other failures, we cannot make sense of the tiny 
movements relevant to Thompson‘s argument as mistakes or failures in their own right. Who cares 
if you move one micron forward (say) rather than one micron backward at the beginning of your 
movement from A to C? But the objection helps our case more than it hinders it. For if we cannot 
make sense of the tiny movements as failures or mistakes, then neither can we make sense of them 
as successes – as the agent having done something in particular that the agent intended to do (according 
to our stipulated use of ‗intention‘).  
It may still be objected that we only credit the agent who moved across the Sahara with an 
intentional movement because of the things she did right in the course of that deed. Had her 
progress been an endless series of pratfalls, we could not credit her with an intentional movement 
overall, but only a lucky (probably hilarious) accidental one. And all Thompson needs for his style of 
argument to go through is the claim that for any completed intentional action, there is some proper 
part of that action that is an intentional action in its own right. The proper part need not encompass 
any particular geometrical point (like halfway, or a micron at the beginning, or a micron at the end), 
but there has to be something (in particular) that the agent did right. 
As far as it goes, this latter objection is a good one. We cannot credit an agent with an 
intentional action if she doesn‘t do anything right. But the objection does not show that in cases 
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where no pratfalls, mistakes or failures occur what the agent must do right is anything short of 
(anything that is a proper part of) the completed deed.  
When the agent encounters certain kinds of obstacle, we have good reason require more of 
her in the way of practical thought if we are to credit her with an intentional deed overall. Her 
original thought, in its relative simplicity, does not suffice – she must divide, and thereby multiply, her 
practical cognition of the case, to account for the problem that is now a proper part of her endeavor. 
The agent prior to falling had no thought about getting up: after she has fallen we require such a 
thought of her, dividing her project into parts and addressing intentions to particular means that can 
make amends for the particular setback. But where there are no unexpected obstacles or difficulties, 
we have no good reason to posit further particular practical thoughts, and so no reason to think that 
the agent must intend to do something that is a proper part of a larger project. To think otherwise 
would be to treat life as if it were one continual overcoming of error, misfortune and particular 
(infinitely small) practical problems. (A tempting, but perhaps overly neurotic, thought.) 
By way of making the role of what is necessary in the circumstances clear, we might question 
the setup of Thompson‘s central (iterative) case. Thompson says that the halfway point B is a 
particular place along some particular path to C that the agent is following, where the path is given to 
the agent in sense or imagination, such that it would be as much true to say of the agent that she is 
heading to B as to say that she is heading to C when she sets out from A. If so, then moving to B is 
probably not a necessary means to moving to C. Most of the time one‘s movement from one place to 
another is not constrained by tunnel walls such that there is only one way to get to one‘s goal. Indeed, 
in most cases, for any particular B within sight, one could miss that B and not rule out the possibility 
of moving from A to C successfully.  
A further argument against Thompson‘s conclusion then takes the following form. We 
imagine a case in which an agent moves from A to C intentionally but does so without an intention to 
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follow some determinate particular path from A to C that is marked out in obvious ways from other 
possible paths to the goal (such as a road, or some other narrow, complete, determinate trajectory) 
because there is no need to settle on such a path in order to go to C intentionally. Such an agent 
intends to move to C, but leaves her practical thought at that level of relative determinacy. The 
explanation of why she takes the particular path she does take will then appeal to her skills and 
habitual ways of moving rather than to her particular intentions. (We might note in passing that the 
explanation of why the agent starts when she does could similarly appeal to her skills and habitual 
ways of moving. If there‘s no need to posit a particular determinate specification of a path in the 
content of her intention, there‘s no need to posit a particular determinate specification of a time at 
which to get going either.) For such an agent, at each moment of the movement there will be some 
segment of an ultimately successful trajectory from A to C that she has completed, but given the 
absence of an intention to move to those places in particular, or to follow a particular path that 
included them, we may say that prior to reaching them she was practically indifferent to them: for any 
of these places, whether specified as parts of some particular path or described in their own terms, 
she neither intended to go there, nor intended not to, before she got there. If she was practically 
indifferent before she reached them, we may say that she is practically indifferent now – by the time 
a particular intention might be relevant to them, the places are already taken care of (just as the 
starting point was). So although it is true of such an agent that during the whole time of the deed she 
was moving to C intentionally, at no time was there some particular B halfway along a particular path 
to C such that she was moving there intentionally (and similarly for any other geometrically-identified 
place one might fix upon short of C itself). The agent lacks an intention to do something that is a 
proper part of moving from A to C intentionally, so Thompson‘s argument fails. 
It might be objected that an agent who intends to go to C and does so intentionally must at 
least have intended to go towards C (or forwards, or roughly that way) during the movement, even if she 
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stops short of settling on some particular determinate path to the goal. If the agent‘s employment of 
her skills and habitual ways of moving is to count as an exercise of practical thought, rather than a 
blind response to some psychological occurrence, then she must determine her own activity in 
thought so as to make it instrumentally relevant to her end: she must choose a rough direction to 
move in, even if she does not thereby choose a determinate path from point of origin to goal, by way 
of addressing the requirement to settle on a sufficient means to her end. 
If this is right, then at each moment of the movement the agent will have completed a 
stretch of activity of moving towards C (or forwards, or in that direction). When completed, the stretch 
of activity as a whole has the look of a successfully completed intentional action of moving from A 
to C. Dividing up this mass of activity, we can isolate an infinite number of component stretches of 
activity in thought, by isolating each stretch in time. Supposing such isolation and division is 
legitimate in the realm of practical thought, each component stretch of activity looks to be a 
successfully completed intentional action, and a variation on Thompson‘s conclusion – a strong 
variation, that grants intentionality to all the parts of this kind of action, rather than just some – 
seems to go through. 
The isolation in question is not legitimate in the realm of practical thought. Consider the 
content of the proposed infinite series of intentions in Thompson‘s original example. The contents 
are all different: ―I intend to go to B‖; ―I intend to go to AA‖; ―I intend to go to AAA‖ and so on. 
To the extent that one is swayed by Thompson‘s argument, one has good reason to think that distinct 
intentions address these various distinct endeavors, because the agent has chosen a path to follow, 
the places on the path are distinct, and the content of each intention varies with the place on the 
path identified, and intentions are individuated by their content. Now consider the content of the 
proposed infinite series of intentions in the new example proposed, of an agent who intends to 
move towards C but does not settle on some determinate path. These intentions all have the same 
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content: ―I intend to move towards C (or forwards etc.)‖. We cannot distinguish these practical 
thoughts from each other on the basis of their content, so we have no reason to posit a multitude of 
intentions. It will not help to say that they are differentiated by distinct implicit temporal indexes: we 
have no reason to suppose that temporal indexes must be a part of their content. We would do 
better to say that the agent has one practical thought here that unites her continuous activity during 
this period of time into one continuous motion to C (and perhaps beyond). Were there an 
unexpected obstacle, we would require more of the subject in the way of practical thought, for 
merely moving forwards (say) will not carry her all the way to her goal. But in the ordinary case there 
are no obstacles, and her practical thought, in its relative simplicity, is sufficient to sustain the 
relevant intentional action all the way to completion.  
So: given that it is possible to move intentionally to C without settling on a determinate path, 
we have reason to deny Thompson‘s conclusion that there are no minimal units of intentional 
action. We have not established that there must be basic actions in every expression of the will, but 
only that there can be. So there is a sense in which Thompson in quite right to ask the question 
―Why must there be basic actions in every case?‖ In fact, for all that has been said, it seems relatively 
easy for Thompson to prove that it is possible to act intentionally without acting through a series of 
basic actions. The discussion above has revealed intentional actions as individuated by their criteria 
of success or failure, much as beliefs are individuated by their truth conditions. We insist on criteria 
of success or failure when we have particular reason to do so. The agent has a particular reason to 
move to C, which is why it counts as a success, but she needn‘t have a particular reason to move to 
any particular B, which is why moving to the particular B she does move to need not count as a 
success, and so need not count as an intentional action in its own right. (It could have, if she had 
planned on moving to that particular B.) Similarly, given that the particular (philosophical) reason to 
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do so is intelligible, Thompson can prove that it is possible to act without acting through a series of 
basic actions simply by intending to do so, and doing so.  
Put in simpler terms: Thompson is right that there is an infinite potential for rationalization in 
any case of intentional action. His mistake is to treat the potentiality as an actuality. The problem is 
not that we can’t encompass the required infinite series in thought, but just that we usually don’t. 
3.3.3 Practical Thought as an Immanent Order of Reason 
Earlier I said that I would not presuppose anything about the ―psychological reality‖ of intentions, 
beyond their tie to practical awareness and Anscombe‘s special question ―Why?‖, so as not to beg 
questions against Thompson. One might object that the distinction between intentions and habits or 
skills – where habits or skills, rather than the content of an intention, explain the determinate path 
that the agent takes to C – sneaks in some objectionable presuppositions about the ―instrumental 
reality‖ of exercises of skills. In particular, one might think that it presupposes that an instrumental 
order cannot be (anyway) present in the exercise of a skill, even when it is unaccompanied by explicit 
awareness of that order.142 
 Consider the following passage from Thompson (2008): 
…as Aristotle (for example) teaches, skill or craft or technē often drives out deliberation. What is done 
in accordance with skill in doing B, or in exercise of a practical capacity to do B, is not, as such, 
determined by deliberation or reflection – unless by a peculiarity of the skill itself (which might 
involve measurement and calculation, say, as laying carpeting does). But the absence of reflection does 
not make the action thus skillfully performed, making a pot of coffee, as it might be, or raising a hand, 
into a sort of unanalyzable whole; egg-breaking certainly does not lose its character as an intentional 
action after the agent‘s thirty-fourth omelet. Why should we suppose that acquisition of the type of 
skill that interests us, skill in moving a limb or object along this or that type of path, must deprive 
movement along sub-paths of their status an intentional?143 
 
                                                 
142 I am grateful to participants of the Time and Agency conference 18th-19th November 2011 at George Washington 
University for pressing me on this point.  
143 Thompson (2008: 108) 
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In this passage Thompson is responding to the idea that when someone acts intentionally, the 
concept expressed by the description under which what the agent does is intentional must figure in 
some occurrent thought of the individual agent. If by an occurrent thought one means that the 
object of thought is given explicit attention, or the thought is said to oneself (sotto voce, or in foro 
interno) Thompson is surely correct that this is not always required for intentional action. Perhaps 
when we are learning omelet-making we must attend to the instrumental stages of omelet-making as 
the steps in the recipe that they are, but once we have internalized the relevant instrumental order, 
attention fades away, having done its work. After internalizing how to make an omelet through 
repetition, it doesn‘t matter for the intentionality of what is done whether one attends to the things 
one does whilst making an omelet. What matters is that there is a determinate and discernible 
instrumental order inscribed in what one does. Perhaps bodily movement is like that too, where 
exercises of our skill in bodily movement follow a ―roadmap of the body‖ that was inscribed in our 
activity long ago and has now fallen well below the level of consciousness. 
 I am not opposed to the idea that practical thought could just be an immanent order of 
instrumental reasoning inscribed in the exercise of acquired skills, in a way that often falls below the 
level of consciousness (where ‗consciousness‘ has the sense of ‗explicit awareness‘ or ‗attention‘). 
But it is crucial that the elements of this order are available to practical awareness on given 
occasions. I do not claim that practical awareness of the kind coordinated with our stipulated sense 
of ‗intention‘ requires reflection or attention at the time of action. The well-practiced early-morning 
omelet-maker is practically aware that she is breaking eggs in the service of omelet-making, even if 
she is doing it almost ―in her sleep‖ (as we say), and responds to queries about what she is doing 
with nothing more than a distracted, half-somnolent grunt. Her practical awareness is shown merely 
by the fact that when she is fully awake and understands the point of our questioning, she can 
truthfully answer in the affirmative: ―Yes, I was breaking eggs in order to make an omelet‖. If she 
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couldn‘t answer this way, and yet clearly understood the point of our questioning, we would have a 
real puzzle as to whether any intentional action took place or not: the kind of puzzle that leads one 
to weigh forgetfulness, repression and sleepwalking against each other. 
I suspect that practical awareness does not even require much facility with analysis and 
articulate verbal expression. There are cases where an agent might need some education about the 
instrumental order that is really present in the exercise of her skills, including education about how 
to talk about that order and how to attend to its joints, in order to respond appropriately to inquiries 
about the instrumental order she is pursuing. Consider a ballet dancer who performs a subtle special 
dance move as part of a very complicated dance, but has never been taught the move‘s name, or 
discussed how it fits in the instrumental order of that particular dance. Perhaps she has never 
attended to the move in particular before, except in the sense that during practice she repeats that 
section of the dance if she happens to muck up the special unnamed move. If you ask her about 
what she is doing right at the moment she is making the move, she may be puzzled as to what to say. 
But after a few minutes (or hours) of education and discussion, the dancer might say truthfully: ―Yes 
that is a step in the dance, and it has just the point you describe, instrumentally speaking.‖ This need 
not be a revelation to her, except in the sense that she now has a way to talk about something she was 
(all along) practically aware of, although she didn‘t attend to it explicitly before, for she had no 
particular reason to attend to it.144 
 In this last case, the element of confirmation by the individual agent is all important. For if 
the dancer were to (truthfully) deny that the special move were part of the instrumental order she is 
pursuing, we could not say it was a means she was taking to her end, regardless of the fact that she 
                                                 
144 By contrast, the conclusion of Thompson‘s argument, were the argument sound, really would be a revelation: it would 
show us something extraordinary about the depth of practical thought (apparently) at work in our everyday activities.  
Compare Anscombe (1957: 87): ―What is necessarily the rare exception is for a man‘s performance in its more 
immediate descriptions not to be what he supposes. Further it is the agent‘s knowledge of what he is doing that gives the 
descriptions under which what is going on is the execution of an intention.‖ 
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made the relevant movements. Of course, the individual agent‘s denial that the move is a step in the 
relevant instrumental order pursued by her would only be intelligible if she did not implicitly regard 
mucking up that move as a failure. But given the individual agent‘s avowed practical conception of 
the case that excludes the move, and her counterfactual lack of concern for cases where she ―mucks 
up‖ (or omits) that part of the dance in particular, we have no good grounds to suppose that the 
special move forms a proper instrumental part of what she has in mind to do. It is just this element 
of confirmation by the individual agent that can go missing in the cases of the tiny movements 
relevant to Thompson‘s argument.  
 Supposing this is right, why does the element of confirmation by an individual agent go 
missing? Here it may help to consider Anscombe‘s description of an Aristotelian practical syllogism: 
… an Aristotelian doctor wants to reduce a swelling; this he says will be done by producing a certain 
condition of the blood; this can be produced by applying a certain kind of remedy; such-and-such a 
medicine is that kind of remedy; here is some of that medicine– give it. 
 It has an absurd appearance when practical reasonings … are set out in full. In several places 
Aristotle discusses them only to point out what a man may be ignorant of, when he acts faultily 
though well-equipped with the relevant general knowledge.145 
 
There are several points of interest in this passage, but my present concern is with the elements of 
the instrumental order represented by the syllogism and their conceptual articulation.146 Anscombe‘s 
setting out of the practical syllogism comes to an end with a simple general term for a kind of action: 
giving. My supposition as to what explains the lack of confirmation for the tiny movements relevant 
to Thompson‘s argument is this: practical awareness of the elements of an instrumental order is 
articulated by means of concepts, but that articulated structure is what we might call a lazy one. (My 
apologies for the imprecision of the term. If I could be more precise about what is at issue here I 
would. I do not mean ‗vague‘ by ‗lazy‘.) The concepts through which practical awareness is 
                                                 
145 Anscombe (1957: 79). 
146 One of the points of interest is the claim that Aristotle often only sets out a practical syllogism in full in order to 
point out what an agent may be ignorant of in cases of faulty action. This may seem to apply to the case of a failed 
‗giving‘: if the doctors drips the medicine into the patient‘s eye, instead of onto their lips as intended, one might think 
that an expansion of the syllogism is in order to account for what went wrong. But it would be a mistake to think that 
beliefs about the levels of care and attention required explain the faulty action: clumsiness is not false belief or ignorance.  
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articulated are as intricately specific as is required by the case in hand given what one has in mind to 
do. Now the case at hand might require the employment of various skills that have techniques, and 
those techniques might display ―their own‖ instrumental order that is articulated by means of 
concepts, and elements of that order often fall below the level of conscious attention. But once 
again, the conceptually-articulated structure characteristic of techniques is a lazy one: the concepts 
that articulate it are as intricately specific as they have been made to be (usually, as intricately specific 
as they need to be, and no more) for the purposes at hand. In particular, they are not as intricately 
specific as the sections of Thompson‘s sub-paths require, and that is why the element of practical 
awareness goes missing at a suitably deep level of analysis of a movement along a path. 
 I think that Anscombe‘s description of the practical syllogism marks a surprisingly deep 
difference from Thompson, given other similarities of their views about the nature of intentional 
action. Anscombe agrees with Thompson that the point of practical syllogisms is not to record the 
contents of what one says to oneself (sotto voce, or in foro interno) but to display the order in what is 
done, and why what is done makes sense in the light of the given end.147 But Anscombe, in her 
description of the practical syllogism, thinks that the syllogism has already been set out in full, in all 
its absurdity. There is, for instance, no further instrumental analysis of ‗give it‘ into ‗carry the medicine 
a quarter-way to the patient‘s lips along the appointed path‘; ‗carry the medicine half-way to the 
patient‘s lips along the appointed path‘ etc. to be made.148 The analysis of the immanent instrumental 
order present in what is done ends with a general term; one that subsumes a multitude of ways of 
giving the patient medicine under it. 
                                                 
147 Anscombe (1957: 80) 
148 As she says, the ―… mark of practical reasoning is that the thing wanted is at a distance from the immediate action‖. 
She is quite happy to countenances an immediate action as the terminating point of the relevant instrumental order. See 
Anscombe (1957: 79). 
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I think that Anscombe‘s judgment that the relevant instrumental order has already been set 
out in full is more in keeping with how we learn concepts of movement and concepts of paths, sub-
paths, landmarks, directions etc., and how we apply such concepts when refining skills and 
techniques of self-movement.149 Human babies learn self-movement that is (relatively?) un-
conceptualized by doing things like stuffing toys in their mouths, kicking and grasping. It is only 
later that these skills are drawn into the service of conceptually-articulated structures with sharp 
bounds, like those enshrined in the parental imperatives ―Come to me!‖; ―Simon says: arms in the 
air!‖; and ―Get away from that power outlet!‖.150 Those sharp bounds encompass any of a range of 
possible fulfillments, and they do not discriminate between the parts of the path taken that 
Thompson‘s argument depends upon. Similarly, specification of the technique of navigation along a 
route comes to an end with general terms for kinds of activity limited by terms for orienting 
landmarks: one walks down to the corner, turns left (relative to the direction one is facing), keeps going 
past the schoolyard and so on. One can of course refine one‘s technique by working out further tiny 
details as one goes along. As one is walking down to the corner, one might stick to the sunny side of 
the street, step around the pile of refuse, put a swagger in one‘s walk, and so on. But again the terms 
by which one refines a route along a sub-path are general terms, so there is much about what falls 
under them that they do not specify. (We do not need to specify them: one of the great beauties of 
the generality of thought is the way in which it allows us to disregard irrelevant details and get on 
with living well.) The doctor who fails to give the patient medicine, dripping it all over the floor 
instead, may invent a new technique for giving on the second attempt. When she does, she pursues a 
new instrumental order, that could be (absurdly) expressed in narrative form: ―Now I‘ll go slowly 
                                                 
149 See Hornsby (2007a, 2007b, 2011a) for reflections on the logical form of abilities. I think the present proposal, with 
its sharp emphasis on practical awareness of the individual agent, is distinct from Hornsby‘s position, where the element 
of practical awareness present in the exercise of skills is not brought squarely into view. 
150 Or as Anscombe (1981: 137) has it, such causative verbs as ―scrape, push, wet, carry, eat, knock over, keep off, squash, make 
(e.g., noises, paper, boats), hurt‖. 
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towards the chair, now from the chair to the bed, now tilt back my hand to make it level, now pause 
until my hand stops shaking…OK, finally I did it right.‖ There is no need to settle on line-thin 
trajectories here; what one settles on is just an ordered structure of continuous stretches of activity 
of a unified kind (e.g. ‗going‘; ‗tilting‘; ‗pausing‘) bound by limits (e.g. ‗the chair‘, ‗until it‘s level‘, 
‗until it stops shaking‘).151 
Compare Anscombe‘s description of the practical syllogism as already being set out in full to 
Thompson‘s thought that an order of reason is inscribed infinitely-deep within every intentional action: 
… it is not so much by being caught up in a rationalizing order, or in a ―space of reasons‖, that 
behavior becomes intentional action; rather, the rationalizing order, that peculiar etiological structure, 
is inscribed within every intentional action proper… Any intentional action (proper) figures in a space 
of reasons as a region, not as a point; or, equivalently, each of them, whether hand-raising or house-
building, is itself such a space.152 
 
As a general description of the possibilities for intentional action, I think Thompson‘s description is an 
excellent one. Our capacity to reason, deliberate, calculate, analyze, symbolize, imagine, hypothesize 
and construct novel concepts give us what seem to be infinite degrees of freedom in dividing up our 
activity into novel instrumental orders particular to the individual on given occasions. Just as we can 
decide what to do, we can decide how to do it. Obsessive-compulsives (arguably) give an example of 
what can go wrong when the conceptual articulation of an instrumental order is much more 
intricately specific than is required for the agent‘s ends. But that is just one extreme: we are quite 
familiar with the gradations of such instrumental depth available to individual agents (who don‘t 
have psychiatric disorders), as with the disaffected teen who insists on having his own special walk, or 
the stickler for the rules who crosses the road at the pedestrian crossing when it is clear that there is 
                                                 
151 Mourelatos (1978) has suggested that kinds of activity bound by limits can figure in the specification of open-ended 
(unlimited) kind of activity, as when one thinks of running-a-mile as a qualitatively different kind of activity from 
running-a-hundred-meter-dash. What Mourelatos contrasts is better described as a contrast between short-distance 
running (or sprinting) and long-distance running: the kind of activity involved is indifferent to the contingent limits we 
place upon it at the Olympics, or the name we give it drawn from our most common employment of the activity in the 
service of a finite end (in the service of an action). Someone could, for instance, run a hundred meter dash by exercising 
her skill at long distance running until she has run a hundred meters (she probably wouldn‘t win), or she could ―run-a-
hundred-meters‖ (sprint) for two hundred meters without a break in this single stretch of activity. 
152 Thompson (2008: 112). 
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no one for miles around. What unites these various projects is the criteria for success and failure 
articulated by means of general concepts applied in practical awareness of what one is doing. The 
individual depth and intricacy of that conceptual structure on given occasions is for the most part up 
to the individual agents themselves, just as it is up to them to determine their ends. 
 I will leave the proper (more precise) expression of what a ‗lazy conceptual articulation‘ is to 
another (more appropriate) occasion. I only mean to sketch an explanation of what I take to be 
plainly true: namely that agents (like, I hope, myself) who understand the point of the relevant 
questioning deny that they are practically aware of the relevant tiny, purportedly intentional, 
movements, even if they are aware of them in some other sense. 
3.4 THE FALLIBLE CAPACITY TO DO WHAT ONE HAS IN MIND TO DO 
The arguments against Thompson‘s conclusion reveal a conception of action individuation as up to 
individual agents in a distinctive way. For the most part we go along with the concepts and 
conceptual structures we were brought up with in our practical projects. But once we realize the 
power we have to determine our ends and our means to our ends, we can mess with our practical 
conception of what to do, coming up with novel ends to pursue, and novel ways and means to those 
ends. There are standards of intelligibility for doing so: not just anything counts as deploying the 
concept moving towards C. There are also standards imposed by the techniques we have learned: not 
just anything counts as deploying the skill of omelet-making. There are also limits imposed by the 
structure of our bodies and the materials available to us. But within the bounds of those standards 
and limits we have a certain freedom to move. 
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 I think that this broad conception of action individuation is best captured by treating 
intentional action as an exercise of the fallible capacity to do what one has in mind to do, where 
‗what one has in mind to do‘ refers to the kind of practical awareness that is so central to the 
discussion above. A proper defense and articulation of a fallible capacity theory of intentional agency 
would require a whole book (or at least: another dissertation). In this closing section I would like to 
point out just one respect in which I think a fallible capacity theory of intentional agency is an 
improvement on both traditional basic action theory and Thompson‘s position. A fallible capacity 
theory of intentional agency can explain why mistakes in performance are particulars. 
3.4.1 Processual Expression of the Will 
Traditional basic action theory seems to stand in need of supplementation.153 We can see this by 
considering an interrupted basic action. Suppose I am straightening my finger as a basic action and 
some petty and violent rival chops it off before I manage to straighten the finger. According to the 
traditional basic action theorist, no basic or non-basic action has taken place: the will has not 
expressed itself in action. Yet there is a clear sense in which the will was expressing itself in what 
(otherwise) would have been a basic action. I may not have straightened by finger intentionally, but I 
was straightening my finger intentionally before the violent interruption. So there is such a thing as 
doing A intentionally that is different from having done A intentionally. Call doing A intentionally 
processual expression of the will. 
                                                 
153 By traditional basic action theories I mean theories such as those of Davidson (2001) and Goldman (1970), who do 
not pay much attention to processual expression of the will. Hornsby was in this camp as well, although she seemed 
dimly aware of processuality even then – see Hornsby (1980: 80). These days Hornsby is all for processual expression of 
the will – see Hornsby (2011b). 
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 Processual expression of the will has only received widespread attention in philosophy of 
action fairly recently.154 Processual expression of the will exhibits what has been called the ―openness 
of the progressive‖.155 The fact that I am doing A intentionally does not imply that I will be doing A 
or will have done A at some time in the future. Generally speaking, if it takes time for me to do 
something, there is time for something to interrupt me (or for me to drop dead).156 The fact that I 
am doing A intentionally does not imply that I have done anything intentionally in the service of my 
end either, unless the substitution for A and circumstances of action are quite special. If I wake up 
and decide to remain in bed, then I have already remained in bed intentionally, even if only for a 
little while. But most actions are not like remaining in bed, and remaining in bed, just as such, is not 
like remaining in bed for ten minutes, which represents the more usual case of doing something that 
takes time to complete.157 
A supplementation of traditional basic action theory would include some account of 
processual expression of the will and would explain how it relates to basic and non-basic action. The 
proposed supplementation is more than a modest revision. One of the main claims of the traditional 
basic action theorist is that whenever one can speak of expression of the will one can speak of an 
expression of the will: expression of the will always falls into the logical category of particulars. But 
there is reason to think that a supplemented basic action theory would have to give up that claim.  
For the supplemented basic action theory, we might think of processual expression of the 
will as the ―stuff‖ or ―activity-material‖ out of which particular (basic and non-basic) actions are 
                                                 
154 For example, Wilson (1989), Thompson (2008), Moran and Stone (2009), Hornsby (2011b).  
155 See Comrie (1976) and Galton (1984) for accounts of the ―openness‖ of the progressive. 
156 Of course one could define a sense of doing A intentionally that had this future-oriented implication. But my present 
concern is not with possibilities for regimentation of senses, so I will not go through the options here. 
157 Here I am ignoring progressive locutions as applied in analysis of intention for the future. There is a relatively clear 
sense in which one might say ―I am remaining in bed tomorrow morning‖ whilst one is up and about today without 
contradicting oneself. 
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formed.158 On this theory, basic actions are still the smallest units in which this ―stuff‖ takes on 
determinate form, and until the stuff has reached completion in a basic action, the proponent of the 
supplemented basic action theory must say that there is no determinate particular action to which 
one might refer. This latter thought is well expressed in Thompson (2008): 
…just as ―I baked a loaf of bread‖ entails ―There is or was a loaf of bread, x, such that I baked x,‖ so 
also ―I performed an act of baking a loaf of bread‖ must entail something on the order of ―There is or 
was an act of baking a loaf of bread, a, such that I performed a‖; and similarly, just as ―I was baking a 
loaf of bread‖ does not entail anything on the order of ―There is or was a loaf of bread, x, such that I 
was baking x,‖ so also ―I was performing an act of baking a loaf of bread‖ should not be supposed to 
entail anything on the order of ―There is or was an act of baking a loaf of bread, a, such that I was 
performing a‖159 
 
If Thompson is right, then we cannot attach a name to the developing deed as it develops, for ―it‖ is 
not complete as a deed yet. And there are reasons to think that there is something right in this 
thought. Consider the very first instant at which it is true to say that I am doing A intentionally. 
Suppose I am hit by an asteroid at that instant and vaporized. Intuitively at least, I need not even 
have braced myself to take a step (or to straighten my finger). There need be nothing in particular in 
which my doing A intentionally consists. Even if the proponent of the supplemented basic action 
theory does not grant this point, and supposes that there is some other kind of particular present, 
she will have to concede that there is no particular action (yet) at the first instant I am doing A 
intentionally. Perhaps the mind does squeeze out discrete particular chunks of more or less shapeless 
―practical-thought-dough‖ whilst there is processual expression of the will, but for the proponent of 
the supplemented basic action theory, basic actions are still the smallest ―loaves of the mind‖ that 
individual agents can bake. 
                                                 
158 Given my ignorance of physics, I‘m not sure how appropriate the analogy is, but we might say that the proposed 
supplementation of practical atomism is a ―quantum field theory‖ of intentional action, which does its work shoring up 
the foundations. Both Thompson and the proponent of the supplemented basic action theory will agree that that the 
original or fundamental expression of the will is imperfective in form. 
159 Thompson (2008: 136). 
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3.4.2 Mistakes in Performance are Particulars 
Mistakes in performance seem to belong to the logical category of particulars. When one makes a 
mistake in performance one does something determinate, complete and irrevocable that precludes 
perfection on that occasion and in that regard. Recall the example from Chapter 2: the baseball 
player‘s fumble consists in an inappropriate ordering of preparatory activity, such that she couldn‘t 
bring her hand up in time to catch the ball. Mistakes in performance need to be in the logical 
category of particulars so we can refer to their features to explain why they preclude perfection on 
that occasion and in that regard.  
 The sense of irrevocable completion that attaches to mistakes in performance is not the 
same as that which attaches to perfect expressions of the will (i.e. intentional actions). But it is 
intuitively plausible that it is a kind of completion: the bad kind. The bad kind of completion exhibits 
systematic similarities with the temporality of intentional actions. An ordinary intentional action isn‘t 
complete until the agent has done the thing in question. We might express this by saying that in the 
normal case of successful action the agent is doing A intentionally until it is impossible for her to 
fail, at which point she has done A intentionally. (The sense of ‗impossible‘ here is temporal 
impossibility.) She might not know that she has done A intentionally, but that is beside the point. 
Similarly, whilst it is still possible to succeed, no irrevocable mistake has yet been made either. One 
makes a mistake in performance when one closes off the possibilities for success on that occasion 
and in that regard. For example, the shopper who has margarine in her cart instead of butter has 
made a local mistake, relative to a local intention: that is now an event that is part of history. But it 
need not be damning, relative to her overall goal. She can check the contents of her cart before 
going through the checkout register, thereby rescuing the performance overall from disaster, and 
turning what otherwise would have been a mistake (relative to the larger project, not the smaller one, 
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which is forever damned) into a perfect expression of the will. To express the various intuitions at 
work here, let us say that mistakes in performance are ―deformed particulars‖. An adequate theory 
of intentional action would explain why the will‘s normatively imperfect expressions are particulars, 
while its grammatically imperfect expression in doing A intentionally doesn‘t exhibit particularity.  
 Can we explain why mistakes in performance are particulars by treating their particularity as 
parasitic on the particularity of intentional action? Davidson argues that all mistakes are actions that 
are intentional under one description but unintentional under another. His example is a naval officer 
who sinks the Bismarck, thinking it is the Tirpitz.160 Davidson‘s treatment of mistakes will only work 
for mistakes that exploit constitutive means to ends and are partly explicable by false belief about 
those constitutive relations. There is some plausibility to the analysis of the given case: the agent did 
one thing perfectly well (sinking that ship over there), even if she thereby precluded doing what she 
intended to do (we may presume it was her last torpedo). But if there are basic mistakes in 
performance, then there are non-parasitic deformed particular expressions of the will, and their 
particularity will need separate treatment. And given that there are basic actions, we should expect 
there to be such basic mistakes. 
3.4.3 Basic Mistakes in Performance 
When Anscombe stubs her thumb on the phone machine, rather than pressing the button that 
would return her coins, she fails to do something she had in mind to do, through no external or 
internal interference, and without having any relevant false beliefs about where her thumb was, 
                                                 
160 Davidson (2001: 46). 
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where the button is, and so on.161 Let us say that this is a basic mistake in performance: a 
normatively-imperfect expression of the will that is not explicable in terms of the unintended results 
of some perfect expression of the will (such as a basic action). I take it that the category of a basic 
mistake is an intuitively plausible one. Stubbing one‘s thumb is not at all like causal deviance: it may 
be perfectly ordinary in its causal history and articulation. Stubbing one‘s thumb is not at all like 
cases where paralysis or convulsion interferes with one‘s normal exercise of one‘s powers, or when 
one‘s rival chops off one‘s finger. To countenance basic mistakes as imperfect expressions of the 
will is just to make the ordinary point that there is such a thing as clumsiness or lack of grace, and 
clumsiness is not a case of convulsion, ignorance, interruption, theoretical error, bad reasoning, or 
bizarre (causally deviant) coincidence. It might be embarrassing to admit, but the will can express 
itself in something that is both immediate and graceless. Shit happens.162 
Basic mistakes in performance, like mistakes in performance generally, seem to be 
particulars. Now that Anscombe has stubbed her thumb, she must try again to press Button A. 
Presumably she will be more careful on the next attempt, and will adjust her technique accordingly. 
The sense in which Anscombe has tried once (and failed) to press Button A isn‘t the only sense of 
‗trying‘ that is in play in the example. Presuming that she hasn‘t changed her mind about how to get 
her money back (as she would, were she to pull out her crowbar and smash the thing) there is a 
different sense in which she is still trying to press Button A, and may do so on the second 
(presumably more careful) attempt. Similarly, whether or not she changes means midstream, she is 
still trying to get her money back, and so long as she does not do something that precludes the 
                                                 
161 Anscombe‘s own case was pressing Button B, not stubbing her thumb. This is an irrevocable mistake that is more 
obviously irrevocable than stubbing one‘s thumb. On the old phone machines in the United Kingdom at the time, 
pressing Button B instead of Button A would ensure that you didn‘t get your money back. Thanks to John McDowell 
for educating me as to how the phone machines used to work.  
162 Or, perhaps more precisely, turds happen. 
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possibility of success, she may well succeed in getting her money back, all in one and the same 
performance, regardless of the fact that the overarching performance started so inauspiciously.163 
I don‘t think that the supplemented basic action theory can account for the sense in which 
Anscombe, having stubbed her thumb, has to try again to do something she had in mind to do. For 
according to the supplemented basic action theory, no basic action has yet taken place, and basic 
actions are the only relevant countable that the basic actions theorist countenances. The 
supplemented basic action theorist can of course account for the second kind of trying, according to 
which Anscombe is still trying to press Button A, by saying that it is processual expression of the 
will. But that is not what we are after: we are after an account of the deformed particularity 
characteristic of basic mistakes, which is exhibited in the first kind of trying. 
On this point, the fallible capacity theory of intentional agency is on stronger ground than 
the supplemented basic action theory. The concepts of an occasion and regard are built into the 
definition of normatively-imperfect exercises of fallible capacities. When it comes to intentional 
agency, what determines the occasion and regard is what the agent has in mind to do. And what the 
agent has in mind to do may come in many forms and many individually different articulations. 
Sometimes, it comes in the kind of form that delimits a small action like pressing Button A, such 
that if Anscombe stubs her thumb, she has precluded doing what she had in mind to do and must 
try again, if she still wants to pursue that kind of means to the end.164  
                                                 
163 There is another kind of case. Consider the braggart trying to impress a girl by hitting the button to get his money 
back without looking at the button and instead looking the girl in the eye the whole time. (To make the example 
plausible, we must suppose the braggart is also a bit of a fool.) When the braggart misses, he need not be still trying to get 
his money back. Now (embarrassed) he might try to, scrabbling with the machine as required, but there is a clear sense in 
which this could be a new project that he did not have in mind before. 
164 I suspect that the concept of continuity is important here. Thompson (2008: 141) says that the progressive has a use ‗in 
hiatus‘ where one can be playing poker intentionally even whilst one is, at that moment, not handling or thinking about 
cards, but getting a cup of coffee whilst waiting for the next deal. If Thompson means to imply that nothing is going on 
in the service of the end of poker playing during this time then he is mistaken: waiting is going on. There are some 
instrumental orders that cannot include waiting for the appropriate cues as proper parts, given what one has in mind to 
do. Consider tiptoeing to the end of the catwalk in one graceful continuous motion, for example. Any interruption here 
(e.g. to get a cup of coffee from somewhere off the catwalk) marks a break in that kind of activity and failure to do what 
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I should make clear that the sense of ‗trying‘ in which Anscombe has already tried once (and 
failed) to press Button A can be slippery and difficult to sort out in individual cases. It is easy to tell 
what counts as an attempt at the Olympics; matters have been regimented for us. But when an agent 
is groping around for a light switch in the dark, there doesn‘t seem to be much in the nature of the 
case, beyond the agent‘s judgment of what she is doing and has done, to help us decide e.g. whether 
she has failed three times to hit the light switch and is now on her fourth flailing attempt, or whether 
she is still groping for the switch such that she hasn‘t (yet) failed to do anything she has in mind to do. 
But the fallible capacity theory of agency can make a virtue of this slipperiness in individual cases: 
the differences follow from the individual agent‘s practical conception of the case (and perhaps the 
instrumental order inscribed in her skills, where the supposed elements of that order must be 
available to practical awareness if they are actually present in the deed). 
3.4.4 A Final Objection: How Could Basic Mistakes Be Mistakes? 
In Chapter 2 I said that all mistakes consist in an inadequate or inappropriate ordering of activity, in 
a suitably broad sense of activity. This may prompt the objection that basic mistakes in performance 
cannot be mistakes, in the sense I described in Chapter 2, for they do not consist in ordered activity; 
they are rather things one just does, and does wrong. 
 I do not think that this objection, even if a good one, is harmful to the overall theory of 
fallible capacities outlined in Chapter 2. If necessary, I could give up the claim that all mistakes 
consist in an inadequate or inappropriate ordering of activity, in a suitably broad sense of activity, 
                                                                                                                                                             
one had in mind to do. In the case of Anscombe stubbing her thumb, it is tempting to suppose that if it is a basic 
mistake (and it need not be), then it is because some similar concept is deployed that doesn‘t tolerate the kind of 
interruption or waiting that poker playing does tolerate. I won‘t develop the thought here, beyond pointing out how it is 
parallel to the conceptual articulation of kinds of continuous activity bound by limits described towards the end of §3.3.3. 
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and say instead that most of them do. But I think there is reason to retain the claim, and a simple 
way to do so. 
 The solution to the objection is prompted by simple-minded reflection on what Anscombe 
did wrong when she stubbed her thumb. The natural criticism of what she did wrong is expressed in 
sentences along the following lines: ―You missed it, pay attention!‖; ―Be more careful next time!‖; 
―Slow down!‖ and so on. And when Anscombe tries again, she adjusts her technique by e.g. paying 
more attention, being more careful, and slowing down. With her adjusted technique, there is no 
mistake and no problem. It would be amazing if, focusing all her powers on the case at hand, 
including her power to take her sweet time, she nevertheless missed Button A. 
 Attending to what’s important, as required by the case at hand given the circumstances in 
which one acts, and adjusting the ordering of one‘s activity as appropriate, is a learned skill or 
technique in the sense outlined in §3.3.3. This kind of skilful adjustment of one‘s activity to what‘s 
required in the circumstances is continual: whilst alive, we don‘t take breaks from it, except perhaps 
when incapacitated (as the word suggests). Often little attention or care is required, given the nature 
of the case and the other complicated skills one has internalized. (There are some things one can do 
intentionally whilst literally asleep, and only one of them is sleeping.) But sometimes more attention 
or care or time is required than is given, in such a way that a mistake is made, and perfection 
precluded. This is particularly obvious when it comes to omissions, like forgetting to put the salt in the 
soup. One precludes perfection in such a case because one doesn‘t figure routines for checking one‘s 
memory and progress into one‘s routine and progress: one did not reflect, in a quiet moment, on 
what steps would be required, nor did one go slowly, checking as one went along, nor did one 
consult the cookbook. The temporal bounds of the agent‘s ordered activities that are relevant to 
putting the salt in start well before the stage in the recipe when salt is called for.  
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Usually one doesn‘t care very much about these careless mistakes, because there are more 
important things in life than being careful and bothering oneself with every little detail, or 
regimenting every aspect of one‘s life, especially if one‘s skills are such that most of the time the 
soup is appropriately salty. But sometimes – particularly when internalizing new skills – these 
mistakes are of great importance. 
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